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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
A large variety of labor market institutions
1
 (e.g., Freeman, 2008) and vocational education 
and training (VET) systems (e.g., Grugulis, 2008) exists in different countries, interacting 
with each other and influencing the behavior of companies by shaping the environment in 
which companies operate. The aim of this thesis is to fruitfully use the variety of both VET 
systems and labor market institutions to identify and analyze their individual and combined 
effects on companies’ personnel and organizational strategies.2 From the company 
perspective, we investigate how companies recruit, promote, and organize in different 
educational and institutional settings. 
 We gathered data on matched-pair engineering and retailing companies in five 
countries on three continents: Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. Chapter 2 
describes the research design and provides an overview of the VET systems and labor market 
institutions in the five countries included in this thesis.  
  To analyze personnel strategies, we investigate how companies fill vacancies at the 
level of skilled employees in production. In chapter 3, we analyze the extent to which 
matched-pair engineering companies in Germany and Switzerland, which produce similar 
products and therefore have similar skill requirements, use their apprenticeship graduates to 
fill vacancies for skilled production employees. Given the similarities of the dual 
apprenticeship systems in Germany and Switzerland, we find an empirical puzzle: Swiss 
companies use their apprenticeship graduates to a much smaller extent and instead show a 
                                                 
1
 The definitions of “institution” are manifold and dependent on the research field. Following the 
contemporary practice in political economy, we include organizations both defined as endurable 
entities with their rules and formally recognized members (North, 1990: 3; Hall & Soskice, 2001: 9) 
and their relationship with each other (e.g., in case of social partnership; Wolter & Ryan, 2011). 
2
 Of course, the state also plays a role by influencing vocational education (e.g., via training laws), 
labor market institutions (e.g., by participating in wage negotiations, as it was the case e.g., in some 
Scandinavian countries), and company behavior (e.g., via taxes). However, the focus of this thesis is 
the direct effect of VET systems and labor market institutions on the behavior of companies in 
personnel and organizational issues, not on preliminary questions such as why certain kinds of VET 
systems or institutions exist or whether a company has chosen to produce in a country due to tax 
advantages. The analysis of these questions is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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higher share of external recruitment. The observation that personnel strategies for filling 
vacancies for skilled employees with apprenticeship graduates differ so dramatically is 
surprising—especially in engineering occupations, which are also associated with net training 
costs in Switzerland—and has been neglected by previous research. Therefore, the first 
innovative contribution of this thesis is the identification and analysis of this empirical puzzle. 
The results show that labor market institutions are responsible for comparatively lower 
training costs in Switzerland than in Germany, thus reducing the necessity of retaining all 
apprentices to cover training costs. Since the occupational labor market is more volatile, 
Swiss companies do not wait until their apprentices graduate; instead they fill their vacancies 
as they arise which is possible as employee representation and collective bargaining 
agreements do not push for a high takeover rate of apprentices, as it is the case in Germany. A 
low level of employment protection in Switzerland suits the stronger external recruitment 
strategy. 
 After emphasizing the role of labor market institutions on personnel strategy at the 
level of skilled production employees, in chapter 4, we analyze whether labor market 
institutions and VET systems cause different patterns of internal promotion to the supervisory 
level. Despite the valuable insights of previous literature, little empirical evidence has 
examined within- and between-country differences in companies’ promotion patterns. 
Therefore, the second innovative contribution of this thesis is its analysis of why companies’ 
shares of internal promotions to the supervisory level are much more prominent in some 
economies than in others. To address the research question, we develop an analytical matrix 
by combining economic and institutional literature. The results show that the type of VET and 
the type of labor market institutions have separate effects on internal labor markets, as 
measured by the percentage of internal promotions to the supervisory level. While companies 
that provide company-specific and non-certified VET show a higher percentage of internal 
promotion than their counterparts with occupation-specific and certified VET, companies that 
act in more coordinated labor market institutions show a higher percentage of internal 
promotion than their counterparts that operate in more liberal labor market institutions. 
Therefore, those companies, in which both dimensions—VET and labor market institutions—
reinforce each other’s effect on internal labor markets, constitute “complementary” cases, as 
is the case Japan and Switzerland. In contrast, those companies, in which VET and labor 
market institutions weaken each other’s effect on internal promotion constitute “mixed” cases, 
as is the case in German and U.S. These results contrast—at least regarding internal 
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promotion patterns—with previous literature that stresses the strong complementarities of 
VET and labor market institutions in Germany and the U.S. (e.g., Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
 Following the analysis of the effect of labor market institutions and VET systems on 
companies’ personnel strategies in terms of recruitment and promotion, we finally focus on 
companies’ organizational strategies in chapter 5. Given that the German combination of VET 
in the form of dual apprenticeship training and labor market institutions that support internal 
labor markets creates a competitive advantage for engineering companies, the question arises 
how matched-pair companies adapt to national institutional settings that are less favorable and 
less coherent, such as those in Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. The third innovative 
contribution of this thesis is the analysis of this question with a set-theoretic analysis of VET 
and labor market institutions at the company level. We find that matched-pair engineering 
companies differ substantially in their span of control of production supervisors depending on 
the national-level institutional variables. In Germany, companies build a consistent cluster 
with a broad span of control; in the U.S., companies build a consistent cluster with a narrow 
span of control. In the less coherent countries, such as Switzerland and the UK, we find 
companies that have a broad and companies that have a narrow span of control. By measuring 
company-level institutions, which are functionally equivalent to the institutions at the national 
level, we are able to identify different institutional configurations also within countries and to 
link these company-level institutional configurations to the span of control.  
In the final chapter, we synthesize the results and draw conclusions and implications 
for companies and policy makers.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
Research design and context information 
 
 
Before analyzing the effects of vocational education and training (VET) systems and labor 
market institutions on the personnel strategies and organizational structures of companies, a 
brief description of the research design and the general context is appropriate. Therefore, the 
first section explains the motivation and necessity for the collection of the dataset that the 
author collected with colleagues from Germany (Prof. Dr. Karin Wagner), Japan (Prof. Dr. 
Shiho Futagami), Switzerland (Prof. Dr. Uschi Backes-Gellner), and the UK (Prof. Dr. Paul 
Ryan). The second section presents the research approach, shows the general context of the 
research project, and describes the choice of countries, regions, sectors, and companies. The 
third section outlines the countries’ (vocational) education systems, shows the dominant 
forms and institutions of vocational skill provision, and provides some stylized facts on 
selected labor market institutions.  
 
2.1 Dataset and research design 
2.1.1 Problems of existing datasets 
To analyze research questions concerning the effects of VET and labor market institutions on 
organizational and personnel strategies, such as recruitment and promotion decisions, detailed 
internationally comparable data at the company level on the type of VET and the shape of 
labor market institutions, such as employee representation or union coverage, are necessary. 
However, only few internationally comparable company data exist. Although the number of 
datasets within countries increases, the possibilities to use them for international comparisons 
of company issues are limited due to manifold problems (Backes-Gellner, Böck & Wienecke, 
1994; Strauss, 1998).  
First, the official definitions and measurements of the subjects of the examination 
differ significantly among countries. These significant differences apply to variables such as 
union density. Visser (2006) shows, for example, how different selections of the employment 
base can lead to significantly different rates of union density. Additionally, because the time 
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of the survey and its intermittency differ among the national datasets, the comparability of the 
data is decreased.  
Second, most international comparative data on, for instance, industrial relations such 
as union coverage, works councils, and employer coordination are only available at the 
national level. Although the data provide valuable insights, the institutions measured are not 
evenly spread over all the sectors and companies within a country. Therefore, the high level of 
aggregation impedes a detailed analysis of the effect of, for example, works councils on 
company-level personnel strategies in an international comparison. Furthermore, nation-
specific datasets suffer from the limitation of a low level of detail. Questions concerning 
whether the company is covered by a collective bargaining agreement capture a general 
picture; however, they disregard important details such as the hierarchical levels which are 
covered by wage negotiations or the degree of employment protection associated with the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Third, the meaning of seemingly functional equivalents, such as employee 
representation or collective bargaining agreements are context-specific and therefore have 
different functions and consequences in different countries. Employee representation varies 
significantly in its degree of influence depending on national regulations. Although trainees 
exist in all countries, their legal status, however, may vary significantly (Ryan, 2011), which 
has important consequences for their wages and for the company’s managerial scope. 
Additionally, industry-wide collective bargaining agreements may exist in numerous 
countries; however, their influence on wage coordination may differ to a large extent 
depending on the inclusion of wages in the agreements, which may differ from sector to 
sector. Furthermore, functional equivalents at the company level need to be identified. 
Although labor market institutions at the national level, such as low employment protection, 
reduces the employees’ incentives to invest in company-specific knowledge and to strive for 
an internal career, companies may succeed in establishing career paths that create functionally 
equivalent strong internal labor markets. Therefore, the country-, sector-, and company-
specific contexts must be taken into account.   
 
2.1.2 Field research and research method 
Given the difficulties associated with existing data, we—a research team consisting of five 
researchers in Switzerland, the U.K., Germany, and Japan—specifically gathered data to 
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overcome the three previously described problems
3
, namely, comparability by consistent 
definitions, company-level measurement of relevant variables, and the identification of 
functional equivalents.  
First, by using consistent definitions and measurements, we ensured comparability, 
which is the main problem with official statistics. Second, we measured all the variables at the 
company level. We gathered information on employee representation, VET within the 
company, collective bargaining agreements, and the content and coverage of the agreements, 
among other variables. Therefore, we are not dependent on national indices but can directly 
identify any relationships between personnel and organizational strategies, and VET and labor 
market institutions. Third, as the meaning of some variables, such as “employee 
representation”, “collective bargaining agreements”, or “trainee”, may be context-specific, we 
had, for the construction of the questionnaire for each country (except the U.S.), a “home 
researcher” on the team. To further ensure that we had the meaning and the functional 
equivalent correct, we did not send out questionnaires but, instead, went personally to the 
companies and interviewed them (for more information on that issue, see Withfield, 
Delbridge & Brown, 1998). In addition, we identified company-level functional equivalents, 
such as “internal labor markets”, of national-level institutions, such as “employment 
protection.” Our specifically collected data set allowed us to analyze our research questions. 
In general, different research methods exist to conduct international comparative 
research (for an overview, see, e.g., Whitfield & Strauss, 1998
4
). As we aimed to collect 
qualitative and context-specific details (allowing an in-depth analysis) and to ensure, at the 
same time, a higher generalizability than a single case study (Strauss, 1998), we chose to 
conduct a comparatively large number of case studies. More precisely, we employed a 
matched-pair research design, as previously used in management, strategy, and comparative 
studies (e.g., Chaganti et al., 2008; Backes-Gellner, 1996
5
).  
The selection of cases in this method is not random because companies are matched 
along certain criteria, such as size or industry. The main advantage of establishing these 
quasi-experimental conditions (Schnatterly, 2003) is to keep the matching characteristics, in 
                                                 
3
 The high share of field research via questionnaires or case studies in international comparative HRM 
studies reflects the lack of international comparable company-based datasets (see overview article of 
Clark, Gospel & Montgomery, 1999, Table 4). 
4
 Arrayed on a continuum, case studies are the most detailed and fine-graded methods, while database 
research is coarse-grained and builds the other end of the continuum (O’Farrell & Hitchins, 1988). 
5
 See also Steedman & Wagner, 1987; Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986; Hitchens & O’Farrell, 1988, 
1987; Teece, 1981; Maurice, Sorge & Warner, 1980. 
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our case, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, constant and, thus, to rule them out 
as explanations for any variations found in the relevant outcome variables, in our case, 
personnel and organizational strategies (Strauss, 1998). Instead, the method allows focusing 
on the differences in the other variables as possible explanations, in our case, different VET 
systems  and labor market institutions. 
In contrast to the extensive literature describing the fact that VET systems and labor 
market institutions vary among countries (e.g., Bamber & Lansbury, 1993; Ferner & Hyman, 
1992; Bosch & Charest, 2010), the aim of this thesis is to analyze the effects of these 
variations on company behavior. Therefore, the levels of analysis in the following chapters 
are not countries but companies where educational and labor market institutions have their 
most important impacts (Withfield, Delbridge & Brown, 1998). The matched-pair approach is 
perfectly suited for an analysis of company-level issues, such as personnel strategies or the 
organizational structure, and their interactions with macro-level institutional factors, such as 
country-specific labor market institutions
6
 such as employment protection (O’Farrell & 
Hitchins, 1988). In addition, the collection of several case studies within the same country 
allows revealing the previously mentioned within-country differences.  
The following section explains why certain sectors and countries have been chosen for 
the company-level analysis and presents the criteria with which matched-pairs have been 
identified.  
 
2.1.3  Sector and country choice 
The choice of countries and sectors was driven by the research goals, which were threefold. In 
addition to the personnel and organizational strategies discussed in the introduction, the 
setting and effects of apprentice pay, and the implications of corporate ownership and finance 
on training have been the primary focus of the analysis. To investigate these questions, 
variations in skill requirements, VET, and labor market institutions were necessary, leading to 
a specific choice of sectors and countries.  
With engineering and retailing, we included not only two economically important 
sectors, but also different “production” processes and technologies and, therefore, skill 
requirements. While companies in the engineering sector rely heavily on firm-specific 
                                                 
6
 “The approach permits one to analyze micro influences—such as the internal division of labor within 
the plant—and their interaction with macro ones—such as conditions in local labor markets, national 
and regional training patterns, and so on” (O’Farrell & Hitchins, 1988: 68). 
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knowledge in their production areas, companies in the retailing sector depend, for their 
services, largely on general skills, such as basic communication and mathematical knowledge. 
 Furthermore, VET in general, and apprenticeship training in particular, differ in their 
history and importance as sources of skills in these two sectors. While the engineering sector 
has historically been the core of apprenticeship training and has mainly influenced its 
development and design, the recently growing service sector has been historically less 
involved in the shaping of apprenticeship training (Thelen, 2004; Gonon, 2009). Various 
authors argue that the service sector derives less competitive advantage from apprenticeship 
training than the engineering sector, a fact that is reflected in the comparatively lower 
apprenticeship ratios (Culpepper, 1999; Thelen, 2007; Werner, 2005). Due to the previously 
mentioned differing characteristics, these two sectors have been of interest in various 
comparative research projects (e.g., Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986; Carré, Tilly, von 
Klaveren & von Dahm, 2010
7
). In addition, we can expect that consistent results for both 
engineering and retailing are generally valid and independent of a particular case selection. 
To create variation in VET and labor market institutions, we chose five countries, 
Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S., that differ significantly in these two 
dimensions (for further details on variations, see 2.2). The data for the European countries 
were gathered during the period from April 2008 to May 2009 (Ryan et al., 2011). The data 
from the U.S. and Japan were gathered from May 2009 to May 2010.  
Due to the extended time for data collection, the problem arose that the international 
financial crisis, which hit companies all over the world and in all sectors
8
, occurred during the 
interview period. Therefore, we cannot eliminate the possibility that our data (e.g., the intake 
figures of trainees) are biased in the light of the deteriorating economic context, especially as 
the companies in Japan and the U.S. were evaluated later. However, many of the questions on 
recruitment strategies aimed not only at current figures, but also at the usual practice of the 
company. These more general questions should at least smooth economic fluctuations and 
reduce the possible bias caused by the time of the interview. 
Within the five countries, we focused on different regions, namely, Berlin, the Ruhr, 
Baden-Württemberg, and Hamburg, with an additional case in Bavaria in Germany, the Kantō 
region in Japan, German-speaking cantons in Switzerland, England in the UK, and the East 
                                                 
7
 See also Dore, 1973; Maurice, Sorge & Warner, 1980. 
8
 Between the end of the second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, the GDP fell in all 
five countries (-5.5% in Germany, -7.0% in Japan, -3.2% in Switzerland, -5.9% in the U.K, and -4.1% 
in the U.S.) while it increased again until the second quarter of 2010 (3.9% Germany, 3.3% in Japan, 
2.8% Switzerland, 1.6% in the U.K, and 3.0% in the U.S., OECD, 2011). 
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Coast of the U.S. (geographically clustered in the “rust belt” between Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania, and the area around Buffalo). By the regional diversification, we cover a broad 
range of companies within a country, thus ensuring that the results are not biased by region-
specific conditions.  
To reduce heterogeneity within the broad sectors of engineering and retailing and to 
apply the matched-pair approach, we used the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
as primary matching criteria, organizing industries according to similarities in products, 
services, and production and delivery systems. We used the highest detail level available (4-
digit SICs) to ensure the best product and production match possible. The final choice of 
sectors was determined mainly by the economic structures in the five countries. The database 
provided by Dun & Bradstreet gave an overview of the presence and size of companies in 
different engineering and retailing subsectors, and we therefore used that dataset for the 
company identification in all the countries but Germany, where we employed various German 
sources, including the directory “Wer Liefert Was.” To further ensure a good match, we asked 
the companies for their main competitors within and outside the country. This approach 
proved to be very successful and allowed, for example, for the covering of all the main 
players on the U.S. East Coast. With this sampling policy, “leading” companies may be over-
represented in our sample. However, because matching pairs is more important given our 
approach and our research questions, this over-representation does not cause major problems 
for the international comparison. 
For engineering, we selected the pump and turbine subsectors; for retailing, we chose 
department stores, stores selling shoes, electronic devices, groceries, and furniture. The 
limited number of the engineering companies willing to participate in the study led to the 
inclusion of two additional subsectors, compressors and aero engines, whose skill 
requirements resemble the pump and turbine companies to a great extent. Compressors have a 
SIC code close to that of pumps, and the UK aircraft engine company also produces air gas 
turbines, which are quite similar to the other turbines in our sample
9
. Table 2-1 shows the 
distribution of participating establishments by SIC code. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 To also include companies in Germany that are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, we 
interviewed companies from the electronic components subsector. As the production processes and the 
associated skill requirements of the electronic component companies differed, we excluded these 
companies from the analyses of the following chapters. 
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Table 2-1: Number of participating establishments by sector (SIC 1987) 
Sector Subsector SIC 1987 UK GER CH JPN USA All
Engineering Pumps and pumping equipment 3561 4 4 4 2 4 18
Turbines and turbine generator sets 3511 1 2 2 3 2 10
Air and gas compressors 3563 0 0 1 1 0 2
Aircraft engines and parts 3724 1 0 0 0 0 1
All engineering subsectors 6 6 7 6 6 31
Retailing Department stores 5311 4 2 3 1 3 13
Grocery stores 5411 3 3 2 3 2 13
Shoe stores 5661 1 2 2 1 1 7
Furniture stores 5712 1 1 1 0 1 4
Radio, TV and electronics stores 5731 1 2 2 0 2 7
All retailing subsectors 10 10 10 5 9 44
Both 16 16 17 11 15 75  
Source: UK, GER, and CH, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 1; JPN and the U.S. own fieldwork
10
  
 
The subsectors have varying importance for the countries’ economies regarding their share of 
employment (Table 2-2). While Dun and Bradstreet uses 1987 SIC classifications, we had to 
choose the 2003 SIC 4-digit codes closest to the interviewed establishments to obtain 
international figures on employment. Our engineering subsectors in Switzerland, the UK and 
the U.S. show similar employment shares of approximately 0.15% (Table 2-2, row 4). The 
share in Germany is twice as high, while the share in Japan is the highest with 1.16%. The 
general figures for the engineering sector (Table 2-2, row 1) reflect the shrunken importance 
of that sector in the UK and the U.S., compared to the other three countries. The employment 
share of retailing in general is, in all countries, greater than that of engineering (Table 2-2, 
row 5). Japan, the UK, and the U.S. have clearly higher employment shares in the retailing 
sector than the continental European countries. Our five retailing subsectors have the lowest 
employment share in Switzerland with 2.8%, followed by Germany and Japan. The U.S. and 
the UK both show a share of more than 5%. 
 
                                                 
10
 Table does not include 8 company interviews from the electronic components subsector. 
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Table 2-2: Employment by country and sector (SIC 2003) 
Sector SIC UK
a
GER CH JPN USA UK
a
GER CH JPN USA
2007 2007 2005 2007 2008 2007 2007 2005 2007 2008
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 242.6 1,005.1 99.0 4,014.6 1,149.6 1.05 2.90 2.20 6.52 0.95
Engines and Turbines 29.11 14.5 34.3 0.8 n.a. 109.9 0.06 0.10 0.02 n.a. 0.09
Pumps and Compressors 29.12 20.3 70.9 4.4 713.1 62.2 0.09 0.20 0.10 1.16 0.05
All subsectors 34.8 105.2 5.2 713.1 172.1 0.15 0.30 0.12 1.16 0.14
Retail trade 52.1-52.6 2,372.6 2,519.1 347.4 7,651.4 15,614.7 10.28 7.26 7.73 12.44 12.91
Non-specialised stores  (non-food) 52.12 197.2 165.7 22.5 550.5 2,977.4 0.85 0.48 0.50 0.90 2.00
Non-specialised stores  (food) 52.11 850.0 702.7 64.9 996.0 2,570.7 3.68 2.02 1.44 1.62 2.13
Footwear and leather goods 52.43 49.4 78.1 8.8 43.7 208.2 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.07 0.17
Furniture and related 52.44 98.9 140.8 12.5 103.8 252.5 0.43 0.41 0.28 0.17 0.21
Electrical appliances, radio, TV 52.45 57.0 80.9 15.5 1,077.1 294.5 0.25 0.23 0.34 0.46 0.24
All subsectors 1,252.5 1,168.2 124.1 2,771.1 6,303.3 5.43 3.37 2.76 4.50 5.21
Whole economy 01-99 23,072.9 34,714.0 4,493.0 61,573.6 120,903.6 100 100 100 100 100
Number ('000) Share (%)
 
Source: UK, GER, and CH, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 3; JPN and the U.S. own fieldwork  
Additional sources:  
Japan: Statistic Bureau & Statistical Research and Training Institute Japan, Employment Status Survey 2007 (平成19年 労働力調査年報), 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/report/2007/ft/index.htm, Japan Standard Industrial Classification (JSIC),  
USA: US Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Businesses, http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/, North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
a. England only 
 
 21 
 
Additionally to the industry and product as matching criteria, we aimed for similar sizes of the 
companies (Table 2-3). For the engineering sector, all our data refer to a particular production 
plant. For the retailing sector, we contacted both single stores (department stores, large 
supermarkets) and (regional) headquarters. Therefore, we have a mixed size picture in 
retailing because we included partly single larger stores and partly aggregations of stores at 
the regional or national level. This explains the differences in the retailing size classes among 
the countries (Table 2-3). However, also in those companies where the unit is the entire 
company, we gathered information at the level of the stores themselves. In the following 
paragraphs, we use company as a synonym for plant and store. 
 
Table 2-3: Distribution of company size (measured as number of employees) in engineering 
and retailing 
Sector
Size class small medium large sum small medium large sum
Number of employees N<50 49<N<250 N>249 N<50 49<N<250 N>249
0 1 5 6 1 2 7 10
0 0 6 6 1 2 7 10
1 3 3 7 2 1 7 10
0 0 5a 5 0 0 5 5
0 4 2 6 2 4 3 9
retailing
JPN
engineering
UK
GER
CH
USA  
Data source: UK, GER, and CH, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 4; JPN and the U.S. own fieldwork
11
  
Note: 
a
 one company in Japan did not provide the information on size 
 
As far as possible, we matched companies according to their size class (Table 2-3). Using the 
EU classification (European Commission, 2005), the sample includes 50 large companies 
with 250 or more employees (13 in the UK, 13 in Germany, 10 in Switzerland, 10 in Japan, 
and 5 in the U.S.), 17 medium-sized companies between 50 and 249 employees (3 in the UK, 
2 in Germany, 4 in Switzerland, 0 in Japan, and 8 in the U.S.), and 7 small companies with 
less than 50 employees (1 in the UK, 1 in Germany, 3 in Switzerland, and 2 in the U.S.). The 
size differences between the countries were partly related to the kind of access to the 
companies. In Japan, for example, we were supported by an employers’ association, which 
represents mainly large companies (see section 2.1.4)
12
. 
We are aware of the problem that, at least in some country combinations, the fit 
between the size classes is not perfect (e.g., solely large engineering companies in Japan 
compared to three large examples in Switzerland). However, these problems are not 
                                                 
11
 Table does not include 8 company interviews from the electronic components subsector. 
12
 Furthermore, Swiss companies are generally smaller; approximately 97% of all the Swiss companies 
fall into the smallest category (BFS, 2009). 
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exceptional given this kind of approach, as other matched-pair studies have had difficulties in 
identifying exact matches (e.g., Maurice, Sorge & Warner, 1980; Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 
1986). To avoid matching errors, Peck (1985) argues that the matching criteria need to be 
measurable and sufficiently unambiguous, as it is the case in this study when we use SIC 
codes. However, the criteria also need a certain breadth to allow matching, as matched-pairs 
are not identical pairs. Therefore, we argue that our sample of matched-pairs meets the 
criteria.  
In the following section, we describe the difficulty of accessing companies in the five 
countries, the kinds of access strategies we used, and the hierarchical levels of our interview 
partners. 
   
2.1.4 Contacting of companies, response rate, and interview details 
After identifying the companies as previously described via their SIC codes or after they were 
mentioned as main competitors by their counterparts in the same country or in one of the 
other countries, we contacted the companies via channels that proved most appropriate for the 
specific country.  
Usually a combination of a contact letter and a follow-up telephone call was sufficient 
to convince companies in Germany, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. to participate. In 
Japan, we made use of the Kanagawa-ken employers’ association. Without such personal 
intermediation, access to Japanese companies is nearly impossible. In addition, gaining access 
to U.S. retail companies turned out to be extremely difficult, as the companies were extremely 
reluctant to give any information to outsiders. After several unsuccessful contact attempts 
both at the headquarters and at shop level via letters, telephone calls, and even newsletters of 
local and national retail associations, we went directly to the stores and asked the managers 
for an interview, which proved to be the most successful strategy.  
The varying degrees of willingness by the companies to cooperate in the study are 
reflected in the participation rate
13
. Switzerland has the highest participation rate with 79% 
(19 out of 24), followed by Germany with 60% (18 out of 30), and England with 43% (19 out 
of 44). The U.S. participation rate was 42% (6 out of 14) in engineering and 32% (9 out of 28) 
in retailing. Though the personal intermediation of the Japanese employers’ association was 
helpful, we had a participation rate of only 40% (12 out of 30).  
                                                 
13
 Participation rates include the 8 company interviews from the electronic components subsector.  
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While the U.S. retail managers granted us, at most, 30 minutes of their time, the other 
company visits lasted between 1 hour and 3 hours (Ryan et al., 2011) including in almost all 
of our engineering cases a site visit after the interview. While the interview language was 
generally in the mother tongue of the interviewee, we occasionally used English when the 
interviewee felt capable of answering in that language. Most of the interviews were conducted 
by two or three research team members. A member of the company’s own country (“home 
researcher”) was always present, with the exception of the U.S. cases.  
 The interview partners were one or more managers, usually personnel managers 
(sometimes specialized on training issues) and plant or store managers. In addition to the data 
gathered during the interview and by a two-page pre-questionnaire on key statistical data, we 
collected information from the company’s website and/or the (financial) press. In case the 
interviewees could not answer all questions during the interview or did not complete the pre-
questionnaire, subsequent follow-up inquiries were conducted by telephone and by mail. 
During one of our U.S. company visits, we also had the opportunity to talk to various 
production workers and union officials. However, due to the already low participation rate, 
we did not systematically extend our research to employee representatives. We further 
explicitly guaranteed to treat all information confidentially. 
In addition to the company visits, we interviewed the major players associated with 
apprenticeship training and labor market institutions relevant for this study. In the European 
countries with apprenticeship training we talked to the employers’ associations and trade 
unions responsible for the engineering and retailing sectors. In addition, we interviewed a 
cantonal office and different engineering training centers
14
 in Switzerland and, as a 
comparison, a German private engineering training center. In the U.S., we additionally talked 
to two experts in the field of educational systems and apprenticeship research. Overall, we 
conducted background interviews in addition to 75 company interviews
15
 to gain an 
impression of the wider context.   
The following section describes the basic structure of the questionnaire relevant for the 
analyses in the thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Additionally, we gathered information on the career paths of the employees from some participating 
companies (for further details see Ryan et al., 2011). 
15
 Figure does not include 8 companies from the electronic components subsector. 
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2.1.5 Questionnaire design 
For the company interviews, we used a semi-structured questionnaire to shape the interview. 
To ensure matching quality, we asked for the type of products and services, the batch size, 
and the type and strength of the competition (questionnaire-sections I and VI). The majority 
of the questions focused on the various research issues described in section 2.1.2. As the 
following chapters analyze the personnel and organizational strategies, we discuss the 
questionnaire in the light of these research questions (the complete questionnaires in English 
for the UK and the U.S. and in German for Germany and Switzerland can be found in the 
appendix; all questions have been adapted to the institutional setting and VET system of each 
country). 
To investigate the effect of different VET systems and labor market institutions on the 
companies’ personnel strategies, our questions focused on the intermediate skill levels 
associated with (initial) VET
16
. The questions aimed, therefore, at two occupational levels, 
skilled front-line staff and first-line management. The first category comprised skilled manual 
production and maintenance workers in engineering, and sales staff in retailing. The second 
category focused on production-related supervisors in engineering companies and department 
managers (in large stores) or store managers (in small stores) in retail companies.  
After identifying the relevant positions within the company, we posed questions with 
respect to the three important areas of our research interest: (initial) VET, labor market 
institutions, and personnel and organizational strategies. We aimed to identify functional 
equivalents, that is, to find arrangements that fulfill the same functions even though their 
shape may be different (e.g., Cole, 1973; Sorge, 1976; Backes-Gellner, 1996). Although the 
training and entry qualifications differed depending on the (national) VET system (see section 
2.2), we defined all the employees as having intermediate skills as long as they were 
functional equivalents within the production or service process, meaning that the sum of all 
jobs resulted in the same products. Therefore, we were interested in the organizational 
structure of the functionally equivalent production and service areas within the companies 
(section I of the questionnaire).  
To investigate VET not only at the national, but also at the company level, we posed 
several questions about the length and content of the (initial) VET programs (section III of the 
questionnaire). We were also interested in the kind of qualifications associated with VET 
                                                 
16
 The intermediate skill level is defined as being between lower positions that need no (vocational) 
training and higher positions that can be reached only with professional education (Ryan, 1991). 
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(certification) and in the pool of applicants for the initial VET programs. Related to the 
qualification question, we investigated the takeover and turnover of trainees. In addition, we 
asked how companies cover vacancies at the functionally equivalent level of skilled front-line 
staff and to what extent initial VET feeds through the hierarchy (see section II of the 
questionnaire on recruitment behavior). 
To measure labor market institutions at the company level, we included questions 
concerning the coverage by a collective bargaining agreement, the influence of unions, and 
employee representation (section IV of the questionnaire). As a functional equivalent to 
national-level institutions that improve the strength of internal labor markets, we included 
questions on the promotion behavior of companies to measure the real shape of internal labor 
markets (see section II of the questionnaire). 
Using our questionnaire, we gathered company-level qualitative and quantitative 
information on all relevant issues, thus, the dataset allows a comparative analysis of company-
level personnel and organizational strategies in different settings of VET and labor market 
institutions. Before going deeper into the analysis, the following section provides some 
stylized facts on VET systems and labor market institutions.  
 
2.2 Overview of VET systems and labor market institutions in the five countries 
The five countries included in this thesis differ in terms of their VET systems, including those 
related to our two sectors, engineering and retailing. This section outlines the principal 
differences in terms of educational attainment in VET relative to general training, and the 
content and regulation of the VET systems. In addition, we provide a short overview of the 
labor market institutions that are relevant for VET and our research questions on personnel 
strategies and on organizational structures.   
 
2.2.1 Relative importance of VET 
Comparative OECD figures (Table 2-4) 
 
show that all countries except the U.S. have upper 
secondary graduation rates of 90 percent or more. Though the graduation rates are similar, the 
relative importance of (pre-) vocational programs differs dramatically, reflecting the 
attractiveness and importance of VET in the entire education system. Switzerland has, by far, 
the highest share of young people completing VET programs, followed by Germany and 
Japan.  
 
 26 
 
Table 2-4: Upper secondary graduation rates (2008)—sum of graduation rates for single year 
of age, by program destination, and program orientation 
country total       
(first time 
graduates)
general 
programs
pre-
vocational/
vocational 
programs
Germany 97 42 56
Japan 95 72 23
Switzerland 90 31 71
UK 91 n.a. n.a.
USA 77 n.a. n.a.
 
Source: OECD 2010a, Education at a Glance, Table A2.1
17
 
 
Unfortunately, the OECD does not provide figures for all the countries involved in our 
analyses. Therefore, we include, as additional information, figures on upper secondary 
enrollment patterns to reflect the relative importance of VET within a country (Table 2-5).  
 
Table 2-5: Upper secondary enrollment patterns (2008) - Enrollment in upper secondary 
programs in public and private institutions by program orientation 
country general pre-
vocational
vocational
Germany 42.5 - 57.5
Japan 76.0 0.9 23.1
Switzerland 35.2 - 64.8
UK 68.6 - 31.4
USA 100 - -
 
Source: OECD 2010a, Education at a Glance, Table C1.4 
 
The enrollment figures show that VET programs are of some importance in the UK. In 
contrast, all young people in the U.S. go through general programs while apprenticeship or 
VET programs are seemingly non-existent. The following description of the U.S. education 
system indicates that apprenticeship training exists in the U.S.; however, it is a separate, non-
                                                 
17
 In this context, figures of Eurostat on persons between 18 and 25 years without upper secondary 
graduation and not participating in education or training are of interest. Germany and Switzerland have 
better figures (Germany, 11.8%; Switzerland, 7.7%) compared to the UK which lies with a value of 
17.0% above the EU-27-average in 2008 (BMBF, 2010, Fig. B2-4). 
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integrated educational path without (or only weak) institutionalized links to the general 
education system.  
To provide a structured overview of the vocational education and training systems of the five 
countries included in this study, we make use of typologies. Various typologies of the 
education and training system in different scientific fields, such as education, sociology, 
economics, and political science exist (see e.g., Ashton, Sung & Turbin, 2000). While some 
educational categorizations focus on the providers of VET (e.g., Green’s (1991) typology of 
an employer-led or education-led/college-based model), other approaches emphasize the role 
of the state (Edwards & Garonna, 1991) and the importance of cultural and historical origins 
(Moura Castro & Alfthan, 1992; Thelen, 2004). We use the following two typologies that are 
widely known in economic and institutional research and that focus specifically on VET while 
taking the role of the companies into account. Lynch (1994) categorizes the training strategies 
pursued by companies in each country according to the main institutional principle around 
which the training system is organized. Crouch, Finegold, and Sako (1999) use the dominant 
forms and the institutions of skill provision in (initial) VET as categories (Figure 2-1). 
 
Figure 2-1: Categorization of countries included in the study according to Lynch (1994) and 
Crouch, Finegold, and Sako (1999) 
 
Notes: This figure does not show Lynch’s (1994) category “employer training tax” and Crouch, Finegold, and 
Sako’s (1999) category “local firm networks” because we have not included countries in these categories, such 
as France or Italy. 
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Both typologies include cover five countries analyzed in this study and provide a systematic 
structure that is not too detailed (thus not every country becomes a category) but also not too 
broad (thus illustrating the existing variation). In the following sections, we use both 
typologies to describe the VET systems in the five countries. 
 
 
Germany and Switzerland 
Apprenticeship training 
The significant importance of vocational education in general and of the apprenticeship 
system in particular justify Lynch’s (1994) category “apprenticeship training” for Germany 
and—as the figures show—also for Switzerland (which is not included in Lynch’s 1994 
typology). VET is the dominant path of secondary education in both Germany and 
Switzerland. In Germany, usually more than 60% of school graduates start apprenticeship 
training (BMBF, 2011, Fig. 2: 23), while in Switzerland, even more than 70% of an age 
cohort enters apprenticeship training (SKBF/CSRE, 2010, Fig. 93: 143). One reason for the 
popularity of VET is that apprenticeship graduates have the possibility to move on to the 
tertiary level, either in the vocational track or in the academic track after passing different 
tests. In Germany, of the 13.5% who received a certificate to attend a university of applied 
science, 89% came from vocational schools, and of the 31.7% who received a certificate to 
attend a university, 14% came from vocational schools (own calculations based on BMBF, 
2010, Table D7-1A). In Switzerland, the possibility of the Federal Vocational Baccalaureate 
(“Berufsmatura”) exists, meaning that apprentices can obtain a certificate to attend a 
university or a university of applied sciences during or after their apprenticeship training. 
Approximately 12% of Swiss apprentices earn such a certificate (OPET, 2010: 15)
18
. The 
vocational track at the tertiary level is also popular. OECD (2010a, Table A3.1) shows 
tertiary-B (professional education and training) graduation figures of 10% in Germany and 
19% in Switzerland
19
.  
 
 
                                                 
18
 Also a change from the academic track to the vocational track is possible by starting an 
apprenticeship after the “Abitur/Matura”. However, this direction is less common in Switzerland. In 
Germany, of the 1.2 million new entrants to the vocational track, approximately 13% have a certificate 
to attend a university or a university of applied science (own calculation based on BMBF, 2010, Table 
E1-2web, data on 2008). 
19
 Tertiary-A graduation rates (academic track) are 26% in Germany and 32% in Switzerland. 
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Corporatist networks 
Both apprenticeship systems are accurately characterized by Crouch, Finegold and Sako’s 
(1999) keyword of corporatist networks, which ensure a uniform training content, common 
quality standards, and a certification that is accepted all over the country. In both countries, 
policies and laws lay the foundation for apprenticeship by regulating the meaning, content, 
and coverage of apprenticeship, and create the environment for the social partners who are, 
under the supporting role of the state and “Länder/Kantone”, jointly responsible for 
developing and (re-)structuring apprenticeship occupations. The resulting VET ordinances 
record the occupational profile, type, and length of training
20
 and the related qualifications. 
Therefore, the ordinances build the basis for the assessment and nationally recognized 
certification of apprentices. The quality of apprenticeship training is generally regarded as 
high (Wolter & Ryan, 2011; Franz & Soskice, 1995; Soskice, 1994; Bierhoff & Prais, 1997; 
OECD, 2009a; see also Chapter 3).  
 
 
The United Kingdom 
Government-led and school-based education 
Compared to Swiss or German figures, VET is not the dominating form of secondary 
education in the UK. After compulsory education until the age of 16, approximately 65% of 
the 16- to 18-year-olds in England are receiving full-time education (which can be 
vocationally oriented, e.g., a narrow range of vocational courses in sixth form colleges), 7% 
are enrolled in Work Based Learning, and only 5% are enrolled in apprenticeship training 
(DfE, 2010, Table 4, data on 2008; OECD, 2009b). Persons over 18 years of age also enroll in 
Apprenticeship programs
21
 and, in fact, 43% of the Apprentices are between 19 and 24 years 
of age (BIS, 2011, Table 4), though the share of the Apprentices out of all the students 
pursuing further education is only approximately 11% (own calculation based on BIS, 2011: 
3).  
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Apprenticeship training takes, depending on the occupation and the level of difficulty, 2 to 3.5 (4 in 
Switzerland) years. 
21
 Apprenticeship training (with capital letter) is supported by the Department for Education and 
Skills. 
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Free markets and direct state 
Many UK companies are not engaged in any kind of official VET program, such as 
Apprenticeship training and offer instead company-specific on-the-job training which is  
reflected by Crouch, Finegold and Sako’s (1999) free market category. Still, the UK has an 
Apprenticeship system, which differs from the German and Swiss systems and, therefore, 
requires further explanation. In contrast to the stable apprenticeship systems in the continental 
European countries, the only continuity in British apprenticeship training seems to be change 
induced by state intervention (Rainbird, 2010; Crouch, Finegold & Sako, 1999, esp. ch. 4).  
When the Conservative government came to power in 1979, neoliberal politics led to a 
weakening of sectoral bodies and the already weak social partnership. The number of 
apprentices declined dramatically between 1970 and 1990. Additionally, low-quality Youth 
Training Schemes (YTS) introduced in the 1980s contributed to the decline of apprenticeship 
training without providing an equivalent alternative (Marsden & Ryan, 1989). With the 
introduction of Modern Apprenticeships in 1994 in traditional (e.g., engineering, construction, 
engineering manufacture) and non-traditional apprenticeship sectors (e.g., health care), the 
government reinstated Apprenticeship training and attempted to evoke employer engagement. 
In contrast to the YTS, which were often detached from employers (Fuller & Unwin, 1999) 
each Apprenticeship program was designed by an occupational sector.  
Though social partnership, which is the strength of the Swiss and German 
apprenticeship systems, has rhetorical support in UK policy documents, no institutional form 
comparable to that of Germany or Switzerland exists (Tailby & Winchester, 2000). Instead, 
centralization of VET policy occurred. The Learning and Skill Councils (LSCs), whose seats 
are allocated 40% to employers without guaranteeing the same proportion to unions, 
cooperate with several other organizations and establish, following a top-down approach, the 
national framework and the nationwide arrangements for funding agreements relevant to local 
LSCs who award contracts for training under the Apprenticeship program.  
As no nationwide law sets the content and meaning of Apprenticeship training, the 
quality of the Apprenticeship training varies considerably by sector, including the two sectors 
in our analyses (Ryan, Gospel & Lewis, 2006). Sector Skill Councils (SSCs)
22
 set training 
standards according to the needs expressed by the employers in the sector. While the 
engineering councils (SEMTA) have high standards, requiring long training schedules with 
                                                 
22
 The Sector Skills Councils, even though they are employer bodies, are not independent institutions; 
rather they rely heavily on government funding. The companies’ confidence in these institutions varies 
significantly (OECD, 2009b; SSDA, 2006). 
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part-time, externally assessed vocational education for craft occupations (NVQ level 3
23
), 
most retail Apprenticeships are only at the NVQ level 2 and do not require any off-the-job 
VET, which is in stark contrast to the retail apprenticeship training in Germany and 
Switzerland. Furthermore, the assessment of skills and the inspection of training providers are 
subject to weak requirements (Lewis & Ryan, 2009). The Apprenticeship training ends in 
separate qualifications for competence in the workplace, assessed to nationally agreed 
occupational standards (NVQs), key skills (literacy and numeracy), and a technical certificate 
for the knowledge learned at a further education college.  
Apprenticeship training (with capital letter) is supported by the Department for 
Education and Skills, and therefore competition to receive the public funding for training 
contracts and public administration plays a major role in the UK Apprenticeship system 
(Rainbird, 2010; OECD, 2009b; Lynch, 1994; Crouch, Finegold & Sako, 1999; Ryan, Gospel 
& Lewis, 2006). Various organizations, such as training companies, charities, further 
education colleges, and employers compete for training contracts.   
 
 
The United States 
School-based education  
The U.S. system is strongly school-based, thus avoiding early choices between general and 
vocational education such as it is prevalent in the continental European apprenticeship 
countries previously mentioned (Bailey & Berg, 2010; Bosch & Charest, 2008; OECD, 
2009c). The principal idea of the U.S. model is that students stay in school-based academic 
education until they begin specializing and learning specific skills required for their 
occupation. Thus, general education builds the foundation for a vocational specialization, 
which occurs in the final years before entering the workforce. Therefore, vocational 
specialization usually does not begin until the late high-school level
24
.  
                                                 
23
 Apprenticeship training leads to either a National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) at level 2 
(Foundation Apprenticeship, FA, minimum 12 months) or at level 3 (Advanced Apprenticeship, AA, 
minimum 24 months). NVQ levels are competence-based qualifications and focus only on the 
execution of a task also without having participated in certain training before. The level 2 is regarded 
as basic craft or semi-skilled, and level 3 is regarded as a craft or technician level comparable to the 
German “Facharbeiter” (Crouch, Finegold & Sako, 1999; Backes-Gellner, 1996: 111).  
24
 Secondary VET is provided via three types of public high schools: comprehensive high schools, area 
vocational schools (part-time vocational training), and full-time vocational high schools (U.S. 
Department of Education, 1995). However, only 0.3% of students were enrolled in vocational schools 
in the school year 2008/09 (own calculation based on the U.S. Department of Education, 2011, Table 
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The strong focus on general education in high schools is intended to give everyone the 
opportunity to continue on to a college or university (“college for all”). Similarly, colleges 
aim to provide the opportunity to continue and to earn a bachelor’s degree (“bachelor for all”, 
Bosch & Charest, 2008: 439). Therefore, VET becomes weaker both in high school and in 
college, even though colleges are some of the main providers of VET
25
. Approximately 45% 
of undergraduates are enrolled in community colleges, and of those, approximately 60% are 
enrolled in vocational programs (Bailey et al., 2004). The rest of the college students are 
enrolled in transfer programs that will allow them to transfer to four-year colleges (Bailey & 
Berg, 2010).   
 
Learning-by-doing training strategies and free markets 
Employers finally have to provide VET to the high school or college graduates. Vocational 
training at the company is usually not regulated at all and takes place mainly as on-the-job 
learning-by-doing. In the school-based system of the U.S., apprenticeship training once 
played a more important and prominent role than it does today (e.g., Strauss, 1965, 1968)
26
. 
Today, formal apprenticeships are registered with the U.S. Department of Labor when they 
meet the government standards of fairness, safety, and training.  
Although apprenticeships are available in more than 1000 occupations, the overall 
number of active apprentices was almost 380.000 in 2010 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2011), 
which is a small number compared to the cohort of high school graduates of more than 3.3 
million in 2010 (U.S. Department of Education, 2011, Table 110). Apprenticeships are most 
successful in unionized sectors, such as construction. Where the apprenticeship system exists, 
it has much in common with the European models. While the length of the apprenticeship 
varies between 1 and 6 years depending on the complexity of the occupation, the majority of 
the programs are 4 years in length. During the training, apprentices receive structured on- and 
off-the-job training, and training standards are usually developed by employee associations 
                                                                                                                                                        
100). In 2005, 15% of all credits earned (Carnegie units) by public high school graduates were in 
vocational subjects (own calculation based on U.S. Department of Education, 2011, Table 157).  
25
 As a reaction to the crowding-out of vocational courses and the theorization of the vocational 
training, colleges are beginning to offer labor market integration courses, also called “reverse 
transfer”, to provide some practical training (Bosch & Charest, 2008: 439).  
26
 Initiatives of the government to introduce more formal employment and training systems, for 
example, during the 1990s, the introduction of a National Skill Standards Board or the School to Work 
Opportunities Act, failed due to the fear and resistance against too much governmental influence 
(Bailey & Berg, 2010). The resistance against too much governmental influence is not limited to the 
area of education and training, as shown by the fierce protests against the health care reform of the 
Obama administration. 
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and (groups of) employers (Crosby, 2002). Usually, per apprenticeship year, 2.000 hours of 
on-the-job training and 144 hours of related classroom instruction take place. The classroom 
instruction may also count toward certain college degrees. As in the UK system, apprentices 
are employees, usually older (in their late twenties) and have some postsecondary education 
or degree. After graduation, apprentices are awarded a certificate from the Department of 
Labor or an approved state agency, and they receive the status of a qualified craft worker.  
 
 
Japan 
Institutional companies, low employee turnover and extensive company training 
Employer-based training plays the dominant role in Japan, even though various vocational 
training institutions at different levels exist. The Japanese situation is characterized by 
“institutional companies” (Crouch, Finegold & Sako, 1999: 29; Grugulis, 2008: 608). These 
large companies “produce” an institutional structure by establishing strong internal career 
paths, including lifelong employment guarantees and initiatives to provide training and re-
training both on- and off-the-job. Lynch (1994) emphasizes these features of extensive 
company training and low turnover when categorizing the Japanese system. Hashimoto 
(1994) argues that the large amount of private-sector training is the result of Japanese 
companies wanting to create a homogeneous
27
 workforce with respect to task-related skills, 
teamwork skills, company values, and corporate identities.   
Students available for recruitment have usually already received VET at various 
school levels. After 9 years of compulsory schooling, students choose between academic 
(general courses at the high school) and vocational paths (specialized courses at the high 
school, specialized training colleges, colleges of technology or miscellaneous schools that are 
mainly intended to provide vocational or other specialized education). The percentage 
distribution of upper secondary school students by course type indicates that the proportion of 
those taking general courses has been increasing over time and accounted for 73% of the 
students in 2005. The proportion of those taking vocational courses was 24%
28
 (MEXT, 2007, 
Table I-2-2).  
                                                 
27
 The Japanese education system already creates a largely homogeneous work force via a curriculum 
put together by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) that is 
valid for all of Japan from primary until upper secondary education (Hashimoto, 1994).  
28
 The last percentages of about 4% are integrated courses that combine general and specialized 
courses and other specialized courses (MEXT, 2007, Table I-2-2). 
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Within the vocational courses, different major subjects, such as industry, commerce, or 
home economics, exist, and each student has to choose his subject in advance and then meet 
the specific entrance criteria. While half of the vocational education is devoted to practical 
exercise, internships are rare. In addition to the schools at the upper secondary level, so-called 
colleges of technology exist. Although their enrollment figures are very small (only 11.280 
new enrollments in 2009 compared to 1.1 million high school entrants in 2009, MEXT, 2011, 
Tables 22-11, 22-5), these colleges are of interest because they offer high-level VET that are 
highly responsive to the needs of the Japanese industry, especially in engineering (OECD, 
2009d). The equipment in the colleges of technology, compared to that of vocational high 
schools or universities, is very modern
29
, and the internships provide connections to the labor 
market.  
After high school, about 47%
30
 of the upper secondary school graduates continued on 
to universities or junior colleges in 2005 (MEXT, 2007, Reference table to figure I-4-3), and 
17% go directly to employment. In addition, about 26% of upper secondary graduates went to 
specialized training colleges and miscellaneous schools (MEXT, 2007, Reference table to 
figure I-4-3), that offer practical vocational and technical education. Specialized training 
colleges offer courses at the upper secondary (upper secondary specialized training schools) 
and post-secondary levels (professional training colleges). Professional training colleges focus 
on the high employability of their students, and due to their private status, they are 
comparatively free of regulation from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (OECD, 2009d). Students who have completed an upper secondary course of 
three years or more at specialized training colleges can apply for a university placement
31
. 
Furthermore, miscellaneous schools exist that provide vocational and practical training, for 
example, in dressmaking, cooking, bookkeeping, and automobile driving (MEXT, 2007). 
Though a large variety of (vocational) training institutions exists, in-company training is still 
the most important factor in the Japanese VET system (Grugulis, 2008). 
                                                 
29
 Therefore, the competition for this institution is very high. While the intake capacity is limited to 
11.000 students per year, approximately twice as many students apply for the entrance exams (MEXT, 
2011, Tables 22-11). Another attractive factor is that the institution’s graduates may apply for 
university. 
30 This figure includes graduates who go to university (undergraduate, correspondence and short-term 
courses), to junior college (regular, correspondence and short-term courses) and to advanced courses 
of upper secondary schools (including those who entered higher-level schools while being employed), 
MEXT, 2007, Reference table to figure I-4-3). 
31
 However, as employability seems to be more and more valued in the labor market, 25.000 junior 
college and university students transferred to professional training colleges in 2005 which is 12 times 
more than the reversed trend (OECD, 2009d). 
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In sum, the typologies show a large variation among the VET systems of the five countries. 
While dual apprenticeship training dominates in Germany and Switzerland, company-specific 
training characterizes the situation in Japan and the U.S. The UK is a mixed case in itself 
because some companies (especially in engineering) offer high-quality dual apprenticeship 
training comparable to that of Germany or Switzerland, while others (especially in retail) 
offer short company-specific on-the-job training similar to the U.S. Both for the functioning 
of the VET systems and with respect to the company’s personnel and organizational 
strategies, various labor market institutions are of importance 
 
2.2.2 Overview of labor market institutions 
In the following paragraphs, we provide a brief overview of three of the most important labor 
market institutions for our research questions (further details are discussed in the respective 
chapters).  
 Coverage by and the coordination of wages reflecting employer coordination and 
poaching danger (the higher the coverage by and the centralization of collective 
bargaining agreements, the higher the employer coordination and the lower the 
poaching danger). 
 Employment protection reflecting employees’ incentives to invest in firm-internal 
careers and employers’ incentives to recruit externally (the higher the employment 
protection, the more attractive are internal labor markets). 
 Existence and rights of employee representation influencing trust and cooperation 
between management and work force (the higher the influence and the more rights an 
employee representation has, the higher is its credibility and the higher is the 
probability that it can be a partner to the management thus creating trust in the 
workforce). 
 
Collective bargaining 
In line with previous literature (e.g., Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010), we 
focus on both the coverage by collective bargaining agreements and the coordination of wage 
setting. The majority of employees in Germany are covered by collective bargaining (63% in 
2007, ICTWSS database, 2009), the coordination of wages is categorized at the second 
highest index value (4) meaning that mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining takes 
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place in Germany (ICTWSS database, 2009). In contrast, in the U.S., wage bargaining occurs 
predominantly at the company level (index value 1), and the coverage by collective 
agreements is very low with only 13% in 2007. Also in the UK, fragmented bargaining at the 
company level takes place; with approximately 35%, the coverage was higher than in the U.S. 
Japan and Switzerland take the middle positions. In both countries, coordination of wages 
takes place at the industry level, with some additional local and company bargaining (index 
value 3, ICTWSS database, 2009). Switzerland had with 48% a higher collective bargaining 
coverage of employees than Japan with 16% (ICTWSS database, 2009).  
 
Employment protection 
To measure the degree of employment protection, previous literature commonly uses the 
OECD index of the strictness of employment protection (OECD, 2008; Schneider, Schulze & 
Paunescu, 2010). The OECD index comprises three variables: protection of permanent 
workers against dismissal, regulation of temporary forms of employment, and specific 
requirements for collective dismissal. A high index represents strong barriers to, or high costs 
of, staff reduction through the termination of employment contracts. The overall protection 
index values show a clear gap between Germany (2.63) on the one side and the U.S., the UK, 
Japan, and Switzerland on the other (0.85, 1.09, 1.73, 1.77).  
 
Employee representation 
We use two comparative indexes of the ICTWSS database (2009) to reflect the existence and 
influence of employee representation in the five countries.   
 The first index measures whether employee representation at the enterprise, firm or 
establishment level (with 50 or more employees) is mandatory by law or by agreements 
between the central organizations of trade unions and employers’ associations and also 
reflects the coverage of employee representation. In Germany and the UK, employee 
representation is, according to the ICTWSS database (2009), assured by law or agreement; the 
coverage, however, is higher in Germany (75% or more of eligible firms, index value 2) than 
in the UK (less than 75% of eligible firms, index value 1). According to the index in the 
ICTWSS database (2009), employee representation in the U.S., Japan, and Switzerland is 
absent or voluntary, existing only in some sectors and firms (a coverage of less than 25%, 
index value 0).  
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 The second index of the ICTWSS database (2009) measures the influence and rights of 
employee representation. While German employee representation has the highest influence 
with its codetermination rights of company economic policies (index value 3), employee 
representation in the UK only has information rights (index value 1). The U.S., Japan, and 
Switzerland have the lowest index value (0) because employee representation is absent. The 
variation of the labor market institutions described above is summarized in Figure 2-2. 
  
Figure 2-2: Overview of labor market institutions in the five countries 
Collective bargaining
Coordination of wage bargaining (index)
Collective bargaining coverage (%)
Employment protection
Overall (index)
Employee representation
Existence of employee representation
(index)
Rights of employee representation
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Coordination of wage bargaining: Index value 5, economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable 
agreements between the central organizations of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire 
private sector, or on b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling. Index value 4, mixed 
industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organizations negotiate non-enforceable central agreements 
(guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers’ associations set pattern for the entire economy. Index value 
3, industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central organizations and 
limited freedoms for company bargaining. Index value 2, mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining, with weak 
enforceability of industry agreements. Index value 1, none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at 
company level.  
Collective bargaining coverage: ranges between 0-100%, employees covered by wage bargaining agreements 
as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as 
percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain. 
Employment protection overall: Compiled from 21 items covering three different aspects of employment 
protection: Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts, additional costs for collective dismissals, 
and regulation of temporary contracts, scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most restrictive). 
Existence of employee representation: Works councils, or provision for the information, consultation and co-
decision rights of employees in firms and establishments with 50 or more staff: Index value 2, employee 
representation at the level of enterprises, firms or establishments (above the threshold of 50 employees) is 
mandatory, based on public law, and or assured on the basis of a enforceable central or basic agreement 
between the central organizations of trade unions and employers’ associations; and coverage of eligible 
employees is 75 or more. Index value 1, employee representation at the level of enterprises, firms or 
establishments (above the threshold of 50 employees) is mandatory, based on public law, and or assured on the 
basis of a enforceable central or basic agreement between the central organizations of trade unions and 
employers’ associations; but coverage is lower than 75 percent of eligible firms. Index value 0, employee 
representation at the level of enterprises or firms is absent or voluntary, and covers only some sectors or firms 
(less than 25 percent of firms above 50 staff threshold). 
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Rights of employee representation in firms, enterprises, or establishments: Index value 3, works council or 
employee representation body has co-decision rights regarding company economic policies (mergers and 
acquisition, investments and divestments, appointments to the board, etc.; includes legal sanctions in case of 
breaching procedures for co-decision). Index value 2, works council or employee representation body has 
major consultation rights concerning social policies, including wage grading, training, job evaluation, 
procedures for recruitment and dismissal, etc. (includes legal sanctions in case of breaching procedures for 
consultation). Index value 1, works council or employee representation body has information rights concerning 
company policy in social and economic matters (with weak or absent sanctions). Index value 0, employee 
representation in firm, enterprise or establishment is absent. 
Sources: OECD (2008), ICTWSS database (2009) 
 
By outlining the research design of analyzing matched-pair companies in engineering and 
retailing in five countries, describing the VET systems and selected labor market institutions 
in the five countries, this chapter provides the broader context of the research project. In sum, 
the countries included in our study differ significantly both in their labor market institutions 
and their VET systems. This variation allows the analysis of the influence of the two factors 
on personnel and organizational strategies. In the following chapter, we analyze whether a 
variation in labor market institutions influences the share of external recruitment to the 
position of skilled production employee in matched-pair engineering companies. Previous 
literature has shown that labor market institutions can influence the training costs and 
strategies of companies (investment vs. substitution strategy). However, whether companies 
that train apprentices in different labor market institutions revert, to different degrees, to their 
own apprentices when they need to fill a vacancy is still an open question. 
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CHAPTER 3     
 
 
Dual apprenticeship and personnel strategies–so similar and yet so 
different?  
A comparative study of matched-pair engineering companies in Germany 
and Switzerland 
 
 
A related version in German language is published in: Die Betriebswirtschaft, 2011, 71(3): 217-233 (with Paul 
Ryan, Kathleen Thelen & Karin Wagner)  
 
3.1 Introduction32 
The dual apprenticeship training systems in Germany and Switzerland show clear similarities, 
both from a theoretical and a structural point of view (Soskice, 1994; BMBF, 2008; BBT, 
2009; OECD, 2009a; OECD, 2010b; Franz & Soskice, 1995). Due to the huge substantial 
similarities between the two apprenticeship training systems, the resulting advantages are 
comparable: on the one hand, the high-skilled workers that emerge from the dual system (see 
e.g., Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Steedman & Wagner, 1987, 1989; Streeck, 1991), and on the 
other hand, the advantages associated with the takeover of these high-skilled employees such 
as the reduction of recruitment costs, the short induction periods, and the reduced danger of 
mismatches (see e.g., Wagner, 1999). Therefore, one would expect that training companies in 
Germany and Switzerland draw on their apprenticeship graduates to a similar degree to fill 
their vacancies for skilled production employees. 
                                                 
32
 We would like to thank the Anglo-German Foundation, the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, SKOPE 
(Oxford), the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Federal Office for Professional Education 
and Technology (OPET), Berne, for their financial support; the managers and employees of the 
participating companies, employers’ organizations, trade unions, professional organizations, and 
governmental authorities for the interviews on which our research work is based; the participants of 
two colloquiums at the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung for suggestions and comments; Michaela Kuhnhenne 
and Christian Dustmann for their consultation and support; Jim Foreman, Christian Busin, Jérôme 
Lutz, Katherine Meyer and Andrea Willi for their research support; Felix Wenzelmann and colleagues 
from BIBB, Samuel Mühlemann and Stefan Wolter from the University of Berne, Barbara Müller 
from SKBF, Jelle Visser from the University of Amsterdam, the Federal Statistical Office, Berlin and 
the Federal Statistical Office, Berne for providing additional data; the Social Science Research Center 
Berlin for research support; Johannes Mure, Marius Busemeyer, Geoff Mason and Hilary Steedman as 
well as two anonymous reviewers for their hints, suggestions, and comments. 
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However, the results of a comparative study of matched-pair German and Swiss 
engineering companies indicate differences: Compared to their German counterparts, Swiss 
engineering companies rely to a larger extent on external recruitment and use their own 
apprenticeship graduates to a lower degree as a source of skills to cover their need for skilled 
production employees. This finding is puzzling, especially when considering that Swiss 
companies do have the opportunity to draw on their own apprenticeship graduates. 
To solve this empirical puzzle, this chapter analyzes the relevance and influence of 
labor market institutions on the design of apprenticeship training systems, the related training 
costs and benefits, and the behaviors of the employers and employees involved. First, taking 
the human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Stevens, 1996) into account, we investigate whether 
the types of skills acquired during apprenticeship training differ between the two countries 
and whether these differences explain the aforementioned counterintuitive findings. Second, 
we analyze how institutions such as company-level employee representation and trade unions 
directly or indirectly steer the personnel strategies of companies, e.g., by influencing the cost-
benefit aspects of the apprenticeship training. Finally, we focus on the extent and manner in 
which the institutional aspect of employment protection affects employers’ and employees’ 
incentives for pursuing internal labor markets.  
To place the results into a broader context, we embed our findings in the international 
comparative Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001, henceforth, 
designated as the VoC approach). Although this political economy approach categorizes both 
Switzerland and Germany as coordinated market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001), our 
sector-specific investigation shows that the two countries tend toward different directions—on 
the one hand, to the pattern of a liberal market economy such as that of the U.S. (for 
Switzerland), and on the other hand, toward the pattern of a segmentalist system such as that 
of Japan (for Germany; Thelen & Busemeyer, 2011).  
The contribution of this chapter is to link the discussion concerning the costs and 
benefits of apprenticeship training, the training motives (whether investment or production 
motives), and the retention of apprenticeship graduates by training companies (Mühlemann et 
al., 2007; Schweri et al., 2003; Wolter & Schweri, 2002; Schönfeld et al., 2010; Beicht, 
Walden & Hergert, 2004; Dionisius et al., 2009; Mohrenweiser & Backes-Gellner, 2010) to 
the companies’ personnel strategic question of how to fill skilled production employee 
vacancies. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows: the second section describes the conceptual and 
structural similarities of the dual apprenticeship training systems in Switzerland and 
Germany. The third section illustrates the design of the country-comparative study and 
presents its counterintuitive empirical findings. Section four constructs three hypotheses as 
possible explanations for this empirical puzzle, followed by an analysis of whether the 
interviewed companies behave consistently regarding these explanations. Section six 
illustrates where the results fit within the international context of the VoC approach and 
indicates the need for further research. The paper concludes with a short summary of the 
results. 
 
3.2 Similarities between the dual apprenticeship training systems in Germany 
and Switzerland 
Concerning the conceptual and practical design of the dual apprenticeship training system, 
Switzerland and Germany are almost identical (Soskice, 1994; Franz & Soskice, 1995; 
BMBF, 2008; BBT, 2009; OECD, 2009e; OECD, 2010b). Conceptually, the corporatist 
structures in the dual apprenticeship training systems are significant for both countries. Within 
the legal framework of the Federal Vocational and Professional Education and Training Act 
and guided by the federal state
33
, social partners
34
 jointly participate in the development and 
(re-)structuring of apprenticeship occupations. Therefore, the learning contents match the 
actual needs of companies and comply with the interests of the apprentices in learning high-
quality and transferable skills. The resulting vocational education and training (VET) 
ordinances (“Berufsbildungsverordnungen”) record the occupational profile and the related 
qualifications. Companies in both countries commit themselves to comply with the 
occupation-specific curriculum by signing a binding apprenticeship contract.  
The practical design manifests its dual character in both countries by alternating 
school-based
35
 and company-based training. In addition, industry courses are provided in 
Switzerland—and in Germany, where required—to impart a broad occupational base of 
knowledge. Training companies have to adhere to certain quality standards. Institutions in 
both countries take responsibility for observing the training companies (in Switzerland, the 
                                                 
33
 Federal Ministry of Education and Research in Germany, Federal Office of Professional Education 
and Technology in Switzerland. 
34
 Also called “Organisationen der Arbeitswelt” in Switzerland. 
35
 The school-based part of the apprenticeship training is publicly financed in both countries. 
Typically, 1-2 days per week are spent at school. 
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cantonal offices for intermediate and vocational schools, and in Germany, the chambers of 
industry and commerce associated with para-public and quasi-legal rights and responsibilities, 
Thelen, 2007). After the apprenticeship period, apprentices are subject to an external 
examination, established at the national level and with the social partners involved, reflecting 
again the sense of corporatism. The national standardization and certification of skills ensures 
their transferability and the occupational mobility of the apprenticeship graduates between the 
companies of particular sectors (Wolter & Ryan, 2011). 
From an economic perspective, various studies highlight the quality of the skilled 
workers that arise from this type of dual training system (e.g., Steedman & Wagner, 1987, 
1989; Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986; Bierhoff & Prais, 1997). These workers comprise an 
important element for the international competitiveness of German and Swiss companies 
because they are capable of both responding flexibly to customer-specific requests and 
fabricating high-quality products (e.g., Streeck, 1991).  
From a company perspective, the provision of apprenticeship training places offers 
various advantages (Schönfeld et al., 2010; Mühlemann et al., 2007; Schweri et al., 2003; 
Sadowski, 1980; Wagner, 1999). Besides the possible direct costs savings by replacing 
unskilled or skilled workers with apprentices (Lindley, 1975), providing apprenticeship 
training can also have indirect positive effects, for example, by increasing the company’s 
reputation as a high-quality workplace and therefore increasing the company’s success in 
recruiting skilled employees (Sadowski, 1980; Backes-Gellner & Tuor, 2010). Furthermore, 
the training period allows a company to screen future employees and to choose those with the 
highest performance levels and that are the best match to the company (Franz & 
Zimmermann, 2002; Soskice, 1994; Jovanovic, 1979). Therefore, the takeover of one’s own 
apprentices, in particular, offers the advantage that firms can save recruitment costs
36
 and 
avoid the dangers of mismatches with externally acquired employees or a loss of productivity 
if no appropriate employee can be found (Stevens, 1994; Merrilees, 1983
37
). Furthermore, the 
company-specific knowledge acquired during apprenticeship leads to shorter induction 
periods and thus lower training costs compared to employees recruited from the external 
market. Finally, employee turnover decreases because apprentices develop loyalty to their 
company during the apprenticeship period (Schönfeld et al., 2010; Schweri et al., 2003).  
                                                 
36
 In the case of external recruitment, additional costs arise for advertising and selection. 
37
 See also Backes-Gellner (1996) for an analysis of how the stock of skills depends on production 
strategies and competitive environments. 
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Taking into account the similarities between the dual apprenticeship training systems, 
the associated quality of the apprentices and the resulting skilled workers, and the multiple 
advantages that companies extract from taking over apprentices, we expect that training 
companies in Switzerland and Germany draw on their own apprenticeship graduates to the 
same degree to cover their needs for qualified employees
38
.  
 
3.3 Empirical findings 
3.3.1 Data 
To examine personnel strategies, we need data at the plant level because recruitment 
strategies and institutional settings have to be measured at the relevant unit. Since we require 
detailed company data, sample size is small by necessity. Therefore, we decided to use a 
matched-pair strategy to reduce heterogeneity. To do so, we collected plant-level data on 
companies gathered in Germany and Switzerland through face-to-face interviews with 
personnel managers, supplemented by secondary data analysis and expert interviews. The 
company interviews, which took place between 2008 and 2009, were combined with on-site 
visits to the production facilities. We selected the pairs by matching companies (“matched 
pairs”) according to their 4-digit SIC codes reflecting their product lines and production 
technologies. To further improve the matching, we asked the companies for their main 
competitors and included the competitors in the analysis.  
Since differences between economic sectors exist within a country (Allen, 2004), we 
focused on engineering because of its importance to the dual apprenticeship training system 
and to the national economy as a whole. We chose the subsectors pumps and turbines as the 
main SICs. The engineering industry subsectors account for 0.12% of the employment in 
Switzerland and 0.3% in Germany (see also Chapter 2). Overall, 10 comparable engineering 
plants
39
 provided the necessary information. The limited number of Swiss engineering 
companies available led to the inclusion of the additional subsector of compressors, which 
resembles the pump and turbine companies to a very large extent in terms of its skill 
requirements (also reflected in the SIC code, which is close to that of pumps). For an 
overview of the country and sector distributions see Table 3-1. 
 
                                                 
38
 We make no statement about the relative size of external recruitment—which still might be 
necessary to acquire new ideas or special qualifications. 
39
 In the following, we use the terms “plant” and “company” synonymously. 
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Table 3-1: Number of participating companies in the engineering sector 
Sector Subsector SIC 1987 GER CH both
Engineering Pumps and pumping equipment 3561 3 2 5
Turbines and turbine generator, sets
Air and gas compressors
All engineering subsectors 5 5 10
2 3 5
3511, 
3563 
 
Source: Ryan et al., 2011, part of table 1 
 
We focused on medium- and large-sized production plants. Using the EU classification 
(European Commission, 2005), the sample includes 8 large companies with 250 or more 
employees (5 in Germany, 3 in Switzerland) and 2 medium-sized companies between 50 and 
249 employees (2 in Switzerland, Ryan et al., 2011, part of table 4). Therefore, the German 
sample has a higher median number of employees (500) and a higher average employment 
(997) than the Swiss sample (a median of 252 employees and an average employment of 347). 
Most of the production plants were establishments of large international companies, 
accounting for 6% and 15% of the total numbers of employees. The following analyses refer 
to the interviews with the personnel managers conducted at the production plants.  
 
3.3.2 Comparison of personnel strategies 
To compare personnel strategies, we asked about a company’s sources of skills when filling 
vacancies for skilled production workers: “How do you typically fill your vacancies for 
skilled production workers”? Companies answered: “X% of vacancies at skilled production 
worker level are usually filled externally; (1-X%) of vacancies at skilled production worker 
level are usually filled internally, Y% of vacancies at skilled production worker level are 
usually filled by apprenticeship graduates”.  
As shown in Table 3-2, German companies use apprenticeship graduates to fill, on 
average, 40% of their vacancies for skilled production workers. The high rate of takeover 
offers by the companies (99% of the apprentices were offered a contract) underscores the 
importance of own apprentices. In contrast, external recruitment is of less importance both at 
the skilled worker (48%) and at the supervisory (18%) levels. Swiss establishments, on the 
contrary, have set different priorities in their personnel strategies: only 17% of the vacancies 
for skilled production workers are filled with their own apprenticeship graduates. This small 
share of internal recruitment cannot be explained by a low amount of own apprentices as only 
57% of the graduates are offered a job. The 57% reflects almost exactly the actual takeover 
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rate of apprentices because 98% of the apprenticeship graduates who are offered a position 
accept it (thus, the almost 57% hired account for the 17% of the vacancies filled).  
 
Table 3-2: Sources of skills and labor turnover  
Occupational category Germany Switzerland
      of them trainees1 2 7
Supervisory level in 
production
18 55
Percentage of own apprentices2 
recruitment
Skilled production worker 40 17
Apprentice job offer ratio3 (%) Skilled production worker 99 57
Labor turnover  (p.a.)5 Skilled production worker 2 4
Percentage of apprentices in 
production6
9 15
Number of companies 5 5
7748Skilled production workerPercentage of external recruitment1 
Percentage of apprentice accepting 
job offer4
100 98Skilled production worker
Source: Ryan et al., 2011, Table 14, extended 
Notes: unweighted averages across production plants 
1) Percentage of all frontline skilled vacancies typically filled by external recruitment (in the previous year or a 
longer period where necessary). External recruitment includes both occupationally qualified workers and 
unqualified workers (second line) who have only received on-the-job training or a 2-year mini-apprenticeship. 
 2) Percentage of frontline skilled vacancies typically filled by the establishment’s own (recently or a longer 
period) completed apprentices 
3) Percentage of apprentices offered an employment contract (any duration) upon completion, previous year 
4) Percentage of apprentices accepting an employment contract offer 
5) Labor turnover in 2007, retirements excluded 
6) Number of apprentices in apprenticeship programs for skilled manual occupations (thus apprentices in the 
production-related area) to the number of employees in production. 
 
In general, two possible reasons exist for the comparatively small takeover rate of Swiss 
companies. First, the companies do not make a contract offer because they have no need for 
employees at the time of graduation. Second, the apprenticeship graduates leave the 
establishment voluntarily (for reasons the companies mentioned such as further studies, 
military service, or employment with another company, among others). The border between 
the voluntary mobility of apprentices and a low takeover offer rate by the companies is fluid: 
many firms enquire long before the apprentice’s graduation as to his or her future plans and 
do not offer a contract when the apprentice signals that he or she wants to leave. However, 
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most of the companies stated that they voluntarily let their apprentices leave the company.
40
 
Accordingly, in the Swiss companies externally recruited employees fill approximately 77% 
of the vacancies for skilled production workers.  
The companies had no information on the share of (Swiss) apprentices who graduated 
and stayed in the educational system after their apprenticeship training, finished an additional 
degree (i.e., a professional qualification or possibly further studies at a university) and then 
returned to their training company. However, at the master level, only two out of five Swiss 
establishments have a current stock of employees that consists primarily of former 
apprentices, thus indicating a relatively small importance of returnees for filling vacancies. In 
the other three Swiss companies, only a minority of 33%, 25%, or even 0% of the employees 
at the master level consists of former apprentices. The stronger focus on external recruitment 
at the supervisory level is reflected not only in the stock of supervisors, but also in the 
recruitment strategy: 55% of Swiss supervisors are recruited from the external market 
emphasizing the low importance of internal career ladders.  
These large differences between the personnel strategies of Swiss and German 
companies raise the question as to their causes—especially against the background of the 
similarities in the apprenticeship systems previously elaborated. 
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
To investigate the descriptive findings, we derive three hypotheses focusing on labor market 
institutions and their influences on apprenticeship-related issues that might affect a company’s 
personnel strategy
41
.   
(1) Despite all of the previously discussed conceptual and practical similarities, 
apprenticeship training in Germany might be more company-specific than in 
Switzerland (because of the difference in the distribution of power among the 
institutions involved in the design of apprenticeship training programs, namely 
employers’ associations and unions), which might—according to Becker’s (1964) 
human capital theory—offer an incentive to German (Swiss) companies to draw more 
(less) on their own apprentices for filling vacancies. 
                                                 
40
 The different apprentices’ turnover figures are also reflected in representative surveys: the retention 
rate after one year across all sectors in Switzerland is significantly lower (37%, Mühlemann et al., 
2007) than that in Germany (55%, Schönfeld et al., 2010). 
41
 Due to the fact that the supply of young people to VET is at a very high level in both countries (see 
Chapter 2), we do not elaborate further on this aspect. 
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(2) A second aspect of the human capital theory focuses on the costs of training and the 
question of who has to bear these costs. Labor market institutions, such as trade unions 
with their influence and goals, and company-level employee representation could 
affect how training costs are shared between the training company and the apprentice. 
With a high share of training costs, companies would take over a higher percentage of 
apprentices, which could, in turn, affect the availability of skilled employees in the 
external labor market and thus the attractiveness of external recruitment. 
(3) Finally, the incentives for companies and apprenticeship graduates set by existing 
labor laws, i.e., “employment protection,” could be different in Germany and 
Switzerland. A higher degree of employment protection in Germany than in 
Switzerland would increase the attractiveness of internal labor markets for companies 
and employees in Germany in comparison to Switzerland.  
The following section analyzes the data from the country-comparison project to determine 
whether or not the companies behave conform to the hypotheses elaborated above. 
 
3.5 Discussion of the hypotheses 
3.5.1 Human capital acquired during apprenticeship training 
To explain the comparatively high use of the companies’ own apprenticeship graduates in 
Germany to fill skilled production worker vacancies, we first analyze whether differences in 
the specificity of the skills acquired during the apprenticeship training exist and whether these 
differences can explain the empirical puzzle (Becker, 1964).  
As previously mentioned, apprenticeship training takes place in two learning 
environments: at school and within the company. The school-based part targets on teaching 
general knowledge (Becker, 1964; e.g., general mathematical skills) and broad occupation-
related theoretical knowledge that is portable across companies (Stevens, 1996, 1999). The 
skills acquired in the company-based part may include also company-specific knowledge. Of 
course, training companies have to ensure that they teach the skills described in the 
“occupational profiles”, thus ensuring their portability between different companies within the 
same occupational field. However, apprentices automatically acquire firm-specific knowledge 
during the company-based training, for example, by using special production machines or by 
being integrated into firm-specific organizational processes. The training companies, 
therefore, benefit from taking over their apprentices after graduation by saving on time and 
initial training costs. Consequently, companies should have a growing interest in filling 
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vacancies with their apprenticeship graduates with an increasing amount of company-based 
training (Becker, 1964). Taking the descriptive results into account, one would expect that 
apprentices in Germany acquire more company-specific skills than apprentices in 
Switzerland. The overall length of apprenticeship training, the integration of apprentices in 
the production process, and the share of company-based training are possible influence factors 
on the amount of company-specific skills. 
We focus first on the overall length of the apprenticeship training. In the 
apprenticeship occupations relevant to this study (e.g., polymechanics), the overall length of 
the apprenticeship training is four
42
 years in Switzerland and three and a half years in 
Germany. Therefore, both the school-based and the company-based training periods are 
longer for the Swiss apprentices than for their German counterparts. Second, Swiss 
apprentices are used more productively during the company-based training and are more 
integrated into the organizational processes (see the study of Dionisius et al., 2009, which 
compares 3-year apprenticeships)
43
 and are thus expected to acquire more firm-specific 
knowledge. At the same time the Federal Vocational and Professional Education and Training 
Act in Switzerland requires industry courses at industry training centers (two weeks per 
training year) for all apprentices (thus, three training places actually exist in the Swiss 
system). In these industry courses, apprentices acquire basic occupational skills 
complementary to the skills they learn at school and in the training company (OECD, 2009a). 
On the one hand, these skills prepare apprentices for the production process and therefore 
allow a smoother integration of apprentices (see Franz & Soskice, 1995, for a discussion of 
the complementary relationship between general and specific skills). On the other hand, the 
courses reduce the time that apprentices spend at the company and provide them with highly 
transferable knowledge.  
Interim conclusion 1: From a human capital theory point of view, we find no clear 
differences in the specificity of the skills acquired during apprenticeship training between 
Germany and Switzerland that could explain the differences in the personnel strategies of 
German and Swiss companies. Taking the training institutions and regulations into account, 
we find no indication that the German apprenticeship training is more specific than its Swiss 
counterpart. Given the stronger productive usage of Swiss apprentices rather the opposite 
                                                 
42
 Some apprenticeships in engineering last only three years, e.g., mechanical technician 
(“Mechapraktiker”); however, these 3-year apprenticeships were rare in our Swiss company sample. 
43
 Both facts underscore the strong influence of employers in Swiss apprenticeship training (OECD, 
2009a: 16, “VET system is strongly employer-driven”) 
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seems to be true instead. However, companies might be less interested in the specificity of 
training and more interested in the costs associated with training. The following section 
discusses the cost-benefit aspect and the associated roles of labor market institutions in greater 
detail. 
 
3.5.2 Training costs, labor market institutions, and their effects on (internal) labor 
markets 
Labor market institutions might have an effect on personnel strategies by influencing how 
costs and benefits of apprenticeship training are shared between the training company and the 
apprentice. In the case in which both the company and the apprentice invest in training, both 
have an incentive to stay together. In the case in which only the apprentice invests, the 
company has no major interest in retaining the apprentice. 
Cost-benefit studies comparing German and Swiss apprenticeship training programs 
have shown that German training companies have to bear higher net costs than their Swiss 
counterparts (Dionisius et al., 2009; see also Wenzelmann et al., 2009; Mühlemann et al., 
2007). An important part of apprenticeship training costs is the pay of the apprentices (relative 
to the skilled employees’ wages). One might expect similar relative apprentices’ pay in 
Germany and Switzerland given the similar training contents and design. However, the data 
from national cost-benefit studies and our company sample indicate that apprentices’ relative 
pay is significantly lower in Switzerland compared to Germany (Wenzelmann et al., 2009; 
Mühlemann et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2011, Ryan et al., 2010b). This applies both to the 
apprentices’ relative base pay and relative earnings.  
National cost-benefit studies demonstrate that Swiss apprentices in the metalworking 
sector earn, on average, only half of the relative base pay of their German counterparts across 
all training years. These strong differences also apply to the relative earnings. The results of 
our survey confirm the national-level findings. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 present the relative pay 
and Figures 3-3 and 3-4 present the relative earnings of German and Swiss apprentices by 
apprenticeship year (abscissa). In Figures 3-1 and 3-3, bars are based on national figures, in 
Figures 3-2 and 3-4, bars compare the figures provided by our company sample. Although the 
companies in our sample pay their apprentices more than the country average (apparent when 
comparing Figure 3-1 with Figure 3-2, and Figure 3-3 with Figure 3-4), the pay differences 
between the countries remain constant, both in terms of the relative base pay and relative 
earnings. 
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Figure 3-1: Pay of apprentices as % of the pay of skilled employees in the relevant 
occupations according to the national statistics  
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Data Source: Ryan et al., 2011, Tables 23/24, unpublished data from the 2007 BIBB survey (Wenzelmann et al., 
2009) and the second cost-benefit survey research center for economics of education from the University of 
Berne (Mühlemann et al., 2007) 
Notes: 
National figures: base pay is defined as mean monthly pay, excluding social insurance contributions (employers 
and employees), additional monthly payment, bonus, and overtime. Data for DE and CH are for firms that 
trained apprentices at the time of the survey. Training occupations: mechatronic technician, industrial mechanic, 
electronics technician, operating technology (GER); polymechanics, electronics technician (CH) 
 
Figure 3-2: Pay of apprentices as % of the pay of skilled employees in the relevant 
occupations according to the company sample  
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Data Source: Ryan et al., 2011, Table 25 
Notes: 
Company sample figures: base pay is defined as mean monthly pay; includes 13th month pay and holiday pay 
where paid, excludes bonuses.  
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The difference between the German and Swiss apprentices is particularly large in the first two 
years and becomes smaller in the third and fourth year. While the German apprenticeship 
wages start at a high level and increase only a little by the end, the comparatively low level of 
the initial Swiss apprenticeship wages and their relatively larger increase toward the end of 
the apprenticeship period reflects the fact that apprenticeship wages in Switzerland are more 
strongly related to the apprentices’ productive contributions44.  
 
Figure 3-3: Earnings of apprentices as % of the earnings of skilled employees in the relevant 
occupations according to the national statistics 
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Source: same as Figure 3.1 
Notes: 
National figures: earnings are defined as average monthly pay, including social security contributions 
(employers and employees), additional month(s) pay, and (only in Switzerland) bonus pay. See also notes of 
Figure 3-1. 
 
                                                 
44
 In general, an apprentice’s productivity is very low in the first two years as the apprentice is only 
slightly productively involved in the shop-floor production process and mainly receives basic training 
instead. In our sample, two German and two Swiss companies sent their apprentices to (independent or 
company-owned) training centers, where they acquire basic theoretical and practical occupation-
specific skills, for the first one to two apprenticeship years (see classification Walther, Schweri & 
Wolter, 2005: 256). In the third and fourth year, all apprentices were involved in the production 
process. By the last year, an apprentice’s productivity has increased to up to 90% of a skilled 
employee, according to our Swiss interview partners. 
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Figure 3-4: Earnings of apprentices as % of the earnings of skilled employees in the relevant 
occupations according to the company sample 
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Source: same as Figure 3.2 
Notes: 
Company sample figures: earnings are defined as mean monthly pay, including 13
th
 month pay, holiday pay and 
bonus pay, but not overtime pay. Only three German companies could provide their earnings figures 
 
To explain the differences in the relative apprenticeship pay, we focus on the institutional 
aspects of wage setting
45
. At first glance, several similarities in the investigated subsectors 
exist: as in Germany, Switzerland has a collective bargaining agreement (“Gesamtarbeits-
vertrag”) for the mechanical and electrical engineering industries (“Maschinen-, Elektro- und 
Metallindustrie—MEM”) negotiated among the employer’s side (represented by the 
employers’ association Swissmem), the employees’ side (represented by multiple employees’ 
associations: Employees Switzerland (“Angestellte Schweiz”), the Swiss Commercial 
Association (“Kaufmännischer Verband Schweiz”), the Swiss cadre organization (“Schwei-
zerische Kader-Organisation”), and the trade unions Unia and Syna. Approximately 590 
companies and 101.500 employees (about 37%
46
 of the employees in the MEM-sector) are 
covered (Unia, 2009). However, the collective bargaining agreement in the Swiss engineering 
sector leaves pay to individual agreement between the employer and employee (ASM et al., 
2006: Art. 15.2) and does not include clauses that set definite values for employees’ wages or 
apprenticeship pay
47
.  
                                                 
45
 For further influences on the wage differences, see Ryan et al. (2010b). 
46
 Part-time employees were converted to full-time employees 
47
 Instead, the collective bargaining agreement in the mechanical and electrical engineering industries 
includes regulations on the annual amount of work time, holidays, wage replacement benefits in the 
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In contrast, the German collective bargaining agreement (“Tarifvertrag”) is wage-
relevant both for employees and apprentices. In the German engineering sector, 
approximately 64% (Tijdens & van Klaveren, 2007) of the employees are covered by the 
collective bargaining agreement. All of our German companies are covered by a regional 
collective bargaining agreement. While German employee and apprenticeship wages are, 
therefore, determined simultaneously and at a regional level
48
, Swiss employee
49
 and 
apprenticeship wages are usually set at the company level, independently from each other. 
Swiss employers use non–binding guidelines for the apprenticeship pay provided by 
professional associations (e.g., the Swiss Commercial Association, “Kaufmännischer Verband 
Schweiz”) or by the cantonal offices for the intermediate and vocational schools; in the end, 
however, the training company takes the final decision. 
Determining the employee and apprenticeship pay separately leads to a decoupled 
increase of apprenticeship pay, as the results of our survey demonstrate. Apprenticeship pay 
has not been raised simultaneously with the employee wages by any of the interviewed Swiss 
companies (Table 3-3). In contrast, apprenticeship pay increases by the same percentage as 
the pay of employees in the German companies which are covered by the collective 
bargaining agreement.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
case of illness or accident, maternity leave, further training, and participation in the company (ASM et 
al., 2006).  
48
 In addition, companies that are not covered are affected by the agreement: they have to pay at least 
80% of the negotiated apprenticeship pay (BMBF, 2008). 
49
 In Switzerland, the coordination of employee wages takes partly place by wage surveys, for 
example, conducted by employers’ associations (Swissmem and Swissmechanic). The results are 
provided to the participating companies upon request. 
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Table 3-3: Union recognition and apprentice pay setting  
Number of establishments with attribute  
 
Collective 
bargaining 
agreement
1
Employee 
represen-
tation
2
Setting of 
apprentice 
pay 
collectively 
negotiated
3
Same pay 
raise as 
employees
4
Number of 
companies
Engineering DE 5 5 5 5 5
CH 0 4 0 0 5  
Source: Ryan et al., 2011, parts of Tables 19 and 22 
Notes: 
1) Company belongs to a wage-relevant industry-wide collective bargaining agreement. 
2) “Betriebsrat” in Germany or “Personalkommission” in Switzerland. 
3) Apprenticeship wages are set by industry-wide/regional collective bargaining agreements. 
4) Apprentices receive the same (usually, in terms of percentage) increase at the same time as the regular 
employees in the same occupation. 
 
The relatively low level of apprentices’ pay in Switzerland compared to Germany can also be 
traced back to differences in the major aims of the unions. In our interview with a Swiss labor 
union representative responsible for youth activities in one of the most important unions in the 
Swiss MEM sector (with 20.000 members in this sector and involved in the collective 
bargaining negotiations), the interviewee told us that their primary goal is a sufficient volume 
of apprenticeship training, which could be endangered by higher apprenticeship pay.   
The explicitly mentioned major aims of the labor union illustrate the different logic of 
the apprenticeship systems in Germany and Switzerland, which is also reflected in the 
national cost-benefit studies (Mühlemann et al., 2007; Schönfeld et al., 2010). While the 
institutional setting in Switzerland allows for lower training costs
50
 to employers, the goals 
and the greater influence of the German unions has led to a situation in which German 
companies bear comparatively higher training costs than their Swiss counterparts
51
. The 
impact of this cost difference is also potentially reflected by the higher apprenticeship rate in 
Swiss companies (15%) compared to that in German companies (9%).  
The higher net costs for German companies can explain the high rate of takeover 
offers to apprentices in Germany (99%) and the comparatively low rate of takeover offers to 
apprentices in Switzerland (57%). German companies rely to a larger degree on the post-
                                                 
50
 However, this difference in focus is not at the expense of training quality (see the similarities 
between apprenticeship training systems previously described). 
51
 Besides the lower pay, the cost difference results from the previously mentioned higher productive 
assignment at the workplace and the longer training period in the last year, during which the 
apprentices are the most productive (see, notably, the survey of Dionisius et al., 2009, who show the 
determinants of cost differences and their relevance for a 3-year apprenticeship). 
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training benefits than their Swiss counterparts (Mühlemann et al., 2010). Furthermore, this 
takeover behavior has important implications for the existence and attractiveness of an 
occupational labor market as shown by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).  
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) argue, for the German case, that training companies 
become aware of their apprentices’ true ability52 during the apprenticeship training. This 
information allows the company to offer low-ability workers a wage equal to their 
productivity. Therefore, mainly a negative selection of apprentices leaves the companies, as 
the average market wages are higher (as this wage reflects the expected ability of the workers 
available on the market). Good apprentices are offered the market wage (or a little more) by 
their training companies and thus would experience a wage loss when leaving the company.  
Therefore, good apprentices have an incentive to accept the employment offers from their 
training companies.  
However, these information asymmetries in terms of apprentice abilities should not 
differ between Germany and Switzerland. What differs, however, is the need of German 
companies to retain their apprentices to cover the apprenticeship training costs. Therefore, 
most of the apprentices including also some that may perform less well are still retained and 
only the worst selection leaves
53
. In contrast, the Swiss companies interviewed explained that 
they let their apprenticeship graduates leave because they would not have had an open 
position at the time of graduation (see the discussion on “long-term personnel planning” in the 
next section). Therefore, the separation between the apprentice and the training company is 
not necessarily associated with a low ability of an apprentices but a lack of a vacancy for a 
skilled production worker at the time of graduation. The companies can afford not to retain 
their apprenticeship graduates for times of staff demand as their training costs are 
comparatively lower. 
In sum, all of the factors discussed above lead to the surprising combination of low 
apprentice takeover and high external recruitment in Switzerland. The reduced danger of a 
negative selection and the higher volatility on the market of apprenticeship graduates (see 
takeover rates) cause the external recruitments of skilled employees to be more attractive in 
                                                 
52
 In contrast to Katz and Ziderman (1990), who focus on the information asymmetry in the amount 
and quality of training a worker receives. However, this explanation does not fit well with the highly 
regulated and externally certified case of the German and Swiss apprenticeship training systems. 
53
 Of course, exogenous separation also occurs (Wolter & Ryan, 2011), and not all apprentices accept 
a company’s contract offer. However, our figures show that almost all apprentices in Germany do 
accept the contract offers. 
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Switzerland than in Germany and offer companies the possibility to recruit personnel when 
needed instead of keeping employees on stock. 
In addition, the collective bargaining agreement in the Swiss engineering sector 
provides the necessary freedom to the Swiss companies to decide whether and how many 
apprentices they would like to take. The apprentices and the company sign an apprenticeship 
contract that automatically ends after the successful completion of the final examination. The 
company has no legal obligation to take over the apprenticeship graduates. The same applies 
in principle to Germany. However, a wide range of German collective bargaining agreements 
tries to influence the takeover behavior of companies. In 2005, 121 agreements on collectively 
negotiated measures to foster training (“Vereinbarungen zur tariflichen Ausbildungs-
förderung”) existed (partly, also in the engineering sector, IG Metall, 2005). 96 regulations 
covering 7.8 million employees included regulations on the takeover behavior of companies 
(Beicht & Berger, 2006). The takeover period is usually half a year or a whole year. No 
comparable regulations exist in the collective bargaining agreements in Switzerland; the 
takeover decision is left to the company. 
In addition to the regulations in the collective bargaining agreements, influential 
German works councils also play a major role in the takeover behavior of companies. As 
Soskice (1994) has already argued, works councils have little interest in replacing their own 
apprentices with external skilled employees and use their influence to assert their claims. A 
current example is the pressure of the Bosch works council in Feuerbach (Baden-
Wuerttemberg). As Bosch offered only 30 of its 104 apprentices a permanent contract (the 
remaining apprentices were offered a temporary contract) the works council organized a daily 
“solemn vigil” supported by the union IG Metall. The works council objected because Bosch 
recruited 80 temporary employees the month before. The company reacted to the pressure; 
negotiations were conducted, and the company conceded (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 
1.12.2010)
54
. In the Bosch plant in Reutlingen, the works council enforced the takeover of 35 
apprentices even though the company planned no takeovers at all. More than 1000 employees 
supported the apprentices’ request (IG-Metall, 2011). Furthermore, besides protests, works 
councils can refuse to agree on new hires, according to §99, II, 2 BetrVG, and signal to the 
employer that the takeover of apprentices has the highest priority (IG-Metall, 2001).  
                                                 
54
 The chairman of the group works council, Alfred Löckle said: “In such a situation, one cannot 
recruit externally, instead of giving all own apprentices permanent contracts“. – „Aber man darf in so 
einer Situation doch niemanden von außen einstellen, statt die eigenen Auszubildenden komplett 
unbefristet zu übernehmen.“ 
 57 
 
In our sample, some companies explicitly told us that they feel pressure from the 
works council to takeover all apprentices (which is consistent with the results of Kriechel et 
al., 2011). During recent years, works councils have even had agreements to give apprentices 
unlimited contracts
55
, raising the problem that the companies have to keep positions open for 
the apprenticeship graduates even when these have to go into the military service. The issue 
of taking over all apprentices is at the top of the works council agenda. One German company 
told us that the works council would like the company to train more apprentices; however, 
their first priority is that all apprenticeship graduates receive a contract
56
. This institutional 
pressure contributes to the fact that German companies have a long-term personnel 
planning
57
. In contrast to the response from the Swiss companies that they had no open 
positions for apprentices at the time of their graduation, the German counterparts had to plan 
in advance to keep positions open for the apprentices. 
Employee representation in Switzerland plays a comparatively minor role (ICTWSS 
database, 2009). The employee representation of the interviewed Swiss companies (four out 
of five companies had an employee representation) is mainly a “communication channel” 
between the management and the employees. In two of four companies with employee 
representation, the “Personalkommission” is involved in the setting of employees’ wages. 
Nevertheless, the employee representation does not play an explicit role in deciding whether 
apprentices are taken over or whether employees are recruited from the external market. 
Therefore, Swiss companies have—in contrast to their German counterparts—freedom of 
action regarding their personnel strategies.  
Interim conclusion 2: Labor market institutions (trade unions, works councils, and 
collective bargaining agreements) enclosing the apprenticeship system have a crucial 
influence on the personnel strategies of companies. The institutional setting in Germany leads 
to comparatively higher net costs. Therefore, companies need to retain their apprentices to 
                                                 
55
 One personnel manager told us: “The works council always participates in the hiring process. (…). 
There has been a commitment due to the works council agreement that all apprentices have to be taken 
over for one year. This commitment has now been changed to give them unlimited contracts.” 
56
 These statements contrast the previously described priorities of Swiss unions. In addition, these 
statements are consistent with the results of Backes-Gellner, Frick, and Sadowski (1997) who found 
that there was a lower proportion of apprentices per employee in companies with a works council than 
in companies without a works council. 
57
 This is consistent with Freeman and Lazear’s (1995) finding that works councils lead to a long-term 
perspective of workers (Hirsch, Schank, and Schnabel, 2010, find a lower separation rate in companies 
with works councils compared to companies without works council). Therefore, companies with a 
works council invest more in firm-specific and general human capital. This investment leads to higher 
net training costs and reinforces the process previously described. 
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amortize their net costs. Even if the company could afford to let the apprentices leave, 
collective bargaining agreements and works councils work toward achieving a high takeover 
percentage. By contrast, Swiss companies can more likely afford—both regarding the 
financial and institutional pressures—to train over their needs and let apprenticeship graduates 
leave for the external labor market, which is thus an attractive skill pool when new personnel 
is required.  
 
3.5.3 Employment protection and classification of Switzerland and Germany in the 
international context 
Finally, we analyze the incentives for companies and apprenticeship graduates set by existing 
labor law, i.e., “employment protection”. We expect that a higher degree of employment 
protection will lead to a stronger focus of companies and employees on internal labor markets, 
as shown by previous literature. Several authors (e.g., Cappelli, 2004; Acemoglu & Pischke, 
1999; Harhoff & Kane, 1997) refer to search and matching frictions as an incentive to invest 
in general training (such as apprenticeship training) because it serves as a screening device for 
future employees, and a high level of employment protection increases this incentive. High 
employment protection hampers (by high firing costs) dismissals of employees that have 
proven to be a poor match to the company. Therefore, selecting future employees from the 
pool of apprentices during the training period is less risky than recruiting employees from the 
external market, in particular, in countries with high levels of employment protection because 
the apprenticeship contract automatically ends with an apprentices’ graduation and does not 
require any additional dismissal costs.  
The OECD’s index on employment protection (2008) indicates a significantly higher 
level of protection for permanent employees against dismissal in Germany than in 
Switzerland. German permanent employees have the third highest employment protection 
rating among all OECD-countries (the German value is 2.85 on the OECD index, which is 
scaled from 0=least stringent to 6=most restrictive). Switzerland has the fourth lowest 
employment protection rating in the OECD area (OECD index value of 1.19). The reasons for 
the large differences in employment protection (and therefore firing costs) are procedural 
issues. While Swiss companies can terminate an employment contract simply by a written 
statement, German companies have to provide reasons for dismissals: the dismissal must be 
socially justified; third parties such as works councils have to be informed; and if the 
employee can be transferred to another position within the company, he or she cannot be 
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dismissed (German dismissal law, “Kündigungsschutzgesetz”).  For German companies, the 
high firing costs (and the high search and selection costs that occur due to the anticipated 
dismissal costs) increase the attractiveness of internal recruitment by taking over already 
screened apprenticeship graduates and filling a high share of skilled worker vacancies with 
them.  
The German combination of high employment protection and of other labor market 
institutions (unions, works councils) are complementary in the sense that they both push for a 
high takeover rate of apprenticeship graduates and long-term personnel planning. This 
complementary relationship is the result of previous developments such as the successful push 
by unions for higher employment protection (1951 Dismissal Protection Act, see 
Emmenegger & Marx, 2010).  
Employment protection creates complementary incentives for companies and 
employees. For employees in Germany, a long tenure and a long-term investment in 
company-specific knowledge are rational (Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Wasmer, 
2006). A high level of employment protection functions as insurance that the employees can 
reap the returns on their investments in company-specific skills. In contrast, due to the low 
level of employment protection in Switzerland and the associated low job security with a 
company, employees in Swiss companies will invest less in company-specific knowledge and 
try to accumulate more occupation-specific knowledge by changing companies. Therefore, we 
find that the higher turnover of Swiss apprenticeship graduates is embedded in an overall 
environment of higher mobility. Our data show a labor turnover of 4% in Swiss companies 
compared to 2% in their German counterparts
58
. The higher volatility of the Swiss 
occupational labor market increases the appeal of external recruitment by reducing the 
searching cost to find an appropriate person.  
Interim conclusion 3: Germany and Switzerland differ significantly in their degree of 
employment protection, thus providing different incentives to employees and companies. 
Under high employment protection regulations such as those in Germany, both employers and 
employees focus on internal labor markets. However, when confronted with a low level of 
employment protection such as in Switzerland, employers focus more strongly on external 
recruitment, while employees exhibit higher mobility.  
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 Our figure for Switzerland is even smaller than the average labor turnover in the Swiss MEM sector 
(8.9%, see Henneberger & Sousa-Poza, 2007). Unfortunately, no comparative figure for the German 
engineering sector exists according to the German Federal Statistical Office.  
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As our two-country comparison suffers from a small dataset, we embed our results in a 
broader context to examine their plausibility. Therefore, we use the VoC approach (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001), which classifies countries according to their institutions (among others the 
education and training system and industrial relations institutions) as either liberal (main 
example: USA) or coordinated market economies (main example: Germany). In liberal 
market economies, employment protection is low, no industry-wide wage agreements exist, 
and employee representation is rather weak. Coordinated market economies show a high 
degree of codetermination via industry-wide wage agreements, influential trade unions and 
works councils, and are characterized by high employment protection.  
The institutional setting has important labor market and training consequences. In 
liberal market economies like the U.S., the individual has the responsibility to acquire general 
skills and has to bear the associated training costs. The U.S. labor market at the national level 
is characterized by high labor turnover, and companies show no affinity for long-term 
personnel planning but adjust their labor force by reducing the number of employees if 
necessary and recruiting external employees if a need for them arises (Houseman & Abraham, 
1995; Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
The cluster analyses of Paunescu and Schneider (2004) show that Switzerland (at the 
national level) has a strong tendency toward a liberal market economy. For 1999, the authors 
even categorize Switzerland in the same cluster as the U.S. Certainly, the VET system differs 
significantly between Switzerland and the U.S. However, the Swiss labor market institutions 
resemble more the U.S. than Germany. Therefore, the higher investments of Swiss 
apprentices compared to German apprentices in (at least occupationally) transferable human 
capital among others via lower relative pay follows the logic of a liberal market economy. 
Additionally, the behavior of companies to rely to a high degree on external recruitment 
instead of long-term planning with their own apprentices reveals similarities to the behavior 
of U.S. companies. The higher fluidity of the (occupational) labor market completes the 
picture.  
In contrast, Germany not only exhibits features of a coordinated market economy, but 
also tends—especially in the first years59 after the apprenticeship—toward a segmentalist 
system with strong internal labor markets (Thelen & Kume, 1999; Thelen & Busemeyer, 
2011). The generally accepted apprenticeship certificate should enable mobility; however, it 
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 In the following chapter, we analyze whether the focus on internal labor markets continues at a 
higher hierarchical level. 
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serves—at least in our sample—more as “insurance” (Soskice, 1994). In addition, the long-
term personnel planning of German companies, the comparatively low labor turnover, the 
high takeover rate of apprenticeship graduates, and the low level of external recruitment 
correspond well to Japan’s segmentalist system. Therefore, our results are consistent in an 
international context. 
 
3.6 Conclusions and limitations 
The results of our matched-pair study show that Swiss engineering companies draw—
compared to their German counterparts—to a surprisingly low extent on their own apprentices 
to fill vacancies for skilled production workers but rely on external recruitment to a large 
degree instead. A micro-level analysis of the human capital acquired during the 
apprenticeship period does not provide an explanation. However, Switzerland and Germany 
differ significantly in their sectoral and national labor market institutions and thus form 
complementary systems in themselves, which can explain the different personnel strategies.  
In Germany, high net training costs (a result of higher relative training pay, among 
others), collective bargaining agreements, influential works councils, and a high level of 
employment protection serve as complements and push for a high takeover rate of 
apprenticeship graduates, long-term employment, and a high share of apprenticeship 
graduates filling skilled production employee vacancies. In contrast, Swiss companies are 
both financially and institutionally less dependent on the long-term employment of their 
apprentices. Instead, they let their apprenticeship graduates go when they have no need for 
them and rely on external recruitment in times of demand of employees. The low level of 
employment protection in Switzerland is complementary to this strategy.  
Our study has several limitations. We cannot exclude the possibility that the results are 
biased in such a way that fewer apprentices than usual have been offered a contract in 
Switzerland because of the economic crisis in 2008 and 2009. Two arguments, however, 
contradict a systematic bias in our findings. First, we interviewed matched-pair companies in 
Germany and Switzerland that produce similar products and compete on the same markets. 
Therefore, an economic shock should have hit the companies in both countries to the same 
extent without leading to a lower takeover percentage in only one country (e.g., Switzerland). 
Second, the recruitment question concerning qualified employees aimed at the usual external 
recruitment. Therefore, the effects of the current economic factors should at least be 
smoothed.  
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Furthermore, our data set consists of only a few companies and does not contain non-
training companies. Therefore, an integrated investigation of the effect of labor market 
institutions on the training behavior of German and Swiss companies is not possible (on this 
aspect, see, e.g., Mühlemann et al., 2010). In addition, our German companies are larger than 
our Swiss companies. This size difference could bias our results. We cannot exclude this 
possibility; however, the small company size in Switzerland may not be exogenous but may 
reflect the difficulty in establishing strong internal labor markets in such a liberal institutional 
setting.  
The results provide important insights and the motivation for further research. How 
can Germany and Switzerland have such different labor market institutions but have 
succeeded in establishing such similar apprenticeship systems? How can Swiss companies 
with (high) training costs survive in such a liberal institutional setting (one possibility could 
be regional monopsonies, Mühlemann, Ryan & Wolter, 2011)? Moreover, it would be 
interesting to investigate if and to what extent the implications of the VoC approach can be 
transferred to further training because Swiss employers bear approximately 50% of the further 
training costs of the labor force (Messer & Wolter, 2009).  
From a policy perspective, the future developments will be of major interest. Since the 
number of young people is decreasing due to demographic changes, it remains to be seen 
whether Swiss companies increase the takeover rate of apprentices and thus their internal 
recruitment. Additionally, the wages of apprentices (and, therefore, the company’s training 
costs) may be increased in the future to attract a sufficient number of applicants. Furthermore, 
unions have shown increased interest in demanding higher apprenticeship pay rates (20 
Minuten, March 9, 2011: Gewerkschaften fordern höhere Lehrlingslöhne) and aim to include 
binding regulations in collective bargaining agreements. The future will show how these 
developments will affect the personnel strategies of Swiss companies. 
 
After highlighting the strong effect of labor market institutions on the companies’ personnel 
strategies at the level of skilled production employees, we investigate the effect of labor 
market institutions at the next hierarchical level in the following chapter. In addition, we 
include countries in which the VET systems differ from the German and Swiss dual 
apprenticeship system.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
 
Promotion patterns–a matter of vocational education and training and  
labor market institutions. 
An international comparison of U.S., German, Japanese, and Swiss 
manufacturing and retailing companies 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Internal labor markets in general and promotions in particular are widely studied in scientific 
fields such as economics, political science, industrial relations, and sociology (e.g., Lazear, 
2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Marsden, 1999; Osterman, 2011
60
). The broad interest in internal 
promotions as one aspect of internal labor markets exists because promotion figures allow for 
the measurement of whether a company is attempting and succeeding in attracting and 
retaining loyal talents and thus company-specific knowledge by offering attractive 
development opportunities. Despite the valuable insights of previous research, only little 
empirical evidence exists on within- and between-country differences in internal labor market 
structures and companies’ promotion patterns. Therefore, we analyze why companies’ rates of 
internal promotion to the supervisory level are so much more prominent in some economies 
than in others.  
In doing so, we draw on the economic and institutional literatures. New Personnel 
Economics explains differences in internal labor markets from an optimization and efficiency 
point of view (Lazear & Shaw, 2007). Varying constraints such as differences in technologies 
or business cycle positions at the time of measurement may cause variation in internal labor 
markets. Individual preferences explain the remaining differences, which arise as a 
consequence of the trade-offs between the four prerequisites for internal labor markets 
(match-specific investments, risk aversion, asymmetric information, and transaction costs, 
                                                 
60
 See also Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Gibbons & Waldman, 1999a; Chan, 1996; Fairburn & Malcomson, 
2001; Waldman, 2003; Marsden, 1986; Eyraud, Marsden & Silvestre, 1990; Doeringer & Piore, 1985; 
Dore, 1973; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 2007; Osterman, 1994; Rosenbaum, 1984; Bruderl, 
Diekmann & Preisendorfer, 1991; Althauser, 1989. 
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Wachter & Wright, 1990
61
). However, even if companies appear to be exposed to the same 
economic constraints differences still remain (Osterman, 2011). In particular, individual 
preferences are unlikely to differ greatly by countries, thus such explanations concede ground 
to institutional labor economics, which considers labor markets to be “institutional 
phenomena” (Marsden, 1986: 231; Osterman, 2011). 
Most institutional literature that focuses on internal labor markets points out the 
existence of complementarities among institutions such as educational (the vocational 
education and training (VET) system) and labor market-related institutions (such as 
employment protection). The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, for example, 
categorizes countries according to their complementary institutions and uses these categories 
to explain country-level differences in internal labor markets (e.g., Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Thelen, 2007). While the VoC approach stays mainly at the national level, some international 
comparative studies focus on the company itself
62
 and its promotion pattern. Eyraud, 
Marsden, and Silvestre (1990), for example, analyze (internal) labor markets in the 
manufacturing sectors in the UK and France and stress the complementary interplay among 
the VET system, the industrial relations systems, labor management, and labor market 
structures (see also Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986; Sorge & Warner, 1980; Maurice, 
Sorge & Warner, 1980; Marsden, 1982).   
Although the economic and institutional approaches are often treated as alternatives, 
they are actually complements because neither stands well on its own. On one side, the 
economic view does not fully explain all of the (cross- and within-country) differences in 
internal labor markets and promotion patterns. On the other side, the institutional view seems 
to pay too much attention to the complementarities of VET and labor market institutions and 
too little on possible contradictions that arise when VET systems are analyzed economically 
with regard to the transferability of skills acquired from VET. A differentiated view allows us 
to analyze whether VET and labor market institutions have separate effects on the structure of 
internal labor markets and internal promotion patterns and whether these separate effects 
reinforce or weaken each other. A possible example for opposing effects is the combination of 
company-specific, non-certified VET that strengthens internal promotions according to 
human capital theory and liberal labor market institutions that imply that employees are less 
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 See also Becker, 1964, Gordon, 1974, Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Holmstrom, 1983; Hart & 
Holmstrom, 1987; Riordan & Wachter, 1982; Williamson, Wachter & Harris, 1975. 
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 Some studies compare data on wage-tenure profiles and turnover in companies in the U.S. and Japan 
but do not explicitly take the promotion behavior of companies into account (Mincer & Higuchi, 1988; 
Hashimoto & Raisian, 1985; Levine, 1993; Blinder & Krueger, 1996).  
 65 
 
willing to invest in company-specific knowledge and will try to change jobs to gain a broad 
labor market experience and to insure against possible lay-offs. 
 Capturing these separate effects of VET and labor market institutions necessitates an 
in-depth analysis using company-level personnel records in different countries supplemented 
by institutional characteristics and qualitative information as requested by Baker and 
Holmstrom (1995). We, therefore, draw on interview data from matched-pair companies in 
the engineering and retailing sectors in Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S. and use 
qualitative and quantitative information on internal promotions, labor market institutions, and 
VET provided in the company.  
The comparison of matched-pair engineering and retailing companies in Germany, 
Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S. shows that the type of VET and the type of labor market 
institutions have separate effects on internal labor markets as measured by the percentage of 
internal promotions to the supervisory level. While companies that provide company-specific 
and non-certified VET show a higher percentage of internal promotion than their counterparts 
with occupation-specific and certified VET, companies with more coordinated labor market 
institutions show a higher percentage of internal promotion than their counterparts acting in 
more liberal labor market institutions. Given these results, we find that companies in both 
Japan and Switzerland constitute “complementary” cases in the sense that both dimensions—
VET and labor market institutions—reinforce each others’ effects on internal labor markets. 
In contrast, German and U.S. companies constitute “mixed cases,” where VET and labor 
market institutions weaken each others’ effects on internal promotions. At least with regard to 
internal promotion patterns, these results contrast with previous literature that stresses the 
high coherence of VET and labor market institutions in Germany and the U.S. (e.g., Hall & 
Soskice, 2001).  
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the relevant 
literature dealing with internal labor markets and internal promotions in organizations. By 
combining economic and institutional literature, we develop an analytical matrix and derive 
our research hypotheses. The third section describes the data and places companies in the four 
countries analyzed in the quadrants of our analytical matrix. The fourth section tests the 
hypotheses concerning the separate effects of VET and labor market institutions on the 
promotion pattern of companies. The final section discusses our results and concludes. 
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4.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Our theoretical analysis of promotion patterns is based on institutional and economic 
literatures. We first discuss the institutional literature by presenting, on the one hand, the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, which provides a broad picture of both VET systems 
and labor market institutions at the country level and which highlights the idea of 
complementarities between these two dimensions, and on the other hand, a literature that is 
more case study-based and which offers a more detailed look at differences between VET 
systems. We then analyze the implications of the institutional literature for promotion 
patterns. Second, we discuss the economic literature by focusing on Becker’s (1964) human 
capital theory and related literature that highlight the importance of the transferability of 
skills. We then analyze the implications of human capital theory for promotion patterns. 
Finally, we use insights from both the institutional and economic literatures to construct our 
analysis matrix that separates the influences of VET and labor market institutions and allows 
us to derive our hypotheses.    
A large variety of labor market institutions exist (e.g., Freeman, 2008). The same is 
true for (vocational) education and training systems, which show a variety ranging from dual 
apprenticeship systems to company-specific training (see Chapter 2). In their well-known 
VoC approach, Hall and Soskice (2001) systemize the variation and categorize countries 
according to their institutional settings, which they define in terms of education and training 
system, corporate governance, internal structure of the firm, industrial relations, and inter-
company relations. Depending on the interplay among the factors described, countries can be 
categorized along a continuum between “liberal” (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Streeck, 200163) and 
“coordinated” market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Soskice, 199164). Typical examples 
of the most coherent cases of the continuum are the United States for the liberal pole and 
Germany for the coordinated pole.  
Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that the complementarity of the institutional settings is 
highest in the polar cases, leading to different internal labor market structures. The U.S.’s 
combination of low employment protection, no obligation to establish employee 
representation, and little or no wage coordination (i.e., weak employer coordination and no 
industry-wide collective bargaining agreements) are main characteristics of the liberal 
category. In such a constellation, individuals have an incentive to invest in general and 
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King and Wood (1999). 
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transferable skills, allowing for high employee mobility and leading to weak internal labor 
markets
65
. In contrast, firm-specific accumulation of knowledge becomes possible in 
Germany because of its combination of high employment protection, strong employee 
representation, employer- and wage-coordination, and the acquisition of specific
66
 skills via 
the German VET system (dual apprenticeship training, Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
The VoC approach, with its notion of coherence and complementarity, adds to our 
understanding of the mechanism through which labor market institutions impact internal labor 
markets in general and promotions in particular. A high degree of employment protection 
gives employees an incentive to stay with the company and to focus on company-internal 
careers (see, e.g. Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Wasmer, 2006). Also the company 
has a high incentive to promote employees from within when employment protection is high, 
as an external recruitment is related with uncertainty and risk and a separation in case of a 
mismatch is difficult and costly. Employee representation increases tenure and strengthens 
internal labor markets by increasing employees’ employment security and satisfaction and 
their willingness to acquire company-specific knowledge (see e.g. Hirsch, Schank & 
Schnabel, 2010). Therefore, a broad pool of possible internal successor exists. Finally, 
employer and wage coordination reduces the danger of poaching and the employees’ 
incentives to change companies (see e.g., Culpepper, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001), which also 
increases the pool on internal candidates. Together, all of the labor market institutional 
components are complementary and the possibility of companies to rely on internal 
candidates when filling positions at the supervisory level.  
As the VoC approach distinguishes between general and specific skills and regards 
apprenticeship training as specific thus contributing to strong internal labor markets, Germany 
is characterized as coordinated labor market economy and in the same category like Japan. 
However, the role of apprenticeship training – as one form of VET – for internal labor 
markets is controversially discussed. Marsden (1986, 1990), for example, argues that 
apprenticeship training is the basis for occupational labor markets. Given the standardization, 
thus the comparatively low firm-specificity, the breadth, the relevance, and the country-wide 
accepted certification of apprenticeship training, the classification of Germany with its 
occupation-specific and certified VET in the same category as Japan with its highly company-
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specific and non-certified VET seems puzzling. Although asymmetric information on the 
trainee and an adverse selection problem may reduce mobility (Katz & Ziderman 1990; 
Acemoglu & Pischke 1998), several studies show that such a standardized, broad, and 
certified kind of VET as existent in Germany enables mobility between companies and 
individual career development (e.g., Backes-Gellner, Mure & Geel 2011; Finegold, Wagner & 
Mason 2000; Crouch, Finegold & Sako 1999; Hinz 1999; Keltner, Finegold & Pager 1996; 
Allmendinger 1989; Marsden 1986). 
To the discussion on the strength of internal labor markets and promotion patterns in 
different VET systems, economic literature gives valuable insights. Becker’s human capital 
theory (1964), for example, focuses on the specificity of skills and argues that the probability 
of internal promotion is high when training is company-specific and when specific human 
capital is necessary for performing a specific task (Topel, 1991; Felli & Harris, 1996)
67
. Kahn 
and Huberman (1988) and Prendergast (1993) argue that also the reverse causality can explain 
high internal promotion: only when employees have the company’s credible commitment that 
the investment in company-specific human capital will pay off, these investments take place. 
Due to the relevance of specificity and transferability of skills, economic literature clearly 
differentiates between firm-specific and occupation-specific training (e.g., Stevens, 1994). 
Occupation-specific training is much less specific to a certain company and shows higher 
transferability, which, therefore, has consequences for the promotion behavior of companies.  
Due to structural differences in the specificity and transferability of VET, more 
differentiated approaches seem necessary and have partly emerged. Thelen (2007) identifies 
three different systems at the country level based on skill specificity, industrial relations, and 
labor market institutions. In addition to the liberal market economy, she differentiates within 
the coordinated countries between “collectivist” (occupational skills, e.g., Germany) and 
“segmentalist” (firm-specific, e.g., Japan) countries (see also Busemeyer, 2009 for a 
discussion on a new categorization of (coordinated) skill regimes using “vocational specificity 
of education system” and “firm involvement in skill formation process”).  
We follow these approaches and differentiate between “collectivist” for occupation-
specific, certified and “segmentalist” for firm-specific, non-certified VET as major influence 
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factor for promotion patterns in companies. Given the effect of labor market institutions, as 
shown by the VoC approach, on internal labor markets, we also differentiate between 
coordinated and liberal labor market institutional settings. Therefore, we create a four-field 
matrix with the type of VET on the y-axis and the type of labor market institutions on the x-
axis (Figure 4-1) to analyze the separate effects of both dimensions on promotion patterns. 
 
Figure 4-1: Analytical matrix 
 
Source: own model 
 
According to the previously described theoretical and empirical findings from the human 
capital literature, we derive the following relationships between VET and promotion patterns:  
 
H1: Companies with largely company-specific and non-certified VET show a 
higher percentage of internal promotion than companies where VET is largely 
occupation-specific and certified.  
We derive subsidiary hypotheses from H1: 
H1a: The percentage of internal promotion in quadrant III > the percentage 
of internal promotion in quadrant II  
H1b: The percentage of internal promotion in quadrant IV > the percentage 
of internal promotion in quadrant I 
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From the description in the previous section of the two polar cases, Germany and the U.S., we 
derive the following relationships between labor market institutions and promotion patterns:  
 
H2: Companies acting in coordinated labor market institutions show a higher 
percentage of internal promotion than companies acting in liberal labor market 
institutions. 
We derive subsidiary hypotheses from H2:  
H2a: The percentage of internal promotion in quadrant II > the percentage 
of internal promotion in quadrant I  
H2b: The percentage of internal promotion in quadrant III > the percentage 
of internal promotion in quadrant IV 
 
The matrix allows us to identify four different cases, which may either be “complementary” 
or “mixed” in terms of the effect of the two influence factors on the promotion behavior of 
companies.  
Company-specific, non-certified VET and coordinated labor market institutions, such 
as high employment protection, employee representation, and collective bargaining 
agreements, reinforce each other’s effect because both dimensions provide incentives for 
strong internal labor markets and a high percentage of internal promotion (quadrant III). 
Similarly, occupation-specific, certified VET and liberal labor market institutions such as low 
employment protection, weak or non-existent employee representation, and little or no wage 
coordination, reinforce each other’s effect because both dimensions provide incentives for 
weak internal labor markets and a low percentage of internal promotion (quadrant I). 
However, the two dimensions can also weaken each other. Occupation-specific, 
certified VET enables mobility between companies and conveys only a limited amount of 
firm-specific skills thus decreasing the incentive to promote internally; however, coordinated 
labor market institutions, such as high employment protection, employee representation, and 
wage coordination, create incentives to stay with the company, to invest in firm-specific 
skills, and to strive for a firm-internal career (quadrant II). Similarly, company-specific, non-
certified VET incentivizes the company and the employee to create and follow internal 
careers; however, liberal labor market institutions, such as low employment protection, non-
existent employee representation, and little or no wage coordination, encourage employees to 
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leave the company to gather further experience and thus insure against the danger of layoffs 
(quadrant IV). We investigate these relationships with the data described in the following 
section. 
 
4.3 Data and company categorization 
We use data gathered via interviews with personnel and plant managers in the engineering 
and retailing sectors (see Chapter 2). Following Osterman (1984), who argues that the correct 
unit of analysis is a subunit such as a department or even a shop (rather than the entire 
company), we use data at the plant level in engineering and at the store level (either a single 
store or a group of stores) in retailing. We chose matched-pair companies according to their 4-
digit SIC codes (see Chapter 2), thereby ensuring that they produce or sell similar products 
and are faced with a similar production technology. In the engineering sector, we concentrate 
on producers of pumps, turbines, and compressors, and in the retailing sector we concentrate 
on department stores and on stores selling shoes, electronic devices, groceries, and furniture 
(Table 4-1); in the following sections, we use “company” as a synonym for “plant” and 
“store”. 
 
Table 4-1: Number of companies by sector (SIC 1987) 
Sector Subsector SIC 1987 GER CH U.S. JPN
Engineering Pumps and pumping equipment 3561 4 3 4 2
Turbines and turbine generator sets
Air and gas compressors
All engineering subsectors 6 6 6 5
Sector Subsector SIC 1987 GER CH U.S. JPN
Retailing Department stores 5311 1 3 3 1
Grocery stores 5411 3 1 1 3
Shoe stores 5661 2 1 1 1
Furniture stores 5712 1 1 1 0
Radio, TV and electronics stores 5731 0 1 1 0
All retailing subsectors 7 7 7 5
3
3511, 3563
2 3 2
 
Source: GER and CH, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 1; the U.S. and JPN, own fieldwork. 
 
According to the size definition of the EU (European Commission, 2005), our sample 
includes 37 large companies with 250 or more employees (all companies in Germany, 9 
companies in Switzerland, 5 companies in the U.S., and all companies in Japan) and 12 
medium-sized companies between 50 and 249 employees (4 companies in Switzerland, 8 
companies in the U.S.). In engineering, all of our data refer to a particular production plant. In 
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retailing, we contacted both single stores (department stores and large supermarkets with at 
least 50 employees) and the (regional) headquarters. However, also in the companies where 
the unit is the entire company, we gathered aggregated information on the stores themselves.  
 
Categorization of companies within countries in the analytical matrix 
To test our hypotheses, we first need to fill every quadrant of our analytical matrix by 
including an example for every possible combination of VET and labor market institutions. 
Therefore, we investigated companies in four very different countries: Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland, and the U.S. Instead of using country-level data for measuring labor market 
institutions and VET as several previous studies have (Paunescu & Schneider, 2004; Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009; Kogut & Ragin, 2006), we use data from companies
68
. To analyze the 
specificity and certification of VET programs, we posed the following questions in our 
investigation: 
 What are your initial VET programs at the intermediate skill level? 
 How long is the initial VET period? 
 Are the skills learned during initial VET certified, and are these certificates generally 
accepted within the sector? 
 
For VET, we identify similarities between companies in two countries, Germany and 
Switzerland: all of the companies offer broad, occupation-specific VET (apprenticeship 
training) that lasts 3 to 4 years in engineering, and 2 to 3 years in retailing. This VET design is 
commonly agreed upon at the occupational level and includes company-internal, school-
based, and (partly) inter-company components. The VET content—including the company-
internal VET—focuses on broad vocational competencies, reducing the company-specific 
skills to a comparatively low share (in Germany on average 12%, Pfeifer, Schönfeld & 
Wenzelmann, 2011). VET in all of our German and Swiss companies ends with an exam and 
an official certification of the acquired skills for those who meet the standards. Due to the 
broad and standardized VET and the exams developed at national level, the VET certificate is 
accepted all over the country and allows skilled persons to switch between companies 
relatively easily (for further comparison of the training systems, Teuber et al., 2011; OECD, 
2009a; OECD, 2010b; Chapter 3).  
                                                 
68
 By using company-level data, we take into account a main point of contention of country-level 
categorizations, which have been criticized of ignoring within-system diversity (Hancké, Rhodes & 
Thatcher, 2007).  
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In contrast, companies in the other two countries, Japan and the U.S., provide mainly 
company-specific VET that is non-certified. The length of VET varies: Japanese companies 
usually have a longer training span (see also MacDuffie & Kochan, 1995; Mincer & Higuchi, 
1988; Dertouzos, Lester & Solow, 1989; Ito, 1992). In our engineering sample, VET in Japan 
lasted from four months to four years, with up to 50% of the training taking place off the job 
in the first year; in the U.S. engineering companies, VET lasted from two weeks to two years, 
with mostly no off-the-job training (only one company offered it). In retailing, the length of 
VET was shorter, from 1.5 to 12 months in Japan, with up to 10% being off-the-job training 
in the first year; and from two days up to one and half months in the U.S., with off-the-job 
sessions only for security training. The length of VET varies (as in the apprenticeship 
countries), but the main criteria still hold: VET in both Japan and the U.S. is mainly company-
specific, no common training design exists at the national or occupational level, and 
certification of (vocational) skills rarely takes place (Grugulis, 2008). Only in a few of our 
Japanese engineering companies new employees had to take a national skill trade test after 
one year of in-house vocational training. Therefore, in our analytical matrix, we classify 
companies in Germany and Switzerland as providing occupation-specific and certified VET, 
and companies in Japan and the U.S. as providing company-specific and non-certified VET 
(Figure 4-2). 
 
Figure 4-2: Categorization of companies in different countries according to type of VET 
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Regarding labor market institutions, a general categorization of all of the companies in each 
country is more difficult than for VET, as companies differ with respect to their company-
level labor market institutions. To measure the labor market institutional setting, we use three 
different measures: 
 degree of employment protection, which we measure using the 2008 OECD index of 
the strictness of employment protection  
 whether plant-level employee representation exists  
 whether (formal) wage coordination via wage-relevant collective bargaining 
agreements at the industry/regional level exists. 
 
To measure employment protection, we use the 2008 OECD index of the strictness of 
employment protection (OECD, 2008) that classifies employment protection in three main 
areas (employment protection of permanent workers against individual dismissal, specific 
requirements for collective dismissal, and the regulation of temporary forms of employment). 
A high index value (at most 6) indicates a high number of restrictions on and costs of 
dismissal and, therefore, a high level of employment protection. As we are interested in 
permanent employees, the relevant work group when considering internal promotions, we 
focus on the employment protection of regular workers against dismissal (see also Chapters 2 
and 3). Germany and Japan clearly have a higher level of employment protection (GER: 2.85, 
JPN: 2.05) than Switzerland (1.19) and the U.S. (0.56).  
Regarding our measure of employee representation, we find a mixed picture in our 
sample. All of the German companies in engineering and retailing had an employee 
representation (works council); in one German retailing company, however, works councils 
did not exist in all shops. In Switzerland, all but one engineering company and 3 out of 7 
retailing companies had employee representation (personnel commission). No U.S. company 
had an employee representation (only company unions existed). In Japan, all but one retailing 
company had an employee representation in form of a works council or consultative body. 
The influences of these different forms of employee representations are hard to 
compare. Relative to the powerful German works councils, Swiss personnel commissions 
have less influence. German works councils and Swiss personnel commissions are both 
involved in (or at least informed of) strategic issues within the company and thus increase the 
cooperation between employer and employees. In Japan, a labor management joint 
consultation system exists. This consultation body participates in management issues and is 
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involved in the improvement of production, information sharing, and exchange of opinions. In 
some cases of Japanese companies, the labor management joint consultation system could 
also play a substantial role in the negotiation of labor conditions. In general, every collective 
voice institution should increase the strength of internal labor markets and the share of 
internal promotion.  
Similar to the employee representation variable, the categorization of the companies in 
the four countries based on the variable “wage coordination” is difficult. The clearest 
distinction can be drawn between the German and U.S. companies. In Germany, all of the 
companies in engineering and all but one company in retailing were covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement negotiated at the industry level between industrial unions and 
employers’ associations69. Therefore, formal wage coordination via collective bargaining 
agreements existed in almost all cases. In the U.S., no company in engineering or in retailing 
was covered by an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement. Wage agreements at the 
company level only existed in 4 U.S. engineering companies.  
The situations in Japan and Switzerland are more difficult to measure. Even though 
none of the companies in Japan was covered by an industry-wide collective bargaining 
agreement, coordination took place. As previous studies have suggested, Germany and Japan 
have similarly coordinated settings, although Japanese companies coordinate less formally 
than their German counterparts (Suzuki & Kubo, 2011; Keller & Kirsch, 2011; Thelen & 
Kume, 1999, 2006; Weathers, 2003). Wage coordination in Japan takes place during the 
Spring Wage Offensive (Shunto). During Shunto, the wage settlements and wage increases 
for large companies that are leaders in their industries create a baseline for other companies in 
the same and other industries
70
, and these standards spread also to nonunion industries (Sako 
& Sato, 1997; Thelen & Kume, 2006; Weathers, 2003). While Japanese unions organize 
themselves in industrial federations and national centers (a typical example is the Japanese 
union federation RENGO; JIL, 2000), they have little influence. The same applies to the 
major employers’ association (Nikkeiren).  
However, these peak associations and their negotiations, which start months before 
Shunto, serve as a means to exchange information and coordinate (wage) policies. These 
coordinated wage increases control competition, which is the prerequisite for lifetime 
                                                 
69
 Our sample is not representative for Germany, as also in Germany institutional change has led to an 
increasing share of companies, which are not covered by collective bargaining agreements (Streeck, 
2009). 
70
 The metalworking industry is usually the pattern-setting industry (Sisson, 1987). 
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employment and seniority wages. (Company) unions in Japan usually aim not for high wages 
but for employment security for regular workers (Sako & Sato, 1997; Thelen & Kume, 1999). 
More than 90% of unions in Japan are company-based unions (Hara & Kawaguchi, 2008). 
Also in our Japanese sample, all of the engineering and all retailing companies had unions at 
the company level that were affiliated with RENGO via their umbrella organizations. In sum, 
Japan has a coordinated wage setting structure even though employers’ associations and 
industrial unions are comparatively weak and bargaining agreements (about wage increases, 
lump-sum benefits, job security, working hours, etc.) are set at the company level (Traxler & 
Kittel, 2000; Sako & Sato, 1997; Weathers, 2003; Hara & Kawaguchi, 2008). 
In Switzerland, we find differences between and within the two sectors studied. None 
of the engineering companies was covered by formal industry-wide wage coordination, unlike 
in Germany, and no peak-level negotiations similar to those in Japan existed. Instead, wages 
in our Swiss engineering sample are solely negotiated at the company level. Although an 
industry-wide collective bargaining agreement exists in the Swiss engineering sector, the 
collective bargaining agreement leaves pay to individual agreement between the employer and 
employee (ASM et al., 2006: Art. 15.2). The two employers’ associations, “Swissmem” and 
“Swissmechanic,” conduct wage surveys among their members; however, the results are only 
for the internal use of the member companies that participated in the survey. In Swiss retailing 
the situation is different. A few publicly available collective bargaining agreements exist. 
Some are negotiated at the company level (two companies in our sample had such 
agreements), and some are negotiated at the cantonal level. Although none of our companies 
was covered by collective bargaining agreements at the cantonal level, these agreements 
might influence their wage setting and coordinate wages within the sector. Whether more 
informal wage negotiations take place in Switzerland is still open to discussion (Ryan et al., 
2010b). However, Swiss retailing seems more coordinated than Swiss engineering, and our 
Swiss retailing companies act in a labor market institutional setting that tends toward the 
coordinated German situation.  
Due to the difficulties of making selective categorizations based on labor market 
institutions, some companies stand in the middle between the coordinated and liberal sides, as 
labor market institutions differ only by a matter of degree (Figure 4-3). Our first measure, the 
OECD index of the strictness of employment protection, allows for the clearest categorization 
that is valid for all companies in one country. German and Japanese companies lie close 
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together in terms of their high employment protections for permanent employees, while U.S. 
and Swiss companies constitute the opposite pair.  
Regarding employee representation, German works councils have the strongest 
influence; Japanese unions do not have the same legally ensured rights but still seem to have 
significant influence on working conditions, especially during wage negotiations. Swiss 
personnel commissions have legally ensured rights but definitely have less influence than 
German works councils. In the U.S. companies no employee representation bodies existed. In 
our analytical matrix, we again categorize German companies and U.S. companies as the 
polar cases. Japanese companies and Swiss companies with employee representation are in 
between and more coordinated, Japanese and Swiss companies without employee 
representation are in between and more liberal.  
Finally, regarding wage coordination, we again consider the German companies (all 
but one retailing company were covered by industry-wide collective bargaining agreements) 
to be coordinated examples and the U.S. companies (no industry-wide wage coordination) to 
be liberal examples. Japanese companies seem to tend more toward the German cases due to 
the strong informal wage coordination. Swiss engineering companies resemble more closely 
the companies in the U.S., while Swiss retailing cases tend to have more wage coordination.  
 
Figure 4-3: Categorization of companies in countries according to labor market institutions 
 
 
Finally, we can fill every quadrant of our analytical matrix (Figure 4-4) with our sample of 
companies in the four countries and operationalize our theoretical model.  
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Figure 4-4: Analytical matrix and company categorization 
 
 
After clarifying the independent variables, we now describe our dependent variables. 
Doeringer and Piore (1985) posit that vertical mobility, which we measure by the percentage 
of internal promotion to the supervisory level, is one of the main dimensions of internal labor 
markets. From a theoretical point of view, this percentage allows us to measure the degree to 
which the external and the internal labor markets are interconnected, to what extent jobs at the 
first rung of the managerial ladder are ports of entry into the internal labor market, and to 
what extent employees have the opportunity for further development within the company. 
Moreover, by also including data on average mobility, we find explanations for the average 
tenure figures measured in previous studies, for example, whether at least a core workforce 
advances internally, while the rest of the workforce shows higher mobility, or whether all 
employees have high average tenure, but the supervisors are nevertheless recruited externally. 
Such details make an important difference in the logic of the internal labor market. Finally, 
we also include figures on the contract offer behavior of companies after training to measure 
how interested companies are in retaining employees. Our questions measuring internal 
promotion are as follows:  
 How do you typically fill your vacancies for production supervisors?  
(for engineering companies) 
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 How do you typically fill your vacancies for department/store managers? 
(for retailing companies) 
Answer: X% of vacancies at the supervisory level are usually filled by internal 
promotion,  
(1-X)% of vacancies at the supervisory level are usually filled by external recruitment 
 
The questions measuring labor turnover are as follows: 
 What is your rate of labor turnover as a percentage (annual, in 2007; excluding 
retirements)? 
 What percentage of those who complete your VET program is offered an employment 
contract? 
 
The following section analyzes our hypotheses using pairwise comparisons of our matched-
pair companies in different countries, keeping either VET or the institutional variables 
constant. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Association of the type of VET with promotion patterns 
We first analyze the influence of the type of VET on promotion patterns in the matched-pair 
companies. Therefore, we compare the company pairs that are largely similar in their 
institutional settings to keep that variable constant. We first compare German and Japanese 
companies that act in coordinated labor market institutions but differ in the types of VET they 
provide (Table 4-2).  
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Table 4-2: Association of the type of VET provided in coordinated labor market institutions 
with promotion patterns (figures in percentages) 
Sector engineering retailing 
Country GER JPN Δ 
(expected Δ) 
GER JPN Δ  
(expected Δ) 
Internal 
promotion to 
supervisors 
 
78.3 
 
 
98.6 
 
 
-20.3 
(expected Δ<0) 
 
61.4 
 
 
96.4 
 
 
-35.0 
(expected Δ<0) 
Labor turnover 
all employees 
 
1.7 
 
1.2 
 
0.5 
(expected Δ>0) 
 
10.1 
 
18.9 
 
-8.8 
(expected Δ>0) 
Contract offer 
after training 
 
98.8 
 
100 
 
-1.2 
(expected Δ<0) 
 
80.3 
 
100 
 
-19.7 
(expected Δ<0) 
Note: only 5 out of 6 German engineering companies could provide information on labor turnover 
 
The comparison between companies acting in coordinated labor market institutions (Germany 
and Japan) suggests that the type of VET is associated with the promotion patterns in both 
engineering and retailing companies. In engineering, the internal promotion share in Japanese 
companies is 20 percentage points higher than in their German counterparts; in retailing, the 
difference is even larger (35 percentage points). Therefore, we find, as expected in hypothesis 
H1a, a higher percentage of internal promotions in the Japanese companies that offer 
company-specific, non-certified VET than in their German counterparts that provide 
occupation-specific, certified VET (Table 4-2).   
The measure labor turnover used by previous literature, such as the VoC, to identify 
the strength of internal labor markets does not fully reflect the large differences in internal 
promotions. In engineering, the mobility figures and contract offers after training are almost 
identical. In retailing, the mobility figures for all employees even suggest a weaker internal 
labor market in Japan. These figures contradict the notion of a stronger internal promotion 
strategy in Japanese companies
71. Therefore, the separate analysis of our measure “internal 
promotion” and the labor turnover measures used in previous studies is essential.  
We now compare U.S. and Swiss companies that act in similarly liberal labor market 
institutions but differ in the type of VET they provide (Table 4-3).   
 
                                                 
71
 The high percentage of promotions in Japanese companies combined with a level of mobility similar 
to or higher than that in German companies, points to a strong reliance on core workers in Japan (see 
also Thelen & Kume, 1999, 2006). 
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Table 4-3: Association of the type of VET provided in liberal labor market institutions with 
promotion patterns (figures in percentages) 
Sector engineering retailing 
Country CH U.S. Δ 
(expected Δ) 
CH U.S. Δ 
(expected Δ) 
Internal 
promotion to 
supervisors 
 
40.8 
 
64.8 
 
-24.0 
(expected Δ<0) 
 
59.8 
 
60.7 
 
-0.9 
(expected Δ<0) 
Labor turnover 
all employees 
 
5.8 
 
2.8 
 
3.0 
(expected Δ>0) 
 
17.2 
 
24.1 
 
-6.9 
(expected Δ>0) 
Contract offer 
after training 
 
56.6 
 
100 
 
-43.4 
(expected Δ<0) 
 
64.0 
 
100 
 
-36.0 
(expected Δ<0) 
Note: only 5 out of 6 U.S. engineering companies and 6 out of 7 U.S. retailing companies could provide 
information on labor turnover, only 5 out of 6 Swiss engineering companies could provide information on 
contract offer after training 
 
Also the comparison between companies in liberal market institutions (the U.S. and 
Switzerland) suggests that the type of VET is associated with promotion patterns in both 
engineering and retailing, yet the association seems weaker in retailing. In engineering, the 
internal promotion share in U.S. companies is more than 20 percentage points higher than in 
their Swiss counterparts; in retailing, the difference is only 1 percentage point, which might 
be due to the previously described fact that the labor market institutions in Swiss retailing are 
less liberal than in Swiss engineering. Although the difference in promotion patterns is small 
in retailing, the sign of the difference does not refute hypothesis H1b, in that we find a higher 
percentage of internal promotions in U.S. companies that offer company-specific, non-
certified VET than in their Swiss counterparts that provide occupation-specific and certified 
VET (Table 4-3).  
In engineering, also the labor turnover and contract offer measures reflect the 
difference in the strength of the internal labor market. In retailing, however, the differences in 
labor turnover suggest weaker internal labor markets in the U.S., while the contract offer 
figure suggests a much stronger internal labor market than is indicated by the internal 
promotion figures. Therefore, again, the separate analysis of our “internal promotion” 
measure and the mobility measures used in previous studies is essential. 
In sum, we find an association of the type of VET with internal promotion patterns in 
both coordinated and liberal labor market institutions for engineering and retailing. 
Companies that provide company-specific and non-certified VET show a higher percentage of 
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internal promotion than their counterparts with occupation-specific and certified VET. 
Therefore, we cannot refute the hypothesis that the type of VET is an independent factor that 
influences the strength of internal labor markets. 
 
4.4.2 Association of the type of labor market institutions with promotion patterns 
We now analyze the influence of the type of labor market institutions on promotion patterns. 
Therefore, we compare companies with similar types of VET to keep that variable constant. 
We first compare companies with occupation-specific and certified VET (Table 4-4).  
 
Table 4-4: Association of coordinated labor market institutions with promotion patterns in 
companies with occupation-specific and certified VET (figures in percentages) 
Sector engineering retailing 
Country CH GER Δ 
(expected Δ) 
CH GER Δ 
(expected Δ) 
Internal 
promotion to 
supervisors 
 
40.8 
 
78.3 
 
 
-37.5 
(expected Δ<0) 
 
59.8 
 
61.4 
 
 
-1.6 
(expected Δ<0) 
Labor turnover 
all employees 
 
5.8 
 
1.7 
 
4.1 
(expected Δ>0) 
 
17.2 
 
10.1 
 
7.1 
(expected Δ>0) 
Contract offer 
after training 
 
56.6 
 
98.8 
 
-42.2 
(expected Δ<0) 
 
64.0 
 
80.3 
 
-16.3 
(expected Δ<0) 
Note: only 5 out of 6 German engineering companies could provide information on labor turnover, only 5 out of 
6 Swiss engineering companies could provide information on contract offer after training 
 
The comparison between companies with occupation-specific and certified VET (Swiss and 
German companies) suggests that the type of labor market institution is associated with 
promotion patterns in both engineering and retailing, even though the association is weaker in 
retailing. In engineering, the internal promotion share in German companies is more than 35 
percentage points higher than that in their Swiss counterparts. In retailing, the difference 
between the promotion patterns is small (less than 2 percentage points), which again might be 
because the labor market institutions in Swiss retailing are less liberal than in Swiss 
engineering. While promotion patters differ little in retailing, the difference has the expected 
sign and thus does not refute hypothesis H2a, in that we find a higher percentage of internal 
promotions in German companies that act in more coordinated labor market institutions than 
in their Swiss counterparts that act in more liberal labor market institutions (Table 4-4).  
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 While in engineering companies, the labor turnover and contract offer measures reflect 
a difference in the strength of internal labor markets, the turnover and contract offer figures in 
retailing companies suggest stronger differences in the internal labor market than was found 
with the internal promotion figures.  
Taking a closer look at the companies’ labor market institutions, we can also find 
associations between labor market institutions and promotion patterns within a country. We 
find a difference in the expected direction between the five Swiss engineering companies with 
employee representation that have an internal promotion share of 49% and the company 
without employee representation with an internal promotion share of 0%. Between companies 
with employee representation and companies without employee representation, the labor 
turnover (6.5% to 2%) and contract offer figures (58.2% to 50%) differ only slightly. As the 
German engineering companies show no differences in their labor market institutions (all 
were covered by an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement and had employee 
representation within the company), a further analysis is not possible. 
 In retailing, we identify two German companies that, in contrast to the other German 
retailers in our sample, exhibit more liberal labor market institutions, in the sense that they are 
either not part of the collective bargaining agreement or only have employee representation 
(works councils) in some of the shops. These companies have the lowest percentage of 
internal promotion (11% compared to 82% in other German companies) consistent with our 
expectation that coordinated labor market institutions such as works councils are positively 
associated with internal labor markets. The retailing companies also show higher labor 
turnover (15% compared to 8%); contract offers differ in a surprising direction (91% 
compared to 76%). 
In sum, our findings suggest that coordinated labor market institutions are positively 
associated with internal promotions when VET is occupation-specific and certified. We now 
analyze whether that association also exists in companies that provide company-specific, non-
certified VET (Table 4-5).   
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Table 4-5: Association of the type of liberal labor market institutions with promotion patterns 
in companies with company-specific and non-certified VET (figures in percentages) 
Sector engineering retailing 
Country U.S. JPN Δ 
(expected Δ) 
U.S. JPN Δ 
(expected Δ) 
Internal 
promotion to 
supervisors 
 
64.8 
 
98.6 
 
-33.8 
(expected Δ<0) 
 
60.7 
 
96.4 
 
-35.7 
(expected Δ<0) 
Labor turnover 
all employees 
 
2.8 
 
1.2 
 
1.6 
(expected Δ>0) 
 
24.1 
 
18.9 
 
5.2 
(expected Δ>0) 
Contract offer 
after training 
 
100 
 
100 
 
0 
(expected Δ<0) 
 
100 
 
100 
 
0 
(expected Δ<0) 
Note: only 5 out of 6 U.S. engineering companies and 6 out of 7 U.S. retailing companies could provide 
information on labor turnover 
 
Also the comparison between companies with company-specific, non-certified VET (Japanese 
and the U.S. companies) suggests that the type of labor market institutions is associated with 
promotion patterns in both engineering and retailing. In engineering, the internal promotion 
share in Japanese companies is more than 30 percentage points higher than in their U.S. 
counterparts; in retailing, the internal promotion share in Japanese companies is more than 35 
percentage points higher. Therefore, we find, as expected in hypothesis H2b, a higher 
percentage of internal promotions in Japanese companies that operate in coordinated labor 
market institutions than in their U.S. counterparts that operate in more liberal labor market 
institutions (Table 4-5).     
 The labor turnover measure reflects differences in the strength of internal labor 
markets in both engineering and retailing; however, the differences found using internal 
promotion figures are larger than suggested by labor turnover.  The contract offer figures do 
not differ, as trainees in both countries automatically become employees of the companies 
after a particular probation period.  
Taking a closer look, we again find associations between labor market institutions and 
promotion patterns also within a country. In our sample, we have four U.S. engineering 
companies with plant-level unions and collective bargaining agreements and two U.S. 
engineering companies without these features. Plant-level unions usually act as coordinated 
labor market institutions that foster internal labor markets, as a vacancy can only be filled by 
external recruitment when no employee wants to bid for it or no employee is qualified 
enough. This was also the case in our unionized companies. Surprisingly, the unionized U.S. 
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companies show a lower share of internal promotion (47.3%) than their non-unionized U.S. 
counterparts, which have an internal promotion share of 100% (labor turnover of unionized 
companies was 3% compared to 2.5%, contract offer figures did not differ). 
During our interviews, we found a possible reason for the surprisingly low internal 
promotion share in unionized U.S. companies. As supervisors are not covered by the plant-
level collective bargaining agreement, companies have problems finding internal candidates 
to “bid for” the supervisory jobs because employees are reluctant to lose their increased 
employment protection, which is a part of the bargaining agreement. Statements by the 
personnel managers in the unionized engineering companies verify this problematic 
interaction: 
 
“It is difficult to find internal personnel interested in the supervisor position, as 
they don’t want to leave their union agreement and employment protection.”  
(US-company A) 
 
“Not many employees are interested in bidding for these positions. This is why the 
company fills these positions with external employees, even though the internal 
employees would be the better supervisors. Only one ever bid because employees 
don’t want to leave collective bargaining and don’t want to give orders to their 
colleagues.” (US-company B) 
 
The two non-unionized U.S. engineering companies succeed in completely filling supervisory 
vacancies internally.  
In sum, we find an association of the type of labor market institutions and internal 
promotion patterns in both companies that provide occupation-specific, certified and 
company-specific, non-certified VET, in both engineering and retailing. Companies that 
operate in more coordinated labor market institutions show a higher percentage of internal 
promotion than their counterparts operating in more liberal labor market institutions. 
Therefore, we cannot refute the hypothesis that the type of labor market institutions is an 
independent factor that influences the strength of internal labor markets. Furthermore, within-
country variations in promotion figures can partly be explained by differences in labor market 
institutions. The influence of plant-level unions and collective bargaining agreements in the 
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U.S. highlights the necessity of taking a closer look at institutional details—as Baker and 
Holmstrom (1995) have already suggested.  
 
In sum, the comparison of matched-pair engineering and retailing companies in Germany, 
Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S shows that the type of VET and the type of labor market 
institutions have separate effects on internal labor markets as measured by the percentage of 
internal promotions to the supervisory level (see overview in Table 4-6). The results also 
suggest that the two dimensions can strengthen each other in their effect on the promotion 
behavior of companies. The highest percentage of internal promotions can be found when 
company-specific, non-certified VET and coordinated labor markets are combined (as it is the 
case in Japan), the lowest percentage of internal promotions can be found when occupation-
specific, certified and liberal labor markets are combined (as it is the case in Switzerland). 
 
Table 4-6: Overview of results 
Germany 
Internal promotion  
to supervisor (in %) 
Engineering: 78.3 
Retailing: 61.4 
Labor  
Market 
Institutions 
Coordinated labor market Liberal labor market 
VET system 
Primacy of  
occupational  
& 
certified training 
Primacy of  
firm-specific  
& 
non-certified training 
Japan 
Internal promotion  
to supervisor (in %) 
Engineering: 98.6  
Retailing: 96.4 
Switzerland 
Internal promotion  
to supervisor (in %) 
Engineering: 40.8 
Retailing: 59.8 
United States 
Internal promotion  
to supervisor (in %) 
Engineering: 64.8 
Retailing: 60.7 
 
 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Based on the existing institutional and economic literatures and given the empirical fact that 
different combinations of VET systems and labor market institutions exist, we argue that 
separate analyses of the two dimensions are necessary. The comparison of matched-pair 
engineering and retailing companies in Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S. shows that 
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the type of VET and the type of labor market institutions have separate effects on internal 
labor markets as measured by the percentage of internal promotions to the supervisory level. 
While companies that provide company-specific and non-certified VET show a higher 
percentage of internal promotion than their counterparts with occupation-specific and certified 
VET, companies that operate in more coordinated labor market institutions show a higher 
percentage of internal promotion than their counterparts operating in more liberal labor 
market institutions.  
Given these results, Japanese companies combine company-specific and non-certified 
VET with a coordinated institutional setting, both of which support internal labor markets. 
Swiss companies (at least in engineering) combine occupation-specific and certified VET 
with a liberal institutional setting, both of which support inter-firm mobility instead of internal 
labor markets. Therefore, companies in both Japan and Switzerland constitute 
“complementary” cases in the sense that in these companies both dimensions—VET and labor 
market institutions—reinforce each other’s effects on internal labor markets. In contrast, 
German and U.S. companies constitute “mixed cases,” where VET and labor market 
institutions weaken each other’s effects on internal promotions. At least with regard to 
internal promotion patterns, these results contrast with the previous literature that stresses the 
strong complementarities between VET and labor market institutions in Germany and the 
U.S. (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
Our theoretical and empirical results contribute to the debate on the strength of internal 
labor markets in an occupation-specific VET system. Our results support Marsden’s (1986, 
1990) argument that occupation-specific, certified VET is associated with weaker internal and 
stronger occupational labor markets and Soskice’s argument (1994) that strong internal labor 
markets are also possible in countries with a transferable (occupation-specific) type of VET. 
Using our analytical matrix, we argue that labor market institutions have to be analyzed as a 
separate dimension. Coordinated labor market institutions weaken the mobility-enhancing 
effect of transferable VET. Therefore, we find a higher internal promotion share in German 
companies than in their Swiss counterparts. Intra-national heterogeneity also shows the 
association between labor market institutions and promotion patterns. Taking labor market 
institutions into account as an additional and separate dimension, the contradiction between 
Marsden’s and Soskice’s arguments is resolved. 
Furthermore, our results support Baker and Holmstrom’s (1995) call for an in-depth 
institutional analysis. Among other things, we found that particular labor market institutions 
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such as plant-based unions and plant-based collective bargaining agreements, which are 
usually thought to strengthen internal labor markets, can have the opposite effect when 
employees are promoted to positions that are no longer covered by these agreements. Our 
results show that “administrative work rules” (Doeringer & Piore, 1985:5) can reduce the 
efficiency of internal labor markets in the sense that the best solution both for the company 
(having qualified and experienced supervisors) and for the employees (obtaining more 
responsibility and pay at a higher position) does not take place, thus stressing the importance 
of taking these rules into account and further inquiring the origins and persistence of these 
rules (Osterman, 2011). 
Our analysis has several limitations. First and foremost, our data set is small, not 
necessarily representative of a certain country, and most notably, it does not allow for a 
multivariate analysis. Due to the lack of control variables, we cannot rule out other influences 
being responsible for our results. Further internationally comparative studies should attempt 
to overcome this limitation by gathering more data, thus allowing for multivariate regression 
analyses. Furthermore, size effects may bias our results. We have, for example, more 
medium-sized engineering companies in Switzerland than in Germany, which could explain 
the weaker internal labor markets. We cannot exclude that possibility. However, that large 
companies in Switzerland exist that have comparatively low internal promotion figures makes 
us confident that our results point in the right direction. If size, and not labor market 
institutions, was the decisive factor, we would not find this result.  
Second, one could also argue that we neglect several other possibly important 
explanations for internal promotions, such as the tournament theory (which analyzes 
incentives for effort), or job assignment and allocation of tasks (internal promotions are the 
natural consequence of the acquisition of skills that are more productive at jobs with higher 
responsibility). However, as Gibbons and Waldman (1999b: 1322) put it, “The job assignment 
literature does not provide direct explanations for wage and promotion dynamics”—and the 
aim of this paper has been to fill that gap. Similarly, tournament theory explains why internal 
promotions take place; however, why the extent of the incentives provided by internal 
promotions varies among countries cannot be fully explained with this approach.  
 
After investigating the interplay of VET and labor market institutions on internal labor 
markets at two hierarchical levels, namely the skilled worker and supervisory level, we 
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analyze in the following chapter how companies adapt their organizations to national-level 
differences in VET systems and labor market institutions.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
How do companies adapt their organization to national institutions: 
evidence from matched-pair engineering companies? 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Several studies in industrial relations and political economy literatures argue that a country’s 
national institutional setting creates competitive advantages for particular industries (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992; Whitley, 2007). One of the most prominent 
approaches that analyzes institutional similarities and differences across economies, is the 
“Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) approach of Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001)72. 
According to the VoC approach, the national institutional setting of coherently coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) such as Germany offers significant advantages for quality-oriented 
engineering production companies; in contrast, the national institutional setting of coherently 
liberal market economies (LMEs) such as the U.S. favors service-oriented or research-
dominated companies (e.g., Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010; Haake, 2002; 
Hall & Soskice, 2001; Nooteboom, 2000; Soskice, 1997). Therefore, companies in different 
countries concentrate on different sub-sectors and products for which the particular national 
institutional setting is advantageous (e.g., in the biotechnology sector, companies focus on the 
development of pharmaceuticals in the U.S. and on the invention and production of (research) 
machinery, and platform enabling technologies in Germany; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Casper, 
Lehrer & Soskice, 1999; Casper & Whitley, 2004; Akkermans, Castaldi & Los, 2009).  
 However, companies are not perfectly sorted according to the national institutional 
setting. We find large, research-intensive pharmaceutical companies in Germany (e.g., Bayer) 
and manufacturing companies producing turbines and machinery in the U.S. (e.g., General 
Electric). Given the differing competitive advantages that stem from institutional settings, the 
question arises as to how matched-pair companies that produce highly similar products and 
                                                 
72
 The foci of other approaches include, for example, trade union behavior and strategy (e.g., Hyman, 
2001), the power of organized labor, the centralization of labor and capital (e.g., Crouch, 1993), and 
welfare-state attributes (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hicks & Kenworthy, 2003). 
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compete in the same (global) markets adapt organizationally to different and possibly less 
favorable national institutional settings. 
 Previous comparative literature has focused on the behavior of matched-pair companies 
in different countries. Backes-Gellner (1996) finds, in her sample of matched-pair companies 
in the service and industry sectors in the UK, Luxembourg, France, and Germany, that 
companies adapt their training strategies to the institutional setting but end up with broadly 
the same stock of qualifications, which allows them to produce similar products. Focusing on 
organizational issues, Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre (1986) argue that technology does not 
fully determine a company’s organizational structure (measured by the span of control) but 
that national training and educational systems play an important role because they influence 
the qualification level of the workforce. The higher the qualification level of the workforce is 
(“professionalization”), the less supervisory input will be required (Maurice, Sorge & Warner, 
1980; Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986). Consistent with Maurice, Sorge and Warner’s 
results, Mason (2000) shows that German supervisors have a broader span of responsibility 
than their counterparts in the UK and the U.S (see also Finegold & Wagner, 1998).  
 Previous literature thus suggests that the span of control (number of employees per 
supervisor) is an important mechanism of adaptation to the national institutional setting. 
However, the literature does not take into account whether the companies are operating in a 
more or less favorable and a more or less coherent national institutional setting. Given that the 
span of control is an important mechanism of organizational adaptation, the questions arise 
whether the span of control differs systematically depending on the institutional setting and 
with what kind of institutional configurations the span of control is associated. We examine 
these questions by theoretically analyzing how companies complement (available or non-
available) national institutions by company-level institutions and how they adapt by their span 
of control. We derive hypotheses about potential configurations of national- and company-
level institutions, which we then test with production plant data gathered through interviews 
in matched-pair engineering companies in Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. (see 
Chapter 2). We choose this set of countries to include the VoC examples of coherent liberal 
and coordinated market economies (the U.S. and Germany) and two less coherent countries 
that combine liberal and coordinated features to different extents (the UK and Switzerland).  
 To reveal in detail which configuration of institutional variables is linked to what kind 
of span of control, we apply the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA, Ragin, 1987) because 
this method has already proven useful for testing VoC propositions (e.g., Kogut & Ragin, 
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2006; Boyer, 2004; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010). This method is also 
particularly useful for conducting cross-country comparisons (e.g., Ebbinghaus & Visser, 
1999), examining strategic management questions (e.g., Greckhamer et al., 2008), and has 
been designed for formally analyzing qualitative evidence and small data sets. 
 Our results show that, depending on the national institutional setting, matched-pair 
engineering companies differ substantially in their span of control of their production 
supervisors. Production supervisors in companies producing in the highly coordinated and 
coherent market economy of Germany have on average, a broader span of control than those 
in the highly liberal and coherent market economy of the U.S. Furthermore, German 
companies all have a broad span of control, and U.S. companies form a consistent cluster in 
which all have a narrow span of control. It is only in the two less coherent countries, 
Switzerland and the UK that we can find companies with a broad and companies with a 
narrow span of control. Based on these results, we further identify the institutional 
configurations at the company level and the related spans of control. 
  This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we provide answers 
to the question of how companies adapt to different national institutional settings with various 
degrees of industry-specific favorability and coherence. To define whether institutional 
settings are more or less coherent, we use the VoC approach and thus take into account 
Redding’s call for a “thick description” (Redding, 2005: 123) of institutions by providing a 
broad institutional view with a simultaneous analysis of several institutional variables 
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Second, we show the institutional diversity that is hidden beneath 
the macro-institutional evidence (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010). To explore 
this institutional diversity, we analyze institutional configurations at two levels, namely the 
national and the company level. Third, we show how companies react with their company-
level institutional setting and their span of control to the national institutional setting and are 
able to link institutional variables directly to the outcomes—in contrast to previous national-
level analyses which have therefore been criticized (Allen, 2004).    
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we use and extend the VoC approach to 
derive two hypotheses on national-level differences and two hypotheses on company-level 
differences. Section 3 describes the data. The first part of section 4 provides the results of our 
national-level hypotheses. The second part of section 4 provides the company-level results 
using QCA-analysis. Section 5 concludes with a further evaluation of our evidence, relating it 
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back to the VoC approach and developing implications of the findings for both theory and 
company policy. 
 
5.2 Theory and hypotheses 
Our theoretical analysis of organizational adaptation and institutional configuration is based 
on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach. This approach was developed by Hall and 
Soskice (2001) and is considered to be the “state of the art of institutional analysis” (Howell, 
2003: 121). The VoC approach categorizes economies according to their institutional 
configurations. The two polar forms of economies are the coordinated and the liberal market 
economy, with the U.S. and Germany as the most coherent examples.   
 Companies in coordinated market economies (CMEs, such as Germany) are embedded 
in a network of mediating institutions. CMEs are characterized by cooperative industrial 
relations systems within companies, strong collective bargaining across companies, strict 
employment protection, nationally coordinated vocational education and training (VET) 
systems, a high investment in vocational (rather than university) training, and financial 
systems that allow for long-term investment horizons for companies (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 
21ff).  
 Companies in liberal market economies (LMEs, such as the U.S.) lack mediating 
collective institutions and rely instead on institutions such as markets and hierarchies. LME 
configurations are the reverse of the CME model: little cooperation within companies but 
strong management power, no (or, at most, company-based) collective bargaining, weak 
employment protection, high (individual) investment in university training, and a high stock 
market capitalization (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 27ff). 
 The different institutional settings generate different, industry-specific advantages, 
depending on whether the country is an LME or a CME. Companies in LMEs have 
competitive advantages in industries that rely on radical product innovations such as 
biotechnology and telecommunications as companies can dismiss labor and close plants 
quickly, and easily shift capital from one industry to another, which both allows them to 
invest in risky but potentially lucrative R&D projects in high-tech industries. The high 
percentage of university graduates provides a suitable workforce for these types of industries 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001: 40ff).  
 In contrast, CMEs provide advantages for industries that are based on incremental 
innovation such as the improvement of production processes. These advantages stem from 
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their vocationally highly qualified employees—resulting from the VET system. High 
employment protection gives employees the incentives to invest in company-specific 
knowledge and leads to strong internal labor markets and highly skilled supervisors. As a 
result of the company-internal corporatism, workers are involved in planning, in 
troubleshooting, and in introducing the latest technologies in ways that enhance product 
quality and improve production processes. Therefore, industries such as mechanical 
engineering find a suitable and favorable environment for their production in CMEs (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001: 39ff). 
 According to the VoC approach, institutional complementarities are important for 
improving the functional capability of the institutional setting and, therefore, also for 
generating industry-specific comparative advantages (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 17ff). 
Complementarity in this context means that the “functioning of one depends on and enhances 
the functioning of others” (Campbell & Pedersen, 2007: 311). Complementarity increases 
with institutional coherence, meaning that all institutions have the same shape (e.g., 
coordinated) and thus fit to each other. The importance of complementary institutions has 
been supported by several studies (e.g., Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010; Hall 
& Gingerich, 2009
73
).  
 We expect that these institutional complementarities can exist both at the national and 
the company level and that particular institutional configurations are associated with either a 
broad or a narrow span of control. Using company-level functionally equivalent institutions, 
companies can complement or substitute functions that are provided (or not provided) by 
national-level institutions. We investigate institutional configurations at the national level, as 
suggested by the VoC approach, and at the company level to expand the national-level 
literature. Using the VoC approach, the following section analyzes which institutional 
configurations at the national level are theoretically associated with a broad and with a narrow 
span of control. 
 
Institutions at the national level 
A coherent configuration of coordinated national institutional variables, namely a VET 
system, coordinated wage setting, high employment protection, and employee representation 
                                                 
73
 Evidence that extreme cases (degree of centralization of national bargaining systems) perform better 
than intermediate ones was previously provided by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). For the effects of 
labor market institutions on unemployment and growth, see e.g., Nickell and Layard (1999). 
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should be associated with a broad span of control. Each institutional variable fulfills a 
particular function described in the following paragraphs.   
 First, the better the VET system and thus the more skilled the employees in production 
are, the fewer supervisors are necessary for supporting and monitoring them. Osterman (1994) 
found in his U.S. study of the supervision intensity of blue-collar core workers that the skill 
level of the employees is inversely associated with the amount of supervision they receive 
(see also Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986). Moreover, better-qualified employees need less 
monitoring also because they can perform more demanding and interesting jobs and are thus 
more motivated. Therefore, we argue that a VET system lays the skill foundation for a broad 
span of control. 
 Second, coordinated wage setting at the industry (or higher) level—showing a high 
level of employer coordination and a high degree of corporatism—supports long tenure and 
strong internal labor markets
74
. Similarly, high employment protection decreases employees’ 
incentive to change employers and increases their incentive to invest in company-specific 
knowledge (Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Wasmer, 2006). Long tenure and strong 
internal labor markets ensure a set of employees with company-specific knowledge, i.e., an 
excellent pool of (potential) supervisors who know the company inside out and can take high 
responsibility. Therefore, we argue that both coordinated wage setting and high employment 
protections lay the skill foundation within the company for a broad span of control by 
ensuring that the highly qualified employees remain in the company at different hierarchical 
levels (production workers and supervisors). 
 Finally, the existence of and a company’s cooperation with an employee representation 
should increase trust between the management and employees (for literature on works 
councils, see e.g., Frege, 2002). According to Hall and Soskice (2001: 24f), works councils 
provide “employees with security against arbitrary lay-offs or changes to their working 
conditions.” This security increases trust between the management and production workers 
and contributes to a more cooperative environment. Since a broad span of control requires 
trust between workers and their supervisors to ensure that workers use their discretion in the 
interest of the company, we argue that an employment representation is another foundation 
for a broad span of control.   
                                                 
74
 The positive relationship between coordinated wages and internal labor markets occurs because 
employer coordination reduces the danger that skilled labor will be poached (Culpepper, 2001) and 
reduces employees’ incentives for leaving the company as wages are equalized at “equivalent skill 
levels across an industry,” assuring workers “that they are receiving the highest feasible rates of pay in 
return for the deep commitments they are making to firms” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 25).  
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 As a VET system, coordinated wages, high employment protection, and works councils 
all apply to coherent CMEs and none of them apply to coherent LMEs, we expect a broad 
span of control in coherent CMEs and a comparatively narrow span of control in coherent 
LMEs, in which all of the foundations for a broad span of control are missing.  
Therefore, we derive hypothesis 1 as follows: 
 
H1: Companies in coherent LMEs show a narrower span of control than those in 
coherent CMEs.  
 
Following the VoC approach, we identify coherent CMEs with Germany, and coherent LMEs 
with the U.S. 
 
As already argued, the VoC approach emphasizes complementary relationships between 
various institutional variables. In less coherent countries, which are neither fully coherent 
LMEs nor fully coherent CMEs, complementarities are not fully guaranteed. Thus, companies 
may react in different ways because neither a broad nor a narrow span of control is clearly 
favorable. Therefore, we expect to find a larger range in the spans of control of companies in 
less coherent countries than of companies in more coherent countries.  
Therefore, we derive our hypothesis 2 as follows: 
 
H2: Companies in less coherent market economies show a larger range in the 
span of control than companies in more coherent market economies (which show 
a small range of narrow or a small range of broad spans of control). 
 
In our empirical analysis, we use Switzerland and the UK as examples for less coherent 
economies, as explained in section 5.4.1.1. 
 
Company-level measurement of institutions 
Although a country’s institutional setting provides an important framework, the company 
might still have some managerial freedom regarding how to act within that framework and 
how to design the institutional setting at the company level. One example would be that a 
company might choose to have strong internal labor markets even though the degree of a 
country’s employment protection is low. In particular, when the institutional setting at the 
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country level is less coherent, we expect to find functionally equivalent institutions at the 
company level to ensure a coherent set of complementary institutions. Since companies in less 
coherent countries can choose to complement either the coordinated or the liberal institutional 
variables in a complementary way, we expect to find a broader variation of institutional 
configurations in the less coherent countries than in the more coherent countries. 
Thus we derive a third hypothesis, as follows: 
 
H3: Companies in less coherent market economies show more configurations of 
company-level institutional variables than companies in more coherent market 
economies. 
 
Furthermore, we argue that coherent institutional configurations lay the foundation for either a 
broad or a narrow span of control. Therefore, we expect to find companies with a broad span 
of control if they have coherent institutional configurations of the coordinated type and we 
expect to find companies with a narrow span of control if they have coherent institutional 
configurations of the liberal type.  
Thus, we derive a fourth and a fifth hypothesis: 
 
H4: Companies with a coherently coordinated company-level institutional 
configuration (coordinated in all institutional variables) show a broad span of 
control.  
H5: Companies with a coherently liberal company-level institutional 
configuration (liberal in all institutional variables) show a narrow span of 
control.  
 
To provide empirical evidence on our five hypotheses, we use a unique set of data described 
in the following section. 
 
5.3 Data set  
To test our hypotheses, plant-level data is required because the span of control and the 
institutional configuration has to be measured at the relevant unit for the production area
75
. 
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 In the following, we use the terms “plant” and “company” synonymously.  
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Since we need detailed company data, the sample size is small by necessity. Therefore, we 
decided to use a matched-pair approach to reduce heterogeneity. To do so, we collected plant-
level data for engineering companies; the data was gathered in Germany, Switzerland, the 
UK, and the U.S. through face-to-face interviews with personnel managers, and was 
supplemented with secondary data analysis and expert interviews. The interviews, which took 
place between April 2008 and October 2009, were combined with on-site visits to the 
production facilities. We identified the cases by matching companies (“matched-pairs”) 
according to their 4-digit SIC codes, which reflect the product line and production technology.  
 Overall, 22 comparable engineering plants provided the necessary information. We 
chose the pumps and the turbines subsectors as the primary SICs. The limited number of 
engineering companies available and willing to participate in the study (particularly in the 
UK) led to the inclusion of additional subsectors: compressors and aero engines which 
resemble in their skill requirements to a great extent the pump and turbine companies. 
Compressors have an SIC code near to that of pumps, and the UK aircraft engine company 
also produces air gas turbines, which are similar to the other turbines in our sample. For an 
overview of the country and sector distribution, see Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-1: Number of participating companies by sector (SIC 1987) 
Sector Subsector
SIC 
1987
GER CH UK U.S.
Pumps and pumping equipment 3561 4 3 3 3
Turbines & turbine generator sets,                    
Air & gas compressors,                  
Aircraft engines & parts
3511,            
3563, 
3724 
2 3 2 2
All engineering subsectors 6 6 5 5
E
n
g
in
ee
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n
g
 
Source: GER, CH, UK, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 1; the U.S., own fieldwork 
 
We also matched companies, as far as possible, according to their size. Using the EU 
classification (European Commission, 2005), the sample includes 14 large companies with 
250 or more employees (6 in Germany, 3 in Switzerland, 4 in the UK, 1 in the U.S.) and 8 
medium-sized companies between 50 and 249 employees (3 in Switzerland, 1 in the UK, 4 in 
the U.S.; Ryan et al., 2011). All plants have existed for several years. Regarding volume, our 
sample comprises different batch sizes, from small to large batches, and all plants followed a 
quality-oriented strategy, partly with engineered-to-order products.  
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5.4 Variables, empirical methods, and results 
Outcome variable: Span of control 
Following classic studies on the span of control (e.g., Bell, 1967; Ouchi & Dowling, 1974), 
we measure our outcome variable, i.e., the span of control in the production area, by asking 
“how many employees (skilled and unskilled) work in production” and “how many 
supervisors and technicians work in production.” These questions were comparatively easy 
for the interviewees to answer, as they merely had to either count the employees and 
supervisors in the production area or transfer the hierarchical structure from their internal 
organizational chart.  
 According to our hypotheses, we divide our analysis into two parts. First, we study the 
institutional settings and average spans of control at a national level, as in the VoC literature. 
Second, we study the institutional configurations and spans of control at the company level. 
 
5.4.1 National-level analysis 
To test our first two hypotheses, which focus on country-specific averages and ranges of the 
span of control, we categorize the countries according to the national institutional settings, 
identified as relevant: VET system, employment protection, coordinated wages, and employee 
representations.  
 
5.4.1.1 Institutional variables 
In measuring the institutional variables, we closely follow the original definitions of Hall and 
Soskice (2001) and previous empirical literature (e.g., Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Schneider, 
Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010).  
 
(1) VET system 
The few studies on the VoC that measure “vocational education and training” (e.g., Schneider, 
Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010; Paunescu & Schneider, 2004) use the OECD “Education 
at Glance” data on the number of tertiary-type A (academic) graduates and tertiary-type B 
(occupational) graduates, each measured as a percentage of the population in the typical 
graduation age (OECD, 2009f, Table A3.1/2). We build a ratio to obtain a better impression 
of the relative importance of each particular path. In 2007, Germany had more than twice 
(2.3) the number of general university graduates as tertiary occupational graduates (23% 
academic, 10% occupational); in Switzerland, the relative number of tertiary academics was a 
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little lower (1.7, 31% academic, 18% occupational); in the UK, the ratio was a little higher 
(2.6, 39% academic, 15% occupational). The U.S. had almost four times (3.7) more tertiary 
type-A program graduates (37% academic, 10% occupational) in 2007.  
 As the first measure is consistent with the previous literature, but focuses strongly on 
tertiary education, we use upper secondary enrollment patterns as a “robustness check.” The 
OECD (2009f, Table C1.4) has calculated the proportion of young people pursuing academic 
(general) or occupational (pre-vocational and vocational) programs at the upper secondary 
level. Switzerland has the highest enrollment in occupational programs (64.8%), followed by 
Germany (57.4%) and the UK (41.4%). The U.S. has a value of 100% enrollment in academic 
programs
76
 (see Chapter 2). Therefore, we conclude that Germany, Switzerland, and the UK 
are more coordinated regarding the VET system than the U.S.  
 
(2) Employment protection 
To measure the degree of employment protection, previous literature commonly uses the 
OECD index of the strictness of employment protection (OECD, 2008; e.g., Schneider, 
Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010; Hall & Gingerich, 2009). The OECD index is comprised 
of three variables: protection of permanent workers against dismissal, regulation of temporary 
forms of employment, and specific requirements for collective dismissal. A high index 
represents strong barriers to (or high costs of) staff reduction through the termination of 
employment contracts. As manual workers in the manufacturing industry are usually 
permanent (which is also the case in our sample), we use the index values that measure the 
protection of permanent workers as crucial variables and use the overall protection index as 
additional information. The protection index values, both for permanent workers and overall, 
show a clear gap between Germany (2.85/2.63) on the one side and the U.S., the UK, and 
Switzerland on the other (0.56/0.85, 1.17/1.09, 1.19/1.77). Thus, we conclude that the U.S., 
the UK, and Switzerland are clearly more liberal than Germany regarding employment 
protection.  
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 Though apprenticeship training exists in the U.S., it is not reflected in the statistics because “U.S. 
registered apprenticeship training programs” usually require a minimum age of 18 years and a high-
school degree or equivalent (Crosby, 2002; Glover & Bilginsoy, 2005; Bilginsoy, 2003). Overall, 
registered apprenticeship training programs show only low enrollment figures. The number of active 
apprentices was almost 380.000 in 2010 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2011), which is a small number 
compared to the cohort of high school graduates of more than 3.3 million in 2010 (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2011, Table 110).  
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(3) Collective bargaining 
Consistent with previous literature, we measure both the coverage by collective bargaining 
agreements and the level of wage centralization (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 
2010; Hall & Gingerich, 2009).  
 The majority of employees in Germany are covered by collective bargaining (63% in 
2007, ICTWSS database, 2009), the coordination of wages is categorized at the second 
highest index value (4) meaning that mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining takes 
place in Germany (ICTWSS database, 2009). In contrast, in the U.S., wage bargaining occurs 
predominantly at the company level (index value 1), and the coverage by collective 
agreements was very low with only 13% in 2007. Also in the UK, fragmented bargaining at 
the company level takes place; the coverage was with approximately 35% almost three times 
higher than in the U.S. Switzerland takes the middle position. Coordination of wages takes 
place at the industry level, with some additional local and company bargaining (index value 3, 
ICTWSS, 2009). Switzerland had 48% of collective bargaining coverage of employees 
(ICTWSS, 2009). In sum, we categorize Germany as coordinated, the U.S. as liberal, and 
Switzerland and the UK as lying in between. 
 
(4) Employee representation  
To measure employee representation, we cannot follow previous empirical VoC-literature, as 
this variable has not been included yet. We, therefore, decided to, use two comparative 
indexes of the ICTWSS database (2009), which reflect the existence and influence of 
employee representation at the national level.   
 The first index measures whether an employee representation at the enterprise, firm, or 
establishment level (with 50 or more employees) is mandatory by law or by agreements 
between the central organizations of trade unions and employers’ associations; the index also 
reflects the coverage of employee representation. In Germany and the UK, employee 
representation is, according to the ICTWSS database (2009), assured by law or agreement; the 
coverage, however, is higher in Germany (75% or more of eligible firms, index value of 2) 
than in the UK (less than 75% of eligible firms, index value of 1). According to the index of 
the ICTWSS database (2009), the employee representation in the U.S. and Switzerland is 
absent (coverage of less than 25%, index value of 0).  
 The second index of the ICTWSS database (2009) measures the influence and rights of 
employee representation. While employee representation in Germany has the most influence, 
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with its codetermination rights for company economic policies (index value 3), employee 
representation in the UK has only information rights (index value 1). The U.S. and 
Switzerland both have the lowest index value (0) because employee representation is absent. 
 Therefore, we again find Germany and the U.S. at polar ends, with the UK again lying 
somewhere in between. Switzerland has in these variables a strong tendency to the liberal 
side
77
. 
 Taking all four institutional variables together (Table 5-2), two polar cases of liberal and 
coordinated shape exist (the U.S. and Germany), which are characterized by coherent 
institutional settings in terms of the dimensions of VET systems, employment protection, 
wage coordination, and employee representation. Switzerland and—in contrast to previous 
literature (e.g., Kenworthy, 2006)—the UK build the less coherent cases because both of these 
countries combine more coordinated with more liberal institutions relevant for the span of 
control. While both countries have low employment protection, Switzerland has a strong VET 
system, which is also existent in the UK (at least numerically, quality differences are 
discussed below). Switzerland is more coordinated in the wage coordination dimension than 
the UK but has less employee representation. Therefore, we situate these two countries as 
mixed cases between the two polar cases Germany and the U.S. 
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 In the VoC approach, the financial and ownership structures of the company play a major role. 
However, these variables have no direct connection to the span of control but are indirectly related via 
their influence on the type and extent of training. Listed companies with dispersed ownership 
structures (no dominant owner) are under higher pressure to maximize their short-term revenues than, 
for example, family-owned companies or those with a principal stockholder who can afford long-term 
investments that are associated with smaller short-term revenues. Therefore, listed companies with 
dispersed ownership make few or no investments in a sound knowledge base that improves long-term 
performance but diminishes short-term results. Instead, these companies offer short and low-
investment on-the-job training. According to the VoC approach, companies in LMEs usually manifest 
this shareholder-oriented strategy. In contrast, companies that do not face strong shareholder pressure 
but are able to focus on all types of stakeholders can provide long-lasting and high-investment training 
with on- and off-the-job periods (the classic example is apprenticeship training). The VoC approach 
suggests that companies in CMEs are more likely to show this training behavior. Analyzing this 
ownership-training relationship in a German-Swiss-UK comparison, Ryan et al. (2010a) show some 
evidence that the expected ownership effects exist for the two sectors—manufacturing and retailing—
that they examine. However, the effects are only moderate, in particular when compared to the 
influence of the skill requirements set by the product market. Given these empirical results, given that 
no direct effect between ownership and the span of control exists, and given that our small case 
number limits our ability to include a larger number of explanatory variables (see company-level 
analysis), we leave financial and ownership structures out of the analysis but attempt to capture their 
effect on the organizational structure via our training variable.  
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Table 5-2: Overview of national-level institutions 
liberal coordinated
VET system
Graduation tertiary level
(ratio academic/occupational)
Enrollment pattern secondary level
(% enrollment in vocational programs)
Employment protection
Overall (index)
Collective bargaining
Coordination of wage bargaining (index)
Collective bargaining coverage (%)
Employee representation
Existence of employee representation
(index)
Rights of employee representation
(index)
U.S./UK 
1 
GER 
4 
CH 
3 
U.S. 
13 
UK 
35 
CH 
48 
GER 
63 
U.S./CH 
0 
UK 
1 
GER 
2 
UK 
1 
U.S./CH 
0 
GER 
3 
U.S. 
0 
U.S. 
3.7 
UK 
2.6 
UK 
41 
GER 
2.3 
GER 
57 
CH 
1.7 
CH 
65 
U.S. 
0.85 
UK 
1.09 
CH 
1.77 
GER 
2.63 
 
Graduation tertiary level: Ratio of tertiary-type A (academic) graduates and tertiary-type B (occupational) 
graduates.  
Enrollment pattern secondary level: Percentage of young people enrolled in occupational (pre-vocational and 
vocational) programs at the upper secondary level.  
Coordination of wage bargaining: Index value 5, economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable 
agreements between the central organizations of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire 
private sector, or on b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling. Index value 4, mixed 
industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organizations negotiate non-enforceable central agreements 
(guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers associations set pattern for the entire economy. Index value 3, 
industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central organizations and 
limited freedoms for company bargaining. Index value 2, mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining, with weak 
enforceability of industry agreements. Index value 1, none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at 
company level. 
Collective bargaining coverage: ranges between 0-100%, employees covered by wage bargaining agreements 
as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as 
percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain. 
Employment protection overall: Compiled from 21 items covering three different aspects of employment 
protection: Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts, additional costs for collective dismissals, 
and regulation of temporary contracts, scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most restrictive).  
Existence of employee representation: Works councils, or provision for the information, consultation and co-
decision rights of employees in firms and establishments with 50 or more staff: Index value 2, employee 
representation at the level of enterprises, firms or establishments (above the threshold of 50 employees) is 
mandatory, based on public law, and or assured on the basis of an enforceable central or basic agreement 
between the central organizations of trade unions and employers’ associations; and coverage of eligible 
employees is 75 or more. Index value 1, employee representation at the level of enterprises, firms or 
establishments (above the threshold of 50 employees) is mandatory, based on public law, and or assured on the 
basis of a enforceable central or basic agreement between the central organizations of trade unions and 
employers’ associations; but coverage is lower than 75 percent of eligible firms. Index value 0, employee 
representation at the level of enterprises or firms is absent or voluntary, and covers only some sectors or firms 
(less than 25 percent of firms above 50 staff threshold). 
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Rights of employee representation in firms, enterprises, or establishments: Index value 3, works council or 
employee representation body has co-decision rights regarding company economic policies (mergers and 
acquisition, investments and divestments, appointments to the board, etc.; includes legal sanctions in case of 
breaching procedures for co-decision). Index value 2, works council or employee representation body has 
major consultation rights concerning social policies, including wage grading, training, job evaluation, 
procedures for recruitment and dismissal, etc. (includes legal sanctions in case of breaching procedures for 
consultation). Index value 1, works council or employee representation body has information rights concerning 
company policy in social and economic matters (with weak or absent sanctions). Index value 0, employee 
representation in firm, enterprise or establishment is absent. 
Sources: OECD (2009f), OECD (2008), ICTWSS database (2009) 
 
 
5.4.1.2 Results  
The analysis at the national level of the matched-pair engineering plants in the four countries 
shows that the average span of control differs between the four countries. While our U.S. 
companies show the narrowest average span of control with only 7.1 employees per 
supervisor in the production area, German companies have on average the broadest span of 
control with 26 employees per supervisor (Table 5-3, row one).  
 These results confirm our first hypothesis that companies in a coherently liberal market 
economy have a narrower span of control than those in a coherently coordinated market 
economy.  
 
Table 5-3: Span of control in matched-pair engineering companies in the U.S., Germany, the 
UK, and Switzerland 
country U.S. UK CH GER
average
span of control
max 13.0 23.6 29.5 53.7
min 2.9 4.1 5.5 17.6
range          
(max-min)
7.1 10.3 13.6 26.0
10.1 19.5 24.0 36.1
 
Note: Span of control is defined as number of employees per supervisor in production 
Source: own calculations 
 
In every country, we find variation in the span of control (Table 5-3, rows 2 through 4). While 
the companies in the more coherent liberal market economy show a relatively consistent 
“cluster,” in the sense that the span of control varies only within a range of around 10 
employees more or less per supervisor (range from minimum to maximum is 10.1 in the 
U.S.), companies in less coherent market economies show less consistent clusters (range from 
minimum to maximum is 19.5 in the UK and 24.0 in Switzerland). In the more coherent 
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coordinated labor market economy, we find also a broad range from minimum to maximum 
(36.1 in Germany). However, in contrast to the companies in the less coherent labor market 
economies, we find in Germany no company that has a span of control, which is close to the 
narrow spans of control of U.S. companies. Instead, we find that one German company has a 
span of control of even more than 50 employees per supervisor.  
 The medium average span of control in Switzerland and the UK derives from a 
combination of companies that have either a broad span of control that is close to German 
companies or a narrow span of control that is close to U.S. companies. This pattern is shown 
in Figure 5-1, which also illustrates that in the less coherent countries a medium range of 
control spans of around 12 to 20 does not exist. Instead, all of the companies are either in the 
upper or the lower part.    
 
Figure 5-1: Span of control in the participating companies 
!
!
!
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Therefore, our results support the second hypothesis that companies in less coherent market 
economies (Switzerland and the UK) show more variation in the span of control than 
companies in more coherent market economies (the U.S. and Germany). 
 
5.4.2 Company-level analysis 
In the following sections, we analyze institutional configurations at the company-level. To do 
so, we use the modern method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) because more and 
different institutional configurations also within a country are possible that may be associated 
with the same type of organizational structure. 
 
5.4.2.1 Methodology: Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis  
To understand the relationship between company-level institutional configurations and the 
span of control, one has to take into account the interplay of institutions themselves as 
described in the VoC. As this interplay cannot be tested using linear regression models, 
particularly not with a small sample, we use configurational comparative methods such as the 
“qualitative comparative analysis” (QCA) (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This type of analysis has 
already proven useful for testing VoC propositions and for conducting cross-country 
53.7 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Therefore, our results support the second hypothesis that companies in less coherent market 
economies (Switzerland and the UK) show more variation in the span of control than 
companies in more coherent market economies (the U.S. and Germany). 
 
53.7 
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5.4.2 Company-level analysis 
In the following sections, we analyze institutional configurations at the company-level. To do 
so, we use the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) because more and different 
institutional configurations also within a country are possible that may be associated with the 
same type of organizational structure. 
 
5.4.2.1 Methodology: Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis  
To understand the relationship between company-level institutional configurations and the 
span of control, one has to take into account the interplay of institutions themselves as 
described in the VoC. As this interplay cannot be tested using linear regression models, 
particularly not with a small sample, we use configurational comparative methods such as the 
“qualitative comparative analysis” (QCA) (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This type of analysis has 
already proven useful for testing VoC propositions and for conducting cross-country 
comparisons (e.g., Kogut & Ragin, 2006; Boyer, 2004; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & 
Paunescu, 2010; Ebbinghaus & Visser, 1999). The underlying principle of QCA is to define 
cases as combinations of attributes; thus each case is coded for having membership in a set of 
“causal conditions” (in this case, the conditions are the institutional variables).  
 As most of our institutional variables at the company level are binary (e.g., collective 
bargaining agreement at the industry level is existent or not), we use the crisp-set QCA 
(csQCA) method. To use this method, all variables are coded dichotomously with (1, 0), 
which determines whether a case is “in” or “out” of a set. This information is then 
summarized in a truth table and reduced with Boolean logic. The resulting statements indicate 
whether single or combinations of variables are necessary and sufficient, respectively. This 
approach thus allows a formal analysis of qualitative information using small data sets. 
Moreover, csQCA allows insights into whether multiple configurations (combinations of 
institutional variables) are associated with the same outcome (equifinality; Fiss, 2007) and 
allows the measurement of “coverage” (the relative importance of different paths to an 
outcome) and “consistency” (the proportion of cases consistent with the pattern). The 
following subsection describes the categorization of the variables that we use in the csQCA. 
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5.4.2.2 Coding of outcome variable and institutional variables  
Outcome variable 
To use the csQCA, we need to get binary values for our dependent variable. As no absolute 
values exist to define a broad or a narrow span of control, we cluster our data points using 
Ward’s linkage-method, which minimizes the sum of squares of any two (hypothetical) 
clusters, that can be formed at each step. Figure 5-2 shows that we find a cluster with a broad 
span of control (from 17.6 to 53.7) and a cluster with a narrow span of control (2.9 to 13). 
 
Figure 5-2: Cluster analysis of control spans  
Narrow	span	
of	control	
Broad	span	
of	control	
 
Source: own calculations 
 
To analyze the relationship between company-level institutional variables and the span of 
control, we also need to measure and code the institutional setting binary at the company 
level. 
 
Institutional variables at the company level 
Even though national-level institutional configurations exist, companies may arrange for a 
different institutional configuration at the company level, particularly in less coherent 
 s   
 trol 
   
 trol 
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economies. With our company data, we measure the functional equivalents to the national-
level institutions (Table 5-4) that were described in section 5.4.1.1.  
 
Table 5-4: Functionally equivalent institutions at the national and the company level 
Function
Variables measured at the 
national level
Variables measured at the 
company level
Skill foundation
Relative importance of 
vocational training system 
(graduation and enrollment                
data, OECD, 2009f)
High-quality vocational      
training provided by                  
the company                          
(yes=1, no=0)                        
Employment Protection      
(indexes, OECD, 2008)
Majority of supervisors          
internally recruited                
(yes=1, no=0)               
Coordination of wage                     
bargaining and coverage      
(ICTWSS database, 2009)
Covered by an external and   
wage-relevant collective 
bargaining agreement            
(yes=1, no=0)     
Trust
Existence and rights of                  
employee representation      
(ICTWSS database, 2009)
Strong employee          
representation at the                
plant level                                    
(yes=1, no=0)                        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Skill retention
 
 
(1) VET system 
A VET system lays the necessary skill foundation for autonomously working and highly 
skilled employees and thus allows a broad span of control. Although vocational training may 
be widely dispersed at the national level, companies may still choose not to train their 
employees within the VET system or, depending on the industry and the company, the 
vocational training may be of low quality. Using the interview data, we code the variable 
apprenticeship training as 1 if the company trains young workers in a formal apprenticeship 
program and 0 if it does not. While all of the German, Swiss, and UK engineering companies 
in the sample have apprenticeship training, the U.S. companies do not.  
 We code UK Apprenticeship training
78
 the same way as in Switzerland and Germany, 
although UK Apprenticeship training has been criticized for being of lower quality and not 
                                                 
78
 Since the mid-1990s, Modern Apprenticeship (MA) was introduced and reformed several times in 
the UK. Three different levels of Apprenticeship training exist: the (Foundation) Apprenticeships at 
National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) Level 2, Advanced Apprenticeship at NVQ Level 3, and 
Higher Apprenticeships equivalent to a university degree (NVQ Level 4). Engineering apprentices are 
usually at Level 3. 
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comparable to the continental variant. The quality in the UK varies depending on the sector. 
While Apprenticeship training in retailing is rather short (usually one year) and of low quality 
because of weak regulations and standards, Apprenticeship training in engineering is usually 
rather comparable to the high quality apprenticeship training found in Germany and 
Switzerland. The UK is therefore a mixed-case in itself in this dimension. Approximately 190 
apprenticeship “frameworks” (consisting of a number of qualifications and certificates) 
ensure, at least formally, that apprentices have the skills and knowledge for their training 
occupation. Sector Skills Councils determine the Apprenticeship training content and the skill 
requirements. Particularly in traditional apprenticeship sectors, such as engineering, most 
apprentices receive off-the-job training (approximately 70%, Fong & Phelps, 2008) and 
receive about 10 hours of off-the-job training per week (Ullman & Deakin, 2005; Ryan et al., 
2010b). Although official requirements in the UK may be more lax than those in Germany or 
Switzerland for content and off-the-job training, some excellent examples still exist. In our 
UK company sample, the average amount of external training in the first year was over 80% 
of the training time, meaning that the apprentices received not only theoretical but also 
practical training from the external training provider—a result comparable to those in training 
centers in Germany or Switzerland. We therefore code the UK apprenticeship cases like the 
German and Swiss cases, as 1, and the U.S. as 0, because no U.S. company in our sample has 
either apprentices or a comparable high-quality training program for new employees. 
 
(2) Employment protection and internal labor markets 
As high employment protection decreases employees’ incentive to change employers and 
increases their incentive to invest in company-specific knowledge and internal careers, 
companies in countries with high employment protection will likely be better able to retain 
skills. However, companies in countries with low employment protection may still succeed in 
building internal labor markets that provide security about reliable career options, ensure 
mutual interest in cooperative behavior and a pool of experienced supervisors.  
 We therefore measure directly the strength of the internal labor markets, i.e., the 
recruitment behavior at the supervisory level. The company data illustrates that some 
companies, even in countries with low employment protection (e.g., the U.S.), recruit the 
majority (more than 50%) of their supervisors internally (Table 5-5). 
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Table 5-5: Percent of supervisor positions filled by internal candidates 
 21 
weeks), on-the-job, and only company-specific vocational training as usually the 
case in the U.S.   
· fully out of the set of high-quality vocational training (value of 0) are companies 
that do not train at all their young workers  
 
(2) Employment protection and internal labor markets  
With our interview data, we measure directly the strength of the internal labor markets using 
the shares of internal promotion to the supervisory level. A closer look at the recruitment 
behavior at the supervisory level in all four countries illustrates that some companies, even in 
countries with low employment protection (e.g., the U.S.), recruit the majority (more than 
50%) of their supervisors internally ( Table 5). 
 
l   Percent of supervisor positions filled by internal candidates  
  
Data source: GER, CH, UK, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 14; the U.S., own fieldwork 
The question for the general recruitment strategy was: “How do you typically fill your vacancies for production 
supervisors?” 
 
To categorize companies according to their degree of employment protection, we calibrate 
companies with strong internal labor markets, thus a 100 percent share of internal promotions, 
as full membership in strong internal labor markets (value of 1). If none of the supervisors is 
recruited internally, we code this as full nonmembership in strong internal labor markets 
(value of 0). Companies with a 50 percent share of internal promotions receive the crossover 
point value of 0.5. 
 
(3) Wage coordination 
We measure directly whether a company is covered by an external, wage-relevant collective 
bargaining agreement. For the calibration of wage coordination between 0 and 1, we use three 
categories: 
· fully in the set of wage coordination (value of 1) are companies with a wage-
relevant collective bargaining agreement that was ne gotiated at the industry level  
US-1 100 UK-1 96 CH-1 25 GER-1 80
US-2 35 UK-2 90 CH-2 0 GER-2 80
US-3 99 UK-3 90 CH-3 50 GER-3 90
US-4 5 UK-4 80 CH-4 90 GER-4 80
US-5 100 UK-5 85 CH-5 60 GER-5 80
CH-6 20 GER-6 60
U.S. UK CH GER
 
  , , ,   ., ,    . .,   
 
 and technicians?” 
We coded all co panies as 1 (= strong internal labor market) if they follow an inte nal 
strategy, i.e., when the company usually recruits the majo ity (ove  50%) of its supervisors 
internally. The other companies were coded as 0 (= we k internal labor market). 
 
(3) Wage c ordi ation 
Coordinated wage setting at the industry level (or higher) reflects a high level of employer 
coordination and corporatism, thus reducing the risk of poaching and supporting the retention 
of skills within the company. However, establishing a country-level categorization based on 
collective bargaining figures has become more difficult. Even though a country such as 
Germany has high coverage by collective agreements negotiated at the industry level, this 
categorization does not necessarily apply to each industry or company. Even the existence of 
an industry-level collective agreement does not automatically include wage coordination. For 
example, in Switzerland negotiations at the industry level take place; however, the collective 
bargaining agreement in the Swiss engineering sector leaves pay to individual agreement 
between the employer and employee (ASM et al., 2006: Art. 15.2). Thus, from a company 
perspective, no formal wage coordination exists in the Swiss engineering industry. The 
between-sector heterogeneity and the importance of exploring the contractual details increase 
the necessity of analyzing the company-level institutional setting. 
 We therefore measure directly whether a company is covered by an external, wage-
relevant collective bargaining agreement. All German companies were tariff companies with a 
wage-relevant collective bargaining agreement that was negotiated at the industry level. 
Therefore, all German companies are coded as 1 (= industry wage coordination present). 
None of the U.S., UK, or Swiss companies was covered by an external and binding wage-
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relevant collective bargaining agreement, so we coded all of these companies as 0 (= no 
formal industry wage coordination).  
 
(4) Employee representation 
The existence of, and a company’s cooperation with, an employee representation increases 
trust and creates a cooperative environment ensuring that workers use their discretion in the 
interest of the company and allowing a broad span of control. We therefore measure directly 
whether an employee representation exists within the company. 
 In our sample, no U.S. company reported on having established something like an 
employee representation, a finding that is consistent with the national categorization. 
Conversely, all German manufacturing companies had a works council. In the UK, only one 
company had employee representation, and in Switzerland, five out of six companies reported 
on having one, a finding contradicting the national categorization. Under Swiss labor law, 
more precisely the “Mitwirkungsgesetz” (law on participation) of 1993, employee 
representation plays a more minor role than under German law. However, Swiss employee 
representation still has the right to be informed about company issues (Article 9) and there are 
special participation rights provided for employee protection and security, change of 
ownership, financial security measures, and mass layoffs (Article 11). As mentioned 
previously, weaker employee representation than German works councils can still contribute 
to a cooperative environment, particularly if it has certain rights regarding employee 
protection. Therefore, we code the presence of employee representation as 1, and its absence 
as 0.  
 
5.4.2.3 Results  
Table 5-6 summarizes the institutional configurations in our sample. In contrast to the 
measurements of institutional variables at the national level, company-level measurement 
allows us to identify various configurations of institutional variables also within countries.  
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Table 5-6: Company-level institutional configurations in the sample 
U.S. UK CH GER
1 1 1 1 1 6 6
2 1 1 0 1 3 1 2
3 0 1 0 0 3 3
4 1 1 0 0 4 4
5 0 0 0 0 2 2
6 1 0 0 1 3 3
7 1 0 0 0 1 1
Number of companies in 
countries
Wage 
Bargaining
Empl. Represen-
tation
Number of              
companies
Apprenticeship 
Training
Internal 
Recruitment of 
Supervisors
Configurations of 
company-level 
institutional variables
 
 
Overall, we find seven different configurations in our sample. All six German companies 
show the same configuration of institutional variables (Table 5-6, row one). We find variation 
in one variable in the U.S. (three U.S. companies have strong internal labor markets, two have 
weaker ones, Table 5-6, rows three and five) and the UK (one company has an employee 
representation, Table 5-6, row 2), and variations in two variables in Switzerland (in the 
employee representation variable and the internal labor market variable, Table 5-6, rows two, 
six, and seven).  
 Therefore, we cannot reject our third hypothesis that companies in less coherent market 
economies show more company-level institutional configurations than companies in more 
coherent market economies.  
 To analyze our fourth hypothesis that only a coherently coordinated configuration of 
institutional variables is associated with a broad span of control, we now use the QCA 
analysis. According to the truth table, two consistent institutional configurations (Table 5-7, 
rows one and two) are associated with a broad span of control.  
 
Table 5-7: Truth table company analysis—institutional configurations associated with a broad 
span of control   
1 1 1 1 1 6 1 1.0
2 1 1 0 1 3 1 1.0
3 0 1 0 0 3 0 0.0
4 1 1 0 0 4 0 0.0
5 0 0 0 0 2 0 0.0
6 1 0 0 1 3 0 0.0
7 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.0
N
Outcome              
Broad span of 
control
raw          
consistency
Apprenticeship 
Training
Internal 
Recruitment of 
Supervisors
Wage 
Bargaining
Empl. 
Represen-
tation
Configurations of 
company-level 
inst. variables
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After reduction using Boolean algebra (see Table 5-8), the results suggest that one 
institutional configuration is associated with a broad span of control: apprenticeship training, 
employee representation, and high internal recruitment of supervisors.   
 
Table 5-8: Results QCA analysis at the company level – broad span of control 
 
Notes: 
Raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by each term of the solution.  
Unique coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term (memberships that are not covered by other solution terms).  
Consistency measures the degree to which membership in each solution term is a subset of the outcome.  
Solution coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome that is explained by the complete 
solution. 
Solution consistency measures the degree to which membership in the solution (the set of solution terms) is a 
subset of membership in the outcome. 
 
The configuration of the three institutional variables represents all three functions that were 
identified in section 5.2 and suggests that the complementary existence of all three functions 
is necessary to end up with a broad span of control. Apprenticeship training ensures the 
necessary skill foundation for a broad span of control. Strong internal labor markets ensure a 
high stock of company-specific knowledge and the retention of skills within the company. 
Finally, employee representation increases trust between management and employees. Even 
when this employee representation is weak compared to, for example, German works 
councils, it appears to increase trust and employee motivation, thus reducing the need for tight 
supervision.  
 We therefore cannot reject our fourth hypothesis that only companies with a coherently 
coordinated company-level institutional configuration show a broad span of control. 
Moreover, companies in less coherently coordinated national-level institutional settings can 
end up with a broad span of control when they use the coordinated institutions that are 
available and compensate for national-level liberal institutions with company-level 
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coordinated institutions. Thus, companies in less coherent market economies can compensate 
for low employment protection and legally non-required employee representation by having 
strong internal labor markets and a company-level employee representation.  
 
To test our fifth hypothesis, we analyze the configurations of company-level institutional 
variables that are associated with a narrow span of control. Five consistent combinations are 
associated with a narrow span of control (Table 5-9, rows one to five).  
 
Table 5-9: Truth table company analysis—institutional configurations associated with a 
narrow span of control 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.0
2 1 1 0 0 4 1 1.0
3 0 1 0 0 3 1 1.0
4 1 0 0 1 3 1 1.0
5 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.0
6 1 1 0 1 3 0 0.0
7 1 1 1 1 6 0 0.0
Empl. 
Represen-
tation
N
Outcome              
Narrow span of 
control
raw          
consistency
Configurations of 
company-level 
inst. variables
Apprenticeship 
Training
Internal 
Recruitment of 
Supervisors
Wage 
Bargaining
 
 
Again, these configurations can be reduced by Boolean algebra (see Table 5-10) with the 
result that two configurations are associated with a narrow span of control: a) apprenticeship 
training, non-existent wage coordination, and weak internal labor markets and b) non-existent 
employee representation and non-existent wage coordination.  
 
Table 5-10: Results of QCA analysis at the company level – narrow span of control 
 
Notes: see Table 5-8 
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The results suggest that not all company-level institutional variables need to be liberal to end 
up with a narrow span of control. When the function of skill retention is missing, even the 
existence of apprenticeship training and, therefore, the possession of the necessary skill 
foundation is not associated with a broad span of control.  
 Regarding our fifth hypothesis, we therefore find no evidence that all company-level 
institutional variables need to have a liberal shape to be associated with a narrow span of 
control. Instead the absence of one function seems to be already enough to end up with a 
narrow span of control.  
 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper analyzes the question of how matched-pair engineering companies adapt their 
organizations to more or less favorable and more or less coherent national institutional 
settings of Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S.  
 We find that matched-pair engineering companies differ substantially in the span of 
control of production supervisors depending on the national-level institutional variables. 
Production supervisors in companies in a coherently coordinated market economy (Germany) 
have, on average, a broader span of control than production supervisors in companies 
producing in a coherently liberal market economy (the U.S.). These results are consistent with 
the VoC approach, which argues that, while U.S. companies fit the institutional setting by 
relying on hierarchies and rules, German companies fit the institutional setting by relying on 
cooperation.  
 In less coherent countries (the UK and Switzerland), companies show a broader range in 
the span of control variable than their counterparts in the more coherent countries. In 
Germany, companies build a cluster with a broad span of control; in the U.S., companies build 
a consistent cluster with a narrow span of control. In the less coherent countries, we find 
companies that have a broad and companies that have a narrow span of control. By measuring 
the functionally equivalent institutions at the company level, we are able to identify different 
institutional configurations within a country. With the QCA analysis, we link the company-
level institutional variables to the span of control. The results suggest that a broad span of 
control is only associated with a coherent set of coordinated institutional variables that fulfill 
the functions of skill foundation, skill retention, and trust, thus supporting the 
complementarity argument of the VoC. For a narrow span of control, not all institutional 
variables need to have a liberal shape.  
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 The small number of cases within each country of course, limits our study. While we 
address the problems of size with a method suitable for small numbers and rich contexts, our 
results could be driven by limited diversity. The result that wage coordination at the industry 
level is not necessary for a broad span of control seems plausible, as the wage-equalizing 
effects of tariff agreements seem, even in Germany, weaker than theory implies (also tariff 
companies can and do pay higher wages than agreed). However, the importance of non-
existent wage coordination for a narrow span of control is likely due to the limited diversity in 
our sample because this is the only variable that strictly separates the German cases from the 
cases in the other countries. 
 We also cannot provide representative evidence for all engineering companies in each 
country. For example, our company sample does not include a U.S. company with 
apprenticeship training, even though “registered apprenticeship training programs” exist in the 
U.S. engineering industry (Crosby, 2002; Glover & Bilginsoy, 2005; Bilginsoy, 2003). Future 
research should include these types of cases to analyze whether registered apprenticeship or a 
similar type of high-quality training is associated with a broad span of control in U.S. 
companies. A further limitation could be that we do not consider additional factors that could 
explain—according to economic and organizational literature—the span of control. An 
example is the complexity of tasks, which is influenced by technology. By matching 
companies by product and thus by production technology, we aimed to reduce technological 
influences.  
Nevertheless, the possibility exists that the companies we studied vary in the type of 
work organization they use. A broader span of control is associated with, among other things, 
stable and routine work and subordinates who perform similar work tasks (e.g., Woodward, 
1965; Burns & Stalker, 1961; Mintzberg, 1979). Moreover, the introduction of teamwork or 
lean production could influence organizational structure. For example, German companies 
might have fewer supervisors because they have introduced more teamwork than their foreign 
counterparts. Previous literature, however, shows that a change in work organization has only 
a limited effect on the number of supervisors. While supervisors’ tasks by themselves may 
change, the introduction of e.g., teamwork does not necessarily lead to a significant increase 
of the supervisor’s span of control—again, the level of skill foundation is of relevance here 
(Mason, 2000). Furthermore, the possibility of introducing routine work is limited in 
companies that rely on engineering-to-order. The solution for these companies would be to 
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introduce a large number of supervisors who break down job tasks for their subordinates. The 
narrow span of control in the U.S. companies supports this explanation. 
 Though various limitations exist, this paper contributes to the existing literature by 
providing, for the first time, evidence addressing the question of how companies adapt their 
organizations to different national institutional settings that have various degrees of 
favorability and coherence. Besides showing that the span of control is indeed an important 
mechanism of adaptation, we provide evidence that companies are not fully dependent on 
whether the national institutional fulfills the three functions. Instead companies have some 
strategic leeway in terms of their company-level institutional setting thus being able to 
determine the presence of the three functions. Therefore, our results have also practice-
relevant implications. Multinational companies, for example, that originate in a country with a 
strong apprenticeship tradition and wish to expand their production to countries without a 
high-quality vocational training system face a major problem in how to deal with the lack of a 
skilled workforce. Our results show that the company’s adaptation strategy could be either to 
follow the national institutional setting and to implement of a narrow span of control or to 
create a company-level institutional setting with high-quality vocational training combined 
with strong internal labor markets and trust-building institutions thus ending up with a broad 
span of control.   
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CHAPTER 6  
 
 
Final Remarks 
 
 
Given the large variation in both vocational education and training (VET) systems and labor 
market institutions across developed economies, the aim of this thesis was to analyze the 
effects of VET systems and labor market institutions on the personnel and organizational 
strategies of companies. Educational and institutional factors form the framework in which 
companies can operate. Therefore, the question arises of how companies behave in different 
combinations of these two dimensions. Previous literature has mainly focused on Germany 
and the U.S., highlighting the advantages of apprenticeship training and of general education 
and emphasizing the complementary relationship between the respective educational and 
labor market systems (e.g., Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
However, little attention has been paid to countries such as Switzerland, which 
combines both German and U.S. features. Previous analyses of Germany and the U.S. have 
been unable to differentiate the effects of VET systems and labor market institutions due to 
simultaneous changes in both dimensions. Therefore, the inclusion of “hybrid” cases, such as 
Switzerland, in this thesis provides important new insights into the personnel and 
organizational strategies of companies acting in different VET systems and labor market 
institutions. The following results are based on a dataset that we gathered by interviewing 
matched-pair engineering and retailing companies in Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, 
and the U.S.  
Our first main result is that the institutional setting influences the way of how 
engineering companies in Germany and Switzerland fill their vacancies at the level of skilled 
production employees. Although some researchers have begun to analyze the costs and 
benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany and Switzerland (Mühlemann et al., 2007; 
Schönfeld et al., 2010), little is known about the effects on personnel strategies. Because the 
length, quality, and certification of German and Swiss VET (i.e., apprenticeship training) are 
highly similar, it is surprising that personnel strategies vary substantially: While German 
companies take over almost all their apprenticeship graduates and use them to cover their 
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(long-term) personnel needs, the percentage of Swiss apprenticeship graduates taken over and 
used to fill vacancies in the training company is comparatively low. The analysis shows, first, 
that labor market institutions are responsible for comparatively lower training costs in 
Switzerland than in Germany, thus reducing the necessity of retaining all apprentices to cover 
training costs. Second, because the occupational labor market is more volatile, Swiss 
companies do not wait until their apprentices graduate; instead they fill their vacancies as they 
arise. Third, Swiss companies are able to do so as labor market institutions, such as employee 
representation and collective bargaining agreements, do not push for a high takeover rate of 
apprentices, as is the case in Germany. Finally, a low level of employment protection in 
Switzerland suits the stronger external recruitment strategy because it reduces the necessity 
for screening potential employees during apprenticeship training. In sum, we find stronger 
occupational labor markets and less long-term personnel planning in Switzerland than in 
Germany due to the different labor market institutions.  
The first results show that labor market institutions explain country-specific 
differences in recruitment strategies. Therefore, we analyze in the next step, whether 
differences in labor market institutions and VET systems can explain why companies’ shares 
of internal promotions to the supervisory level are more prominent in some economies than in 
others. Despite the valuable insights of previous literature, little empirical evidence has 
examined within- and between-country differences in internal labor market structures and 
companies’ promotion patterns.  
Our second main result is that the type of VET system and the type of labor market 
institutions has separate effects on internal labor markets, as measured by the percentage of 
internal promotions to the supervisory level. Using an analytical matrix that combines results 
from economic and institutional literature, we find, first, that companies that provide 
company-specific and non-certified VET show a higher percentage of internal promotion than 
their counterparts with occupation-specific and certified VET. Second, companies that act in 
more coordinated labor market institutions show a higher percentage of internal promotion 
than their counterparts acting in more liberal labor market institutions. Therefore, companies 
in both Japan and Switzerland constitute “complementary” cases as in these companies both 
dimensions—VET and labor market institutions—reinforce each other’s effect on internal 
labor markets. In contrast, German and U.S. companies constitute “mixed” cases, in which 
VET and labor market institutions weaken each other’s effect on internal promotions. These 
findings contrast—at least regarding internal promotion patterns—with previous literature that 
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stresses the strong complementarities of (vocational) education and training systems, and 
labor market institutions in Germany and the U.S. (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
 Given that VET systems and labor market institutions not only influence personnel 
strategies but also contribute to industry-specific competitive advantages, and given that the 
German complementary combination of both VET in the form of dual apprenticeship training 
and coordinated labor market institutions (which support internal labor markets) creates a 
competitive advantage for engineering companies, the question arises of how matched-pair 
companies adapt to national institutional settings that are less favorable and less coherent, 
such as those in Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. 
 Our third main result is that matched-pair engineering companies differ substantially in 
their span of control of production supervisors depending on the national-level institutional 
setting. Production supervisors in companies in a coherently coordinated market economy 
(Germany) have, on average, a broader span of control than production supervisors in 
companies producing in a coherently liberal market economy (the U.S.). These results are 
consistent with the argument of the VoC approach: U.S. companies fit the institutional setting 
by relying on hierarchies and rules, whereas German companies fit the institutional setting by 
relying on cooperation. In less coherent countries (the UK and Switzerland), companies show 
a broader range in the span of control variable than do their counterparts in more coherent 
countries. In Germany, companies build a cluster with a broad span of control; in the U.S., 
companies build a consistent cluster with a narrow span of control. In the less coherent 
countries, we find companies that have a broad and companies that have a narrow span of 
control. By measuring functionally equivalent institutions at the company level, we are able to 
identify different institutional configurations within countries. Using QCA analysis, we link 
the company-level institutional variables to the span of control and find that a broad span of 
control is only associated with a coherent set of coordinated company-level institutions 
(apprenticeship training, strong internal labor markets, and employee representations) that 
ensure the three functions of skill foundation, skill retention, and trust. For a narrow span of 
control, not all institutional variables must have a liberal shape.  
 In sum, our results show the effects of VET systems and labor market institutions on 
personnel and organizational strategies. Together with the qualitative information that we 
gathered during our interviews, our findings point to several policy implications.  
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We connect with the OECD’s critique of countries with strong VET systems—in 
particular apprenticeship training—that they need to increase their share of academic students 
to remain competitive (OECD, 2003; OECD, 2009f)
79
.  
We first argue that the other side of the coin of increased academic training is 
automatically a reduction in the number of young people who follow the vocational track, 
which may create substantial problems in finding suitable apprenticeship applicants, as was 
the case some UK companies we interviewed. Although our results in chapter 5 show that 
companies have the possibility to compensate for missing qualifications in their workforce 
with a narrow span of control, only apprenticeship training and, thus, skilled employees offer 
companies the choice of how to organize. 
Second, a decreasing supply of suitable apprenticeship applicants (or the pressure from 
unions) can lead to increases in apprentices’ pay and thus to increased training costs for 
companies. This cost increase, however, has a major impact on the personnel strategy. Our 
results in chapter 3 show that the consequences include stronger internal recruitment at the 
level of skilled employees. Thus, companies and individuals may risk losing the advantages 
associated with strong occupational labor markets, such as flexibility and optimal allocation 
of skilled employees.   
Finally, we interviewed engineering companies that act in environments with a high 
share of academic students and whose personnel managers told us, “It is unfortunate that we 
don’t have apprenticeship programs today because business and industry could benefit from 
an apprenticeship program.” A personnel manager in a company that had ended its 
apprenticeship program some years ago said: “It was short-sighted to close apprenticeship 
down, today it is not less expensive to train the new employees—they get full wage today.” 
Companies realize that they are lacking the people with intermediate skills that can realize the 
ideas of the university graduates and interact with them, thus creating even better ideas. 
In sum, pushing academic education in countries with strong VET systems may not be 
necessary. This thesis has shown that different but equal kinds of personnel strategies or ways 
of organizing companies exist depending on country-specific VET systems and labor market 
institutions.  
 
 
                                                 
79
 The dual apprenticeship system is also criticized as being unsustainable in the future (“Die duale 
Berufsbildung ist ein Auslaufmodell”, NZZ, September 1, 2009). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Questionnaires 
 
Maschinenbauunternehmen mit Auszubildenden GER/CH 
 
I. Eigenschaften des Unternehmens 
 
Welchen Status hat Ihr Unternehmen? 
 □ Einzelunternehmen 
 □ Unternehmen innerhalb eines Mehrbetriebunternehmens 
  Name:   _______________________ 
 □ Geschäftsbereich eines Mehrbetriebunternehmens 
 
Welche Nationalität hat die (Mutter-) Gesellschaft  _____________________________ 
 
Ist Ihr Unternehmen (oder die Muttergesellschaft) börsennotiert? 
□  Ja   □  Nein  
 
Falls ja: 
Besteht eine Mehrheitsbeteiligung?  
(z.B. Einzelperson oder Familienanteile 50%+ des Eigenkapitals) 
□  Ja, Identität_____________________ □  Nein  
 
Welche Produkte stellen Sie hauptsächlich her (und/oder welchen Service)? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Was ist Ihre Position im Produktmarkt? 
□   Größter Wettbewerber □  2./3.  □  4./5.  □  6. oder darunter 
 
Was ist wichtiger, um im Wettbewerb zu bestehen? 
□   Qualität    □  Preis   □    Beides gleich wichtig  
 
In welcher Losgröße werden Ihre Hauptprodukte üblicherweise gefertigt? 
□   Große/Mittlere    □  Kleine/Einzelfertigung  □  Beides 
 
Wie viele Beschäftigte waren in Ihrem Betrieb tätig  
(1. Januar 2005 und 1. Januar 2008)? 
   2008: _______  2005: _______ 
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Unterteilen Sie Ihre Beschäftigten in der Produktion in die verschiedenen 
Berufsgruppen  
(Nur in der Produktion und Instandhaltung): 
 (aktuell) Beschäftigte 
(1. Jan. falls möglich) 
Management/Kaderposition  
Meister und Techniker  
Facharbeiter in der  
(a) Produktion 
 
(b) Sonstige Bereiche  
    (Instandhaltung, Werkzeugraum, etc.) 
 
Angelernte (in Produktion oder in sonst.  
Bereichen) 
 
Andere (Auszubildende, Trainees, Praktikanten)  
Gesamt  
 
Wieviel Prozent Ihrer Facharbeiter sind bei Zeitarbeitsfirmen beschäftigt?  
 Zeitarbeit: Zahl oder % ________ 
 
Wie hoch ist die Fluktuation in Ihrem Unternehmen?  
(Jahr 2007, nur Kündigungen und Entlassungen, wenn möglich keine Pensionierungen 
einbeziehen) 
Gesamt:       _______%  pro Jahr 
 Facharbeiter:     _______ %  pro Jahr 
 Meister und Techniker:   _______ %  pro Jahr 
 
 
II. Qualifikationserwerb 
 
Wie besetzen Sie üblicherweise die Stellen in der Produktion für Facharbeiter und 
Abteilungsleiter/Meister/Techniker? 
Prozentsatz (%) für die beiden Positionen 
  
Qualifikationsquellen 
Vakante 
Positionen: 
Facharbeiter 
Vakante Positio- 
nen: Abt.leiter/ 
Meister/Techniker 
Extern Total   
 Einstellung Facharbeiter   
 Einstellung und Weiterbildung ange- 
lernter (weniger qualifizierter)  
Mitarbeiter 
 
 
 
 
 Einstellung von Absolventen von  
Fachschulen, FHs, Unis 
 
 
 
 
Intern Total   
 Besetzung mit eigenen Azubis, die  
gerade ihre Lehre abgeschlossen haben 
 
 
 
 
 Umsetzung erfahrener Fachkräfte   
 Weiterbildung von angelernten  
Mitarbeitern  
 
  
 
 
 Gesamt  100%  100% 
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Was sind die wichtigsten Vor- und Nachteile dieser Rekrutierungsquellen?  
 Vorteile: _________________________________________________________ 
 Nachteile: ________________________________________________________ 
 
Falls Sie Weiterbildungen anbieten, um fachlich gering qualifizierte Angestellte als 
Fachkräfte einzusetzen: 
Was beinhaltet die Weiterbildung für fachlich gering qualifizierte Angestellte?  
Woche mit Vollzeitarbeit 
 Wochen % 
Off the job - Schulung   
On the job - Schulung   
Sonst   
Gesamt  100% 
 
Wie lange dauert es, bis die volle Qualifikation erreicht ist?  ___________________    
             
Haben Sie in den letzten drei Jahren für diese Positionen Absolventen mit einem 
Bachelor Abschluss eingestellt? Falls nicht, werden Sie es in den nächsten fünf Jahren 
tun? 
Wurden schon eingestellt  □   Ja  □   Nein  
Für die nächsten 5 Jahre geplant □   Ja  □   Nein 
 
Was beinhaltet die Einführungsausbildung für junge Hochschulabsolventen, die für 
Positionen als Meister oder Techniker ausgebildet werden?  
Woche mit Vollzeitarbeit 
 Wochen % 
Off the job - Schulung   
On the job - Schulung   
Produktive Arbeit: gelernte Aufgaben   
Produktive Arbeit: ungelernte 
Aufgaben 
  
Sonst   
Gesamt  100% 
 
Wie lange dauert es, bis die volle Qualifikation erreicht ist?  ___________________                
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III. Eigenschaften der Ausbildung 
 
Die folgenden Fragen über die Lehrausbildung beziehen sich auf Facharbeiter. 
Was sind Ihre wichtigsten Ausbildungsprogramme? Wie lang ist die Ausbildungszeit? 
Wie viele Auszubildende sind in den jeweiligen Programmen? 
 
 Name/Titel/Beruf Lehrjahre  Anzahl der Azubis  
(aktueller Bestand,  
über alle Jahre und 
Ausbildungsstufen) 
1.    
2.    
Gesamt    
 
Wie viele Auszubildende haben Sie 2007/08 eingestellt und wie viele drei Jahre zuvor?  
Nur Facharbeitstätigkeiten 
2007/08  ______________________      2004/05  ______________________ 
 
Die kommenden Fragen bitte in Bezug auf Ihr Ausbildungsprogramm für Facharbeiter 
beantworten, entweder alle Programme oder das größte. Bitte kreuzen Sie an, was Sie hier 
angeben. 
 [Abdeckung:   □  Alle Facharbeiter   □  nur die größte Gruppe] 
 
Was beinhaltet Ihre Ausbildung/sind die typischen Ausbildungsbestandteile? 
Lehrprogramm für größte Berufsgruppe, Angaben entweder in Stunden oder in prozentualem 
Anteil der gesamten Stunden pro Woche 
Aktivität   Durch- 
schnitt 
Stunden (pro Woche oder 
%) 
1. 
Jahr 
2. 
Jahr 
3. 
Jahr 
4.  
Jahr 
“Off the job” 
Schulung und  
Ausbildung 
Externer Anbieter 
    a. Berufsschule 
     
     b. spezielles 
Schulungszentrum/ 
Seminare 
     
 Interne Lehrwerkstätte      
“On the job” 
Schulung  
(an der Arbeitsstätte) 
      
Produktive Arbeit:  
Facharbeitertätigkeit 
      
Produktive Arbeit:  
Angelernte 
Tätigkeiten 
      
Sonstiges       
Gesamt      100
% 
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Falls die Auszubildenden normalerweise ein zu geringes Bildungsniveau mitbringen: 
 
Stellen Sie weitergehende Ausbildungsmöglichkeiten zur Verfügung, um das 
Qualifikationsdefizit auszugleichen? 
□   Ja   □  Nein 
 
Haben Sie mehr Bewerbungen als Stellen für Ihr Ausbildungsprogramm? Konnten Sie 
alle Stellen besetzen? 
Momentane Situation oder Stand bei letzter Einstellung 
□   Unbesetzte Stellen :     ____  von _____ offenen Stellen 
□   Zu viele Bewerber:     ____  von _____ Bewerbern wurden angenommen   
 (nur hinreichend Qualifizierte) 
□   Übereinstimmung 
 
Wie alt sind Ihre Auszubildenden, wenn sie die Lehre beginnen?  
Stand bei letzter Einstellung 
15-17 ____ % 18-20   ____ % 21-24   ____ % 25+____ % 
 
Wie viele Frauen, wie viele Männer sind unter den Auszubildenden? 
momentaner Bestand  
 Männer: _____ %  Frauen: _______ %  Zusammen: 100 % 
 
Haben Sie spezielle Förderprogramme, um die Rate der Frauen (oder Männer) 
anzuheben?  
□   Ja, für Frauen    □   Ja, für Männer  □   Nein 
 
Welches Bildungsniveau sollten die Bewerber mitbringen? Welches Niveau haben sie? 
Wie verteilen sie sich auf die Niveaustufen? 
 Deutschland              Notwendig   Realität Anteil 
 Hauptschulabschluss   □   □  _____% 
 Realschulabschluss   □   □  _____% 
 Abitur     □   □  _____% 
 
 Schweiz 
Sekundarschulabschluss (C)  □   □  _____%  
Sekundarschulabschluss (A,B) □   □  _____% 
Matura     □   □  _____% 
 
Welcher Anteil an Auszubildenden bricht die Lehre vor ihrem Abschluss ab? 
(einschließlich Probezeit falls möglich) 
 ____ %  der Anfänger 
 
Von den Auszubildenden, die ihre Lehre abschliessen, wie hoch ist da die 
Übernahmequote?  
___  % der Auszubildenden erhalten ein Übernahmeangebot 
___  % der Auszubildenden akzeptieren das Angebot 
 
Welcher Anteil der Azubis, die ein Jobangebot angenommen haben kündigen innerhalb 
des ersten Jahres?  __________ %  
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Welcher Anteil von Ihren Meistern und Technikern wurde im Unternehmen als 
Lehrling ausgebildet?  ____________%  
 
Welche weitere Ausbildungsmaßnahme ist für ausgelernte Azubis notwendig, um solche 
Positionen zu erreichen? ____________________________________________________ 
 
 
IV. Ausbildung: Institutionen und Vergütung  
Wie hoch ist das durchschnittliche Gesamteinkommen für Fachkräfte und für 
Auszubildende? Falls sich der Grundlohn unterscheiden sollte, bitte ebenfalls angeben. 
 
 Gesamt- 
einkommen 
(Durchschnitt) 
Grundlohn 
(falls 
abweichend) 
Fachkräfte (a) unmittelbar nach der Ausbildung    
                  (b) Gesamt   
21-jährige angelernte Mitarbeiter   
Auszubildende 
Relevantes Kästchen ankreuzen: 
  
□ nach 
Ausbildungsjahr 
         
  □ nach Alter  □ 
keines 
  
               1        16   
               2        17   
               3        18   
               4        19   
        20   
        21
+
   
Jahr 200 _______  
Basis:  □ Stündlich  □ Wöchentlich □ Monatlich  □ Jährlich 
 
Erhalten die Auszubildenden einen Bonus? Falls ja, welcher Art? 
Leistungsbezogen? Für einen Einzelnen oder eine Gruppe? Im Tarif einbegriffen? Basierend 
auf dem Umsatz oder durch Anerkennung vom Vorgesetzten? 
□   Ja   □   Nein  
 
Erhalten Ihre Auszubildenden Sozialleistungen? 
(Freiwillige) Krankenversicherung? Rentenversicherung? Kantine? Urlaub? 
□   Ja   □   Nein   
 Die gleichen wie andere Arbeitnehmer? 
 
Wie wird die Vergütung Ihrer Auszubildenden geregelt? 
(Tarifverhandlungen, Entscheidung des Managements, Mindestlohn, ...) 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Wird das Gehalt der Facharbeiter nach anderen Kriterien und Methoden bestimmt als 
das Gehalt der Auszubildenden? 
□  Nein  □  Ja 
Falls Nein, zur nächsten Frage übergehen. 
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Erkennen Sie einen oder einige Gewerkschaftsverbände an?  
d.h. für die Aushandlung von Gesamtarbeitsverträgen, entweder durch Ihr Unternehmen oder 
durch eine Arbeitgebervertreter, der für Sie spricht. 
 □     Nein  □     Ja  Name (n): ______________________________ 
 
Haben Sie einen Betriebsrat/Personalkommission?    
□  Nein  □  Ja     
  Falls ja,: auf welchen Ebenen?  □  im Betrieb   □  im Unternehmen  
 
Beeinflusst eine der folgenden Organisationen das Gehalt und die Anzahl der 
Einstellungen bzw. Übernahmen Ihrer Auszubildenden? Falls ja, wie? 
            Falls 'ja', Einfluss beschreiben:  
Arbeitgeberverband   □   Nein   □   Ja: _____________________________ 
Gewerkschaftsverbände  □   Nein   □   Ja: _____________________________ 
Betriebsrat/Personalkommission □   Nein   □   Ja: _____________________________ 
 
Gab es in den letzten Jahren deutliche Veränderungen im Verhältnis der Gehälter der 
Auszubildenden im Vergleich zu den Gehältern der Fachkräfte? 
□  Keine Veränderungen  □  Eine oder mehrere Veränderungen 
  
         Wann? (größte Veränderung)  ________ 
         Um wie viel? ________ 
Gründe _______________________   
Probe: Wählte das Unternehmen die Veränderung? 
 
Falls eine oder mehrere Veränderungen auftraten, 
Welche Effekte hatte die Veränderung des relativen Auszubildendengehalts auf 
die folgenden Schulungs- und Einstellungsmerkmale?  
___________________________ 
 
Falls keine Veränderungen auftraten,  
Was wäre der Effekt einer erheblichen Veränderung der 
Auszubildendengehälter (z.B. ein 20%iger Anstieg oder Abfall) auf die folgenden 
Merkmale? 
Alle anderen Umwelteinflüsse bleiben gleich 
i. Effekt auf die Anzahl der neu eingestellten und übernommenen Auszubildenden:  
 Anstieg der Gehälter   _______________________________________ 
 Abfall der Gehälter   ________________________________________ 
ii. Gebrauch von anderen Ausbildungsmethoden (Weiterbildung, Neueinstellung, etc.) 
      
________________________________________________________________________ 
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V. Organisatorische Merkmale der Ausbildung 
 
Auf welcher Managementebene werden Entscheidungen über das Training von 
Auszubildenden getroffen? 
Ein Kästchen in jeder Spalte ankreuzen 
 
 Umfang    Inhalt (nur Training innerhalb des Unternehmens) 
 □   Zentrale    □   Zentrale  
□   Werksebene   □  Werksebene 
 
Haben Sie ein festgesetztes Budget für die Aus- und Weiterbildung? 
□   Ja (Höhe: ____ % der Gehaltskosten/Umsatz)  □   Nein 
 
Falls ja, 
Gibt es ein separates Budget für die Auszubildenden?   
□   Ja (Höhe:  _______ %)  □   Nein 
 
Wie wird mit den Ausbildungskosten, “Off the job” und “On the job” (Schulung an der 
Arbeitsstätte), in der Buchhaltung umgegangen? 
     „Off the job”-Ausbildung in einem separaten Ausbildungsbudget   □   Ja □  Nein 
     “On the job”-Ausbildung in einem separaten Ausbildungsbudget  □   Ja □  Nein 
Kommentar: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
Werden in Ihrem Unternehmen die Ausbildungskosten für Auszubildende geschätzt? 
□   Ja  □    Nein  □    Keine Angabe 
Falls ja, 
 Von wem wird die Schätzung durchgeführt?  ___________________ 
 Wie hoch sind die Kosten eines Auszubildenden? __________ 
  Ist die analytische Basis der Brutto- oder Nettowert der Arbeitsleistung eines 
   Auszubildenden? 
□ brutto (z.B. ohne die Beachtung der Leistung des Auszubildenden) 
□ netto (z.B. die Leistung des Auszubildenden wird von den Kosten 
     abgezogen) 
Haben die Resultate Ihr Ausbildungsprogramm beeinflusst? 
 
Erhalten Sie Finanzhilfen jeglicher Art von öffentlichen Stellen, um die 
Ausbildungskosten zu decken? 
□   Ja   □   Nein □   Keine Angaben 
 Falls ja,  
Finanzquellen: _____________________________________________ 
Höhe pro Auszubildenden:  ___________________________________  
Verknüpfte Konditionen: _____________________________________ 
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VI. Finanzielle Aspekte 
 
 Veröffentlicht Ihr Unternehmen seine Gewinne, z.B. an der Börse? 
 
 □  Ja, auf dieser Ebene (z.B. das Werk ist eine Firma) 
 □  Ja, doch nur auf einer höheren Ebene (z.B. durch die Muttergesellschaft) 
□   Nein    
□   Sonstiges (z.B. freiwillige Veröffentlichung oder Veröffentlichung zu einem Teil)
   
Falls ja,  
 Wie häufig veröffentlicht Ihr Unternehmen die Gewinne?  
  □ Jährlich  □ Halbjährlich □ Jedes Quartal 
 
Haben Sie den Eindruck, dass die Veröffentlichung der Gewinne oder der Preis 
der Unternehmensaktien die Ausbildungsbudgets oder –methoden beeinflusst 
□   Ja, sehr stark □   Ja, aber nicht sehr stark  □   Nein 
 
Nur börsennotierte Unternehmen: 
Sind Ihrem Unternehmen in den letzten Jahren an der Börse starke Veränderungen in 
der Bewertung widerfahren?  □   Nein □   Ja 
  
Gab es in den letzten Jahren einen bedeutenden Wechsel der Eigner (z.B. durch eine 
Übernahme) oder in der Finanzstruktur (z.B. Verstärkte Verschuldung)? 
□   Ja  □   Nein 
     Falls Ja,   Jahr:     ___________ 
Inhalt: 
____________________________________________________ 
 
     Falls Ja zu einer von beiden Fragen: 
Wie groß war die Auswirkung auf das Ausbildungsbudget und die –methoden. 
□   Signifikant □   keine signifikante Auswirkung 
Inhalt: ____________________________________________________ 
  
  Falls Nein zu beiden, 
Welche Entwicklungen hinsichtlich der Ausbildungsbudgets und -methoden 
erwarten Sie, falls Ihre Firma von einer Private-Equity Gesellschaft gekauft 
werden würde und mehr Fremdkapital aufnehmen würde (Leverage-Effekt)?  
‘Leverage’: Verhältnis von Fremdkapital zu Eigenkapital 
□   Maßgebliche Effekte werden erwartet 
□   Keine maßgeblichen Effekte werden erwartet 
 
Wie stark ist der Wettbewerb auf dem Produktmarkt? 
□  Stark  □  Moderat  □  Gering  □  Keiner  
 
Welchen Effekt hat der Konkurrenzdruck auf die Ausbildungsmaßnahmen? 
□ Wenig oder kein Effekt □   Starker positiver Effekt    □   Starker negativer Effekt 
 
Wer sind Ihre stärksten Konkurrenten in Ihrem und in den anderen Ländern unserer 
Studie und wie ähnlich sind deren Produkte im Vergleich zu den Ihren? 
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Einzelhandelsunternehmen mit Auszubildenden GER/CH 
 
I. Eigenschaften des Unternehmens 
 
Welchen Status hat Ihr Unternehmen? 
 □ Einzelunternehmen 
 □ Unternehmen innerhalb eines Mehrbetriebunternehmens 
  Name:   _______________________ 
 □ Geschäftsbereich eines Mehrbetriebunternehmens 
 
Welche Nationalität hat die (Mutter-) Gesellschaft  ______________________________ 
 
Ist Ihr Unternehmen oder die Muttergesellschaft) börsennotiert? 
 □  Ja   □  Nein  
 
Falls ja: 
Besteht eine Mehrheitsbeteiligung?  
(z.B. Einzelperson oder Familienanteile 50%+ des Eigenkapitals) 
□  Ja, Identität_____________________    □  Nein  
 
Welche Produkte und Dienstleistungen verkaufen Sie hauptsächlich (z.B. Kleidung, …)? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Was ist Ihre Position im Produktmarkt? 
□   Größter Wettbewerber □  2./3.  □  4./5.  □  6. Und darunter 
 
Was ist wichtiger, um im Wettbewerb zu bestehen? 
□   Qualität     □  Preis    □    Beides gleich wichtig  
 
Wie viele Beschäftigte waren in Ihrem Betrieb tätig  
(1. Januar 2005 und 1. Januar 2008)? 
   2008: _______  2005: _______ 
 
Unterteilen Sie die Beschäftigten nach Berufsgruppen (nur in Verkaufsabteilung): 
 (aktuell) Beschäftigte 
(1. Jan. falls möglich) 
Management/Geschäftsleitung/Kaderposition  
Abteilungsleiter im Verkauf  
Verkaufspersonal  
                    gelernt  
                    angelernt  
Andere (z.B. Verwaltung, Einkauf, 
Sekretärin..) 
 
Andere (Trainees, Praktikanten, Aushilfen..)  
Gesamt  
 
Wie viel Prozent Ihres Verkaufspersonals sind bei Zeitarbeitsfirmen beschäftigt?  
 Zeitarbeitsfirmen:    Zahl oder % ______ 
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Wie hoch ist die Fluktuation in Ihrem Unternehmen?  
(Jahr 2007, nur Kündigungen und Entlassungen, wenn möglich keine Pensionierungen 
einbeziehen) 
Gesamt:       _______%  pro Jahr 
 Verkaufspersonal:   _______ %  pro Jahr 
 Abteilungsleiter:    _______ %  pro Jahr 
 
 
II. Qualifikationserwerb 
 
Wie besetzen Sie üblicherweise die Stellen für Verkaufspersonal und Abteilungsleiter? 
Prozentsatz (%) für die beiden Positionen 
  
Qualifikationsquellen 
Vakante 
Positionen: 
Verkaufspersonal 
Vakante 
Positionen: 
Abteilungsleiter 
Extern Total   
 Einstellung gelernter Verkaufskräfte  
 
 
 
 Einstellung und Weiterbildung ange- 
lernter (weniger qualifizierter) 
Mitarbeiter 
 
 
 
 
 Einstellung von Absolventen von  
Fachschulen, FHs, Unis 
 
 
 
 
Intern Total   
 Besetzung mit eigenen Azubis, die  
gerade ihre Lehre abgeschlossen haben 
 
 
 
 
 Umsetzung erfahrener Fachkräfte   
 Weiterbildung von angelernten  
Mitarbeitern  
 
  
 
 
 Gesamt  100%  100% 
 
Was sind die wichtigsten Vor- und Nachteile dieser Rekrutierungsquellen?  
 Vorteile: _________________________________________________________ 
 Nachteile: ________________________________________________________ 
 
Falls Sie Weiterbildungen anbieten, um fachlich gering qualifizierte Angestellte als 
Fachkräfte einzusetzen: 
Was beinhaltet die Weiterbildung für fachlich gering qualifizierte Angestellte?  
Woche mit Vollzeitarbeit 
 Wochen % 
Off the job - Schulung   
On the job - Schulung   
Produktive Arbeit: gelernte Aufgaben   
Produktive Arbeit: ungelernte 
Aufgaben 
  
Sonst   
Gesamt  100% 
 
Wie lange dauert es, bis die volle Qualifikation erreicht ist?_________________               
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Haben Sie in den letzten drei Jahren für diese Positionen (Verkaufspersonal, 
Abteilungsleiter) Absolventen mit einem Bachelor Abschluss eingestellt? Falls nicht, 
werden Sie es in den nächsten fünf Jahren tun? 
Wurden schon eingestellt  □   Ja  □   Nein  
Für die nächsten 5 Jahre geplant □   Ja  □   Nein 
 
Was beinhaltet die Einführungsausbildung für junge Hochschulabsolventen, die für 
Positionen als Abteilungsleiter ausgebildet werden?  
Woche mit Vollzeitarbeit 
 Wochen % 
Off the job - Schulung   
On the job - Schulung   
Produktive Arbeit: gelernte Aufgaben   
Produktive Arbeit: ungelernte 
Aufgaben 
  
Sonst   
Gesamt  100% 
 
Wie lange dauert es, bis die volle Qualifikation erreicht ist? _________________               
 
 
III. Eigenschaften der Ausbildung 
 
Die folgenden Fragen über die Lehrausbildung beziehen sich auf das Verkaufspersonal. 
Was sind Ihre wichtigsten Ausbildungsprogramme? Wie lang ist die Ausbildungszeit? 
Wie viele Auszubildende sind in den jeweiligen Programmen? 
 Name/Titel/Beruf Lehrjahre  Anzahl der Azubis  
(aktueller Bestand,  
über alle Jahre und 
Ausbildungsstufen) 
1.    
2.    
Gesamt    
 
Wieviele Auszubildende haben Sie 2007/08 eingestellt und wie viele drei Jahre zuvor?  
Nur Verkaufsberufsgruppen 
2007/08  ______________________     2004/05  ______________________ 
 
 135 
 
Die kommenden Fragen bitte in Bezug auf Ihr Ausbildungsprogramm für Verkaufspersonal 
beantworten, entweder alle Programme oder das größte. Bitte kreuzen Sie an, was Sie hier 
angeben. 
 [Abdeckung:   □  Alle Verkaufsberufsgruppen □  nur die größte Gruppe] 
 
Was beinhaltet Ihre Ausbildung/sind die typischen Ausbildungsbestandteile? 
Lehrprogramm für größte Berufsgruppe, Angaben entweder in Stunden oder in prozentualem 
Anteil der gesamten Stunden pro Woche 
Aktivität   Durch- 
schnitt 
Stunden (pro Woche oder %) 
1. 
Jahr 
2. 
Jahr 
3. 
Jahr 
4. 
Jahr 
“Off the job” 
Schulung und  
Ausbildung 
Externer Anbieter 
    a. Berufsschule 
     
     b. spezielles 
Schulungszentrum/ 
Seminare 
     
“On the job” 
Schulung  
(an der Arbeitsstätte) 
      
Produktive Arbeit       
Sonstiges 
 
      
Gesamt      (100
%) 
 
Falls die Auszubildenden normalerweise ein zu geringes Bildungsniveau mitbringen: 
Stellen Sie weitergehende Ausbildungsmöglichkeiten zur Verfügung, um das 
Qualifikationsdefizit auszugleichen? 
□   Ja   □   Nein 
 
Haben Sie mehr Bewerbungen als Stellen für Ihr Ausbildungsprogramm? Konnten Sie 
alle Stellen besetzen? 
Momentane Situation oder Stand bei letzter Einstellung 
□   Unbesetzte Stellen :     ____  von _____ offenen Stellen 
□   Zu viele Bewerber:     ____  von _____ Bewerbern wurden angenommen   
 (nur hinreichend Qualifizierte) 
□   Übereinstimmung 
 
Wie alt sind Ihre Auszubildenden, wenn sie die Lehre beginnen?  
Stand bei letzter Einstellung 
15-17 ____ % 18-20   ____ % 21-24   ____ % 25+ ____ % 
 
Wie viele Frauen, wie viele Männer sind unter den Auszubildenden? 
momentaner Bestand  
 Männer: _____ %  Frauen: _______ %  Zusammen: 100 % 
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Haben Sie spezielle Förderprogramme, um die Rate der Frauen (oder Männer) 
anzuheben?  
□   Ja, für Frauen    □   Ja, für Männer  □   Nein 
 
Welches Bildungsniveau sollten die Bewerber mitbringen? Welches Niveau haben sie? 
Wie verteilen sie sich auf die Niveaustufen? 
 Deutschland              Notwendig   Realität Anteil 
 Hauptschulabschluss   □   □  _____% 
 Realschulabschluss   □   □  _____% 
 Abitur     □   □  _____% 
 
 Schweiz 
Sekundarschulabschluss (C)  □   □  _____%  
Sekundarschulabschluss (A,B) □   □  _____% 
Matura     □   □  _____% 
 
Welcher Anteil an Auszubildenden bricht die Lehre vor ihrem Abschluss ab? 
(einschließlich Probezeit falls möglich) 
 ____ %  der Anfänger 
 
Von den Auszubildenden, die ihre Ausbildung abschliessen, wie hoch ist da die 
Übernahmequote? 
   ___  % der Auszubildenden erhalten ein Übernahmeangebot 
___  % der Auszubildenden akzeptieren das Angebot 
 
Welcher Anteil der Azubis, die ein Jobangebot angenommen haben kündigen innerhalb 
des ersten Jahres?  __________ %  
 
Welcher Anteil Ihrer Abteilungsleiter wurde im Unternehmen als Lehrling ausgebildet? 
____________%  
 
Welche weitere Ausbildungsmaßnahme ist für ausgelernte Azubis notwendig, um solche 
Positionen zu erreichen?  ___________________________________________________ 
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IV. Ausbildung: Institutionen und Vergütung  
 
Wie hoch ist das durchschnittliche Gesamteinkommen für Fachkräfte und für 
Auszubildende? Falls sich der Grundlohn unterscheiden sollte, bitte ebenfalls angeben. 
 
 Gesamt- 
einkommen 
(Durchschnitt) 
Grundlohn 
(falls 
abweichend) 
Fachkräfte (a) unmittelbar nach der Ausbildung    
                  (b) Gesamt   
21-jährige angelernte Mitarbeiter   
Auszubildende 
Relevantes Kästchen ankreuzen: 
  
□ nach 
Ausbildungsjahr 
         
  □ nach Alter  □ 
keines 
  
               1        16   
               2        17   
               3        18   
               4        19   
        20   
        21
+
   
Jahr 200 _______  
Basis:  □ Stündlich  □ Wöchentlich □ Monatlich  □ Jährlich 
 
Erhalten die Auszubildenden einen Bonus? Falls ja, welcher Art? 
Leistungsbezogen? Für einen Einzelnen oder eine Gruppe? Im Tarif einbegriffen? Basierend 
auf dem Umsatz oder durch Anerkennung vom Vorgesetzten? 
 □   Ja   □   Nein  
 
Erhalten Ihre Auszubildenden Sozialleistungen? 
(Freiwillige) Krankenversicherung? Rentenversicherung? Kantine? Urlaub? 
 □   Ja   □   Nein   
 Anmerkungen: ____________________________________________________ 
    Die gleichen wie andere Arbeitnehmer? 
 
Wie wird die Vergütung Ihrer Auszubildenden geregelt? 
(Tarifverhandlungen, Entscheidung des Managements, Mindestlohn, ...) 
      ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Wird das Gehalt der Facharbeiter nach anderen Kriterien und Methoden bestimmt als 
das Gehalt der Auszubildenden? □  Nein  □  Ja 
 
Falls Nein, zur nächsten Frage übergehen. 
Erkennen Sie einen oder einige Gewerkschaftsverbände an?  
d.h. für die Aushandlung von Gesamtarbeitsverträgen, entweder durch Ihr Unternehmen oder 
durch eine Arbeitgebervertreter, der für Sie spricht. 
□     Nein  □     Ja  Name (n): ______________________________ 
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Haben Sie einen Betriebsrat/Personalkommission?    
□  Nein  □  Ja     
  Falls ja,: auf welchen Ebenen?  □  im Betrieb  □  im Unternehmen  
 
Beeinflusst eine der folgenden Organisationen das Gehalt und die Anzahl der 
Einstellungen bzw. Übernahmen Ihrer Auszubildenden? Falls ja, wie? 
            Falls 'ja', Einfluss beschreiben:  
Arbeitgeberverband   □   Nein   □   Ja: _____________________________ 
Gewerkschaftsverbände  □   Nein   □   Ja: _____________________________ 
Betriebsrat/Personalkommission □   Nein   □   Ja: _____________________________ 
 
Gab es in den letzten Jahren deutliche Veränderungen im Verhältnis der Gehälter der 
Auszubildenden im Vergleich zu den Gehältern der Fachkräfte? 
□  Keine Veränderungen  □  Eine oder mehrere Veränderungen 
  
         Wann? (größte Veränderung)  ________ 
         Um wie viel? ________ 
Gründe _________________________ Probe: Wählte das Unternehmen die 
Veränderung? 
 
Falls eine oder mehrere Veränderungen auftraten, 
Welche Effekte hatte die Veränderung des relativen Auszubildendengehalts auf 
die folgenden Schulungs- und Einstellungsmerkmale? 
__________________________ 
 
Falls keine Veränderungen auftraten,  
Was wäre der Effekt einer erheblichen Veränderung der 
Auszubildendengehälter  
(z.B. ein 20%iger Anstieg oder Abfall) auf die folgenden Merkmale? 
Alle anderen Umwelteinflüsse bleiben gleich 
i. Effekt auf die Anzahl der neu eingestellten und übernommenen Auszubildenden:  
 Anstieg der Gehälter   _______________________________________ 
 Abfall der Gehälter   ________________________________________ 
ii. Gebrauch von anderen Ausbildungsmethoden (Weiterbildung, Neueinstellung, etc.) 
      _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
V. Organisatorische Merkmale der Ausbildung 
 
Auf welcher Managementebene werden Entscheidungen über das Training von 
Auszubildenden getroffen? Ein Kästchen in jeder Spalte ankreuzen 
 Umfang     Inhalt (nur Training innerhalb des 
Unternehmens) 
 □    Zentrale     □   Zentrale  
□   Kaufhaus/Geschäft   □   Kaufhaus/Geschäft 
 
Haben Sie ein festgesetztes Budget für die Aus- und Weiterbildung? 
□   Ja (Höhe: ____ % der Gehaltskosten) □   Nein  
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Falls ja, 
Gibt es ein separates Budget für die Auszubildenden?   
□   Ja (Höhe:  _______ %) □   Nein 
 
Wie wird mit den Ausbildungskosten, “Off the job” und “On the job” (Schulung an der 
Arbeitsstätte), in der Buchhaltung umgegangen? 
     „Off the job”-Ausbildung in einem separaten Ausbildungsbudget   □  Ja □  Nein
 “On the job”-Ausbildung in einem separaten Ausbildungsbudget  □  Ja □   Nein 
Kommentar: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Werden in Ihrem Unternehmen die Ausbildungskosten für Auszubildende geschätzt? 
□   Ja  □    Nein  □    Keine Angabe 
Falls ja, 
 Von wem wird die Schätzung durchgeführt?  ___________________ 
 Wie hoch sind die Kosten eines Auszubildenden? __________ 
  Ist die analytische Basis der Brutto- oder Nettowert der Arbeitsleistung eines 
   Auszubildenden? 
□ brutto (z.B. ohne die Beachtung der Leistung des Auszubildenden) 
□ netto (z.B. die Leistung des Auszubildenden wird von den Kosten 
 abgezogen) 
Haben die Resultate Ihr Ausbildungsprogramm beeinflusst? 
 
Erhalten Sie Finanzhilfen jeglicher Art von öffentlichen Stellen, um die 
Ausbildungskosten zu decken?  □   Ja   □   Nein □   Keine 
Angaben 
 Falls ja,  
Finanzquellen: _____________________________________________ 
Höhe pro Auszubildenden:  ___________________________________ 
Verknüpfte Konditionen: _____________________________________ 
 
 
VI. Finanzielle Aspekte 
 
 Veröffentlicht Ihr Unternehmen seine Gewinne, z.B. an der Börse? 
 □  Ja, auf dieser Ebene (z.B. das Werk ist eine Firma) 
 □  Ja, doch nur auf einer höheren Ebene (z.B. durch die Muttergesellschaft) 
□   Nein  
□   Sonstiges (z.B. freiwillige Veröffentlichung oder Veröffentlichung zu einem Teil)
   
Falls ja,  
 
 Wie häufig veröffentlicht Ihr Unternehmen die Gewinne?  
  □ Jährlich  □ Halbjährlich □ Jedes Quartal 
 
Haben Sie den Eindruck, dass die Veröffentlichung der Gewinne oder der Preis 
der Unternehmensaktien die Ausbildungsbudgets oder –methoden beeinflusst 
□   Ja, sehr stark □   Ja, aber nicht sehr stark  □   Nein 
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Nur börsennotierte Unternehmen: 
Sind Ihrem Unternehmen in den letzten Jahren an der Börse starke Veränderungen in 
der Bewertung widerfahren? 
 □   Nein □   Ja 
 
Gab es in den letzten Jahren einen bedeutenden Wechsel der Eigner (z.B. durch eine 
Übernahme) oder in der Finanzstruktur (z.B. Verstärkte Verschuldung)? 
□   Ja  □   Nein 
     Falls Ja,   Jahr:     ___________ 
Inhalt: 
____________________________________________________ 
 
     Falls Ja zu einer von beiden Fragen: 
Wie groß war die Auswirkung auf das Ausbildungsbudget und die –methoden. 
□   Signifikant □   keine signifikante Auswirkung 
Inhalt: ____________________________________________________ 
 
    Falls Nein zu beiden, 
Welche Entwicklungen hinsichtlich der Ausbildungsbudgets und -methoden 
erwarten Sie, falls Ihre Firma von einer Private-Equity Gesellschaft gekauft 
werden würde und mehr Fremdkapital aufnehmen würde (Leverage-Effekt)?  
‘Leverage’: Verhältnis von Fremdkapital zu Eigenkapital 
□   Maßgebliche Effekte werden erwartet 
□   Keine maßgeblichen Effekte werden erwartet 
 
Wie stark ist der Wettbewerb auf dem Produktmarkt? 
□  Stark  □  Moderat  □  Gering  □  Keiner  
 
Welchen Effekt hat der Konkurrenzdruck auf die Ausbildungsmaßnahmen? 
□ Wenig oder kein Effekt □   Starker positiver Effekt    □   Starker negativer Effekt 
 
Wer sind Ihre stärksten Konkurrenten in Ihrem und in den anderen Ländern unserer 
Studie und wie ähnlich sind deren Produkte im Vergleich zu den Ihren? 
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Engineering with apprenticeship UK 
 
I. Attributes of the employer 
 
What is the status of your establishment?  
 □ stand-alone establishment/company 
 □ establishment within a multi-plant company 
  name:______________________ 
 □ division within a multi-plant company 
□ non-employer training provider (UK only) 
 
What is the nationality of your (parent) company?  ____________________________ 
 
Is your company (or its parent) listed on the stock market? 
□  Yes   □  No  
If Yes,   
Does your company have a controlling interest?  
e.g., an individual or family owns 50%+ of equity 
□  Yes; identity of interest:  _______________________   □  No   
 
What are your principal products (and/or services)?   _________________________ 
 
What’s your position in your main product market? (market share) 
□ First  □ second/third  □ fourth/fifth  □ sixth and below 
 
What is more important to be competitive: quality (of products and services) or price? 
□ Price □ Quality  □ None (Price and Quality have the same importance) 
 
In which batch sizes do you produce? 
 □   Large/medium    □  Single/small  □  Both  
 
How many people do you employ?  
In this establishment 
January 1
st
  2008:   _______ January 1
st
  2005:        _______ 
 
What is the breakdown of employment by occupation (in production and maintenance 
only)?  
 
  Number of employees 
 (1 Jan if possible) 
Management and professional  
Supervisors (production) and technicians  
Skilled manual (a) Production  
                         (b) Other (maintenance, tool-room, etc.)  
Less skilled (manual and non-manual)  
Other (trainees, internships, helpers...)  
Total    
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How many of your skilled manual employees work on temporary contracts or on agency 
contracts? Number (or %):  __________   
 
What is your rate of labour turnover? 
year 2007; quits and layoffs only, excluding retirements, if possible 
All employees     ________ % per year 
 Skilled manual  ________ %  per year 
 Supervisors, technicians ________ %  per year 
 
II. Sources of intermediate skills  
How do you typically fill your vacancies for  
(i) skilled manual employees and  
(ii) production supervisors and technicians? 
     % of vacancies within each category 
 
 Sources of skills  Skilled 
manual 
vacancies 
Production 
supervisor, 
technician 
vacancies 
External Total   
 Skilled recruits             
 Upgrade training of semi-skilled/ 
less skilled recruits 
  
 Other recruits  
(university) 
  
Internal Total   
 Your own continuing ex-apprentices   
 Other skilled employees 
(e.g. other trades) 
 
                      
                      
                     
 Upgrade training of semi-skilled/ 
less skilled employees  
  
      Total             100%                           100%              
 
What are the principal advantages and disadvantages of these sources of skill? 
   Advantages: ______________________________________________________________ 
   Disadvantages: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
If the company uses upgrade training of less skilled employees to fill skilled manual 
vacancies, 
 
What is the content of your upgrade training for less skilled production workers?  
Full-time equivalent weeks 
 Weeks % 
Off the job training   
On the job training   
Productive labour: skilled tasks   
Productive labour: unskilled tasks   
Other   
Total  100% 
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How long does it take until the full qualification level is reached? _________ 
 
Have you recruited Bachelor-level graduates? Might you do so in the near future? 
 Have already recruited □   Yes □   No  
 Might recruit in future □   Yes □   No  
 
What is the content of your initial training programme for young graduate recruits for 
supervisor or technician positions?  
full-time equivalent weeks 
 Weeks % 
Off the job training   
On the job training   
Productive labour: skilled tasks   
Productive labour: unskilled tasks   
Other   
Total  100% 
 
How long does it take until the full qualification level is reached? _________ 
 
III. Attributes of apprentice training 
UK only,  
 Do you participate in the Apprenticeships programme?  
□  Yes  □ No  □ Not applicable 
 
If yes, Is your company the prime contractor with the Learning and Skills Council? 
 □  Yes  □ No  □ Not applicable 
  
What are your principal apprenticeship programmes? How long is the training period? 
How many apprentices do you have in them? 
 
                Name/title/occupation   Duration  
    (years) 
Number of 
apprentices  
(current; stock, all 
years) 
1.    
2.    
All    
 
What was your apprenticeship intake in 2007? In 2004?  
All apprenticeship programmes 
2007 ______________  2004   _____________ 
 
Ask the following questions with reference to the apprenticeship programme for skilled 
manual occupations, either all programmes or one specific programme (e.g., the largest) 
only. Tick: 
 Coverage   □  All skilled manual occupations   
□  Specific occupation or programme:  ______________________ 
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What is the typical breakdown of an apprentice’s activities during training? 
Enter either actual hours or the share of total hours 
 Provider (external) Hours (actual or % total) 
  Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Off the job education and training college     
 training company 
or centre 
    
Workshop training and practice  
(away from the workstation) 
     
On the job training  
(at the workstation) 
     
Productive labour: skilled tasks      
Productive labour: less skilled 
                       and unskilled tasks 
     
Other      
Total      
 
Do you make any special provision for low (prior) achievers in your apprenticeship 
programme? 
□ Yes    □ No 
 
Do you have surplus places or surplus applications in your apprenticeship programme? 
For your current or most recent cohort of entering apprentices; tick one box 
□   Surplus places:  ____  out of _____ vacancies 
□   Surplus applicants:       ____ out of  _____ applicants (acceptable applicants only) 
□   Neither 
 
How old are your apprentices when they start their apprenticeships?  
For most recent intake 
15-17 ____ % 18-20   ____ % 21-24   ____ % 25+____ % 
 
What is the mix of males and females among your apprentices? 
Numbers or percentages; current stock (not the recent inflow) 
 Male: _____  Female: _______  
 
Do you have any special programme(s) to increase female (or male) applications for 
apprenticeship? 
□   Yes, for females    □   Yes, for males  □   No 
 
What educational entry qualifications do you require your apprentices to have? What 
do they actually have? 
               Required  Actual (typical)- Share (%) 
UK  
None      □   □  ________ % 
GCSEs     □   □  ________ % 
A Levels     □   □  ________ % 
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What share of entrants to your apprenticeship programme leave before completing? 
For a recent entry cohort; include probationary period if possible 
___________ % leave before completion  
 
Of your apprentices who complete training, what share are offered an employment 
contract? 
_________ % of completers are offered a contract 
_________ % of completers accept a contract 
 
What share of completers who accept a contract leave within one year?  
__________ % of completers accepting a contract leave within a year 
 
What qualification(s) do your apprentices normally acquire as part of their training? 
Title(s): _______________________________________________ 
   UK only, 
 Qualification title(s) Level(s) 
Work-based skills   
Technical knowledge   
Key Skills   
 
What proportion of your production supervisors and technicians has come through your 
own apprenticeship programmes?  ____________%  
 
What further training after completion is needed for apprenticeship completers to reach 
such positions?   
__________________________________________________________________ 
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IV. Apprenticeship: institutions and pay 
 
The following questions involve apprenticeship for skilled manual occupations only 
What are the total earnings of your manual employees and apprentices? If base pay 
rates are different, what are they? 
 Total earnings  
  (average p.c.) 
 Base pay rate 
  (if different) 
Skilled employees (a) immediately after training    
                               (b) all   
Semi-skilled employees of the age of 21   
Apprentices  
Tick relevant box: 
  
□  by year of training 
         
   □ by age       □ other   
               1        16   
               2        17   
               3        18   
               4        19   
        20   
        21
+
   
    Period: 200_____    
Pay period:     □  Hourly     □  Weekly     □  Monthly □  yearly 
 
Do your apprentices receive bonus pay? If so, what type of bonuses? 
Performance based pay? Individual or group? Included in table? 
□   Yes   □   No  
 
Do you pay your apprentices fringe benefits? 
□   Yes   □   No   
    Details: _____________________________________________________________ 
    Same as other employees? 
 
How is the pay of your apprentices determined? 
(collective bargaining, consultation, managerial decision, minimum wage, ...) 
      ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Is the pay of skilled manual employees determined differently from the pay of 
apprentices? 
i.e. Using different methods or criteria, or at a different time or place 
□  No   □  Yes     
 
UK only,  
Do you recognise trade unions?  
i.e., for collective bargaining of terms and conditions of employment 
 □     No □     Yes: name(s): __________________________________________
     
Do you have an employee representation? 
 □     No □     Yes: on the level of  □  company  □  plant    
 
 147 
 
What is the influence of the following institutions on the pay of your apprentices? 
Trade unions     □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None 
Works council    □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None  
 Employers’ association   □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None 
UK only,  
Learning and Skills Council    □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None 
Sector Skills Council   □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None  
     
In recent years, have there been any significant changes in the pay of your apprentices  
relative to the pay of skilled manual workers?   
Exclude pay increases that apply both apprentices and other employees 
□  No changes  □ One or more changes   
   When (largest)? ________ 
  By how much? ________ 
       Cause(s): ________________________________ 
 
If one or more changes occurred, 
What was the effect of the largest change in apprentice relative pay on your 
training and employment practices? _______________________________ 
 
If no changes occurred,  
What would be the effect on your training and employment practices of a 
substantial forced change in the pay of apprentices (e.g., a 20% fall or rise)? 
i. Number of apprentices recruited and retained: __________________________ 
ii. Use of other sources of skill (recruitment, upgrade training, ...) :  ________________ 
 
 
V. Organisational attributes of training 
 
At which level are decisions made in your company about apprentice training? 
Tick one box in each column 
  Volume      Content of training 
 □   At headquarters   □   At headquarters 
□  At plant level   □   At plant level 
 
Do you have a formal budget for employee training? How big is it? 
 □   Yes  (amount:  ___% of payroll)  □   No 
 
If Yes Is there a separate budget for apprenticeship training?   
 □   Yes  (amount: ____%  of ________) □   No 
 
How is the cost of training apprentices, off-the-job and on-the-job, handled in your 
accounts?  
     Off-the-job training in a separate training budget     □   Yes □   No  
     On-the-job training in a separate training budget  □   Yes □   No  
Comment: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Has your company estimated the cost of training apprentices? 
□   Yes   □   No  □   Not applicable 
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    If Yes,  Who performed the study?  ___________________ 
 Cost per apprentice? __________ 
  □   Gross: no deduction of the value of apprentice output  
□   Net: after deduction of the value of  apprentice output  
Did the results of the study affect your apprenticeship programme? 
 
Do you receive any direct financial contribution to the cost of training apprentices from 
outside bodies, including public funds? 
□   Yes   □   No  □   Not applicable 
 If Yes,  Source of funds: ____________________________ 
  Amount per apprentice:  _____________________ 
  UK only:  Who pays it?  _____________________________ 
 
 
VI. Financial attributes of the company 
 
Does your company publish its audited net earnings (e.g., report to the stock market?) 
 □  Yes, at this level (i.e., the plant is a company) 
 □  Yes, at higher level only (e.g., parent company level) 
□   No    
□   Other  (e.g., voluntary reporting, partial reporting)   
 
  If Yes, How frequently does your company publish its net earnings? 
  □  Annually  □ Half yearly  □ Quarterly 
 
Do you have the impression that a need to report net earnings or support the 
company’s share price affects your training budgets or practices? 
□   Yes, strongly □   Yes, but not strongly □   No 
 
Stock-market listed companies only: 
Has your company experienced in recent years any substantial change in its position in 
relation to financial markets? □   No  □   Yes 
 
Have there been any substantial changes in recent years in the identity of your owner 
 (e.g., through a takeover)? 
□   Yes   □   No 
      If Yes,  Year:   ___________  Content: _____________________________ 
      
If Yes to either 
What was the effect of the change (in financial position or ownership) on training 
budgets or practices?  □   Significant effect          □   No significant effect 
 
If No to both, 
Were your company become highly leveraged (e.g. were it to be bought by a 
private equity group), what effects would you expect on your training budgets or 
practices?  
‘Leverage’: ratio of debt to equity in company’s finance 
□   Significant effect expected 
□   No significant effect expected 
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How strong is the competition facing your company in your product market(s)?  
□   Strong  □  Moderate    □  Low  □  None  
 
What effect does that competition have on your training programmes?  
 □ Little or no effect  □   Strong effect: positive    □   Strong effect: negative 
 
Who are your principal competitors in your country and in the other countries in our 
study? How similar are their products to yours?
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Engineering employer without apprenticeship training USA  
   
I. Attributes of the employer 
 
What is the status of your establishment?  
 □ stand-alone establishment/company 
 □ establishment within a multi-plant company 
  name: ___________________________ 
 □ division within a multi-plant company 
 
What is the nationality of your (parent) company?  __________________________ 
 
Is your company (or its parent) listed on the stock market? □  Yes  □  No  
 
If Yes,   Does your company have a controlling interest?  
e.g., an individual or family owns 50%+ of equity 
□  Yes; identity of interest:  _____________________ □  No   
 
What are your principal products (and/or services)?   ________________________ 
 
What’s your position in your main product market? 
□   Largest   □  second/third    □  fourth/fifth  □  sixth and 
below 
 
What is more important to be competitive: quality (of products and services) or price? 
□   Quality  □  Price  □    None (Price and Quality have the same importance) 
 
In which batch sizes do you produce? 
 □   Large/medium    □  Single/small  □  Both  
 
How many people do you employ?  
In this establishment 
  January 1
st
  2008:   _______  January 1
st
  2005:        _______ 
 
 151 
 
What is the breakdown of employment by occupation (in production and maintenance 
only)? 
 
     Number of employees 
    ( 1 Jan if possible) 
Management and professional  
Supervisors (production) and technicians  
Skilled manual   (a) Production  
                           (b) Other  
                          (maintenance, tool-room, etc.) 
 
Less skilled (manual and non-manual)  
Trainees  
Other (internship, helpers)  
Total    
 
How many of your skilled manual employees work on temporary contracts or on agency 
contracts?  Number (or %):  __________     
 
What is your rate of labor turnover? 
year 2007; quits and layoffs only, excluding retirements, if possible 
 All employees   ________ % per year  
 Skilled manual  ________ %  per year  
 Supervisors, technicians ________ %  per year 
 
 
II. Sources of intermediate skills  
How do you typically fill your vacancies for  
(i) skilled manual employees and  
(ii) production supervisors and technicians? 
     % of vacancies within each category 
 Sources of skills  Skilled manual 
vacancies 
 
Production 
supervisor, 
technician 
vacancies 
External Total   
 Skilled recruits                                                       
 semi-skilled/less skilled recruits   
Internal Total   
 Own trainees    
 Own employees  
(e.g. from other production places  
of your company )  
               Skilled 
               Unskilled 
 
                      
                      
                     
        Total     100%                      100%              
 
What are the principal advantages and disadvantages of these sources of skill? 
   Advantages: ______________________________________________________________ 
   Disadvantages: ____________________________________________________________ 
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Do you recruit Bachelor or Master graduates for supervisor or technician positions? 
Have already recruited □   Yes □   No  
Might recruit in future □   Yes □   No  
 
 
III. Attributes of training 
What are your training programs/training strategies (if there exist different) on 
intermediate skill level?  
How long is the training period? How many trainees do you have in them? 
 
                Name/title/occupation   Duration  
    (years) 
Number of trainees 
(current; stock, all years) 
1.    
2.    
All    
 
What was your trainee intake in 2007? In 2004?  
All training programs 
2007 ______________  2004   _____________ 
 
Ask the following questions with reference to the training program for skilled manual 
occupations, either all programs or one specific program (e.g., the largest) only. Tick: 
 
 Coverage   □  All programs   □  Specific program:  ________________ 
 
What is the typical breakdown of a trainee’s activities during training? 
Enter either actual hours or the share of total hours 
 Provider (external) Hours (actual or % total) 
  Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 
Off the job education and training college     
 training company 
or centre 
    
Workshop training and practice  
(away from the workstation) 
Company-courses, own  
training facilities 
    
On the job training  
(at the workstation) 
     
Productivity compared to a fully 
skilled employee 
     
Other      
Total      
 
How many applications do you get per free positions in your training program? 
 
How many % of the applicants are potentially acceptable? 
 
How old are your trainees when they start their training?  
For most recent intake (compulsory education until 16, most common, or 17/18) 
15-17 ____ % 18-20   ____ % 21-24   ____ % 25+ ____ % 
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What educational entry qualifications do you require your trainees to have? What do 
they actually have?               Required  Actual (typical)- Share (%) 
None      □   □  ________ % 
High school diploma    □   □  ________ % 
College degree    □   □  ________ % 
Bachelor     □   □  ________ % 
 
What share of entrants to your training programme leave before completing? 
For a recent entry cohort; include probationary period if possible 
___________ % leave before completion  
 
Of your trainees who complete training, what share are offered an employment 
contract? 
_________ % of completers are offered a contract 
_________ % of completers accept a contract 
□  Have already working contract 
 
What share of completers who accept a contract leave within one year?  
__________ % of completers accepting a contract leave within a year 
 
Are externally validated qualifications acquired as part of the training? 
 
What proportion of your production supervisors and technicians have come through 
your own training programs?   ____________%  
 
What further training is needed for training completers to reach a production 
supervisors and technicians positions? (weeks/months...) 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
IV. Institutions and pay 
 
The following questions involve training for skilled manual occupations only 
[What are the total earnings of your manual employees and trainees? If base pay rates 
are different, what are they? 
     Base pay rate 
      (if different) 
Trainee 
 
 
Skilled employee immediately after training 
Skilled employee average  
Or Steps: 
 
 
 
Period: 200_____    
Pay period:     □  Hourly     □  Weekly     □  Monthly      □  Yearly   
 
Do your trainees receive bonus pay? If so, what type of bonuses? 
Performance based pay? Individual or group? Included in table? 
□   Yes   □   No  
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Do you pay your trainees/employees fringe benefits? 
□   Yes   □   No   
    Details: _____________________________________________________________ 
    Same as other employees? 
 
Do you recognize trade unions?  
i.e., for collective bargaining of terms and conditions of employment 
 □     No □     Yes: name(s): __________________________________________
     
 
 Do you have an employee representation? 
 □     No □     Yes: on the level of         □  company  □  plant    
 
How is the pay of your trainees and your regular employees determined? 
Trainees      regular employees 
□ Collective bargaining company level  □ Collective bargaining company level 
□ Collective bargaining plant level   □ Collective bargaining plant level 
□ Consultation     □ Consultation 
□ Managerial decision    □ Managerial decision 
□ Minimum Wage     □ Minimum Wage  
□ Other ____________    □ Other ____________ 
 
Do trainees usually get the same wage raises (at the same rate) as regular employees? 
 □     No □     Yes 
 
What is the influence of the following institutions on the pay of your trainees? 
Trade unions     □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None 
Works council/Empl. Repr.  □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None  
 Employers’ association   □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None 
 
In recent years, have there been any significant changes in the trainee pay relative to the 
pay of skilled manual workers?   
Exclude pay increases that apply both trainees and other employees 
□  No changes  □  One or more changes   
    When (largest)? ________ 
    By how much? ________ 
       Cause(s): e.g. change of minimum wage, or excess of  
       supply, etc. ________________________________ 
 
If one or more changes occurred, 
What was the effect of the largest change in trainee relative pay on your training 
and employment practices?  
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 155 
 
If no changes occurred,  
What would be the effect on your training and employment practices of a substantial 
forced change in the pay of trainees (e.g., a 20% fall or rise)? 
i. Number of trainees recruited and retained: __________________________ 
ii. Use of other sources of skill (recruitment, upgrade training, ...):  ___________ 
 
 
V. Organizational attributes of training 
 
At which level are decisions made in your company about training? 
Tick one box in each column  
  Number of trainees    Content of training 
 □   At headquarters   □   At headquarters 
□   At plant level   □   At plant level 
 
Do you have a formal budget for employee training? How big is it? 
 □   Yes  (amount:  ___% of payroll)  □   No 
 
If Yes 
Is there a separate budget for the training programs?   
 □   Yes  (amount: ____%  of ________) □   No 
 
How is the cost of trainee programs, off-the-job and on-the-job, handled in your 
accounts?  
     Off-the-job training in a separate training budget     □   Yes □   No 
 On-the-job training in a separate training budget  □   Yes □   No  
Comment: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Has your company ever estimated in detail the cost of your trainee programs? 
□   Yes   □   No  □   Not applicable 
    If Yes,  Who performed the study?  ___________________ 
 Cost per trainee? __________ 
□   Gross: Trainee productivity not taken into account 
□   Net: Trainee productivity taken into account 
Did the results of the study affect your trainee program? 
□   Yes _____________  □   No   
 
Do you receive any direct financial contribution to the cost of your trainee programs 
from outside bodies, including public funds? 
□   Yes   □   No  □   Not applicable 
 If Yes,  Source of funds: ____________________________ 
  Amount per trainee:  _____________________ 
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VI. Financial attributes of the company 
 
Does your company publish its audited net earnings (e.g., report to the stock market?) 
 □  Yes, at this level (i.e., the plant is a company) 
 □  Yes, at higher level only (e.g., parent company level) 
□   No   
□   Other  (e.g., voluntary reporting, partial reporting)   
 
If Yes, How frequently does your company publish its net earnings? 
 □  Annually  □ Half yearly  □ Quarterly 
 
Do you have the impression that a need to report net earnings or support the 
company’s share price affects your training budgets or practices? (pressure for 
short-term performance?) 
□   Yes, strongly □   Yes, but not strongly □   No 
 
Stock-market listed companies only: 
Has your company experienced in recent years any substantial change in its position in 
relation to financial markets? Any cost cutting program to raise profitability? 
□   No  □   Yes 
 
Have there been any substantial changes in recent years in the identity of your owner 
 (e.g., through a takeover)? 
□   Yes   □   No 
      If Yes,  Year:   ___________  Content: _____________________________ 
If Yes to either 
 
What was the effect of the change (in financial position or ownership) on training 
budgets or practices?  
□   Significant effect (Number, methods)         □   No significant effect  
 
If No to both, 
Were your company become highly leveraged (e.g. were it to be bought by a 
private equity group), what effects would you expect on your training budgets or 
practices?  
‘Leverage’: ratio of debt to equity in company’s finance 
□   Significant effect expected 
□   No significant effect expected 
 
How strong is the competition facing your company in your product market(s)?  
□   Strong   □  Moderate    □  Low  □  None  
 
What effect does that degree of competition have on your training programs?  
 □ Little or no effect  □   Strong effect: positive    □   Strong effect: negative 
 
Who are your principal competitors in your country and in the other countries in our 
study? How similar are their products to yours? 
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Retailing employer without apprenticeship USA/UK    
 
I. Attributes of the organisation 
 
What is the status of your organisation?  
 □ stand-alone establishment or store/company 
 □ establishment or store within a multi-plant company 
  name: ________________________ 
 □ division within a multi-plant company 
□ non-employer training provider (UK only) 
 
What is the nationality of your (parent) company?  ____________________________ 
 
Is your company (or its parent) listed on the stock market?  
 □  Yes  □  No  
If Yes, 
Does your company have a controlling interest?  
e.g., an individual or family owns 50%+ of equity 
 □  Yes; identity of interest:  ___________________   □  No   
 
What are your principal products and services?   __________________________ 
 
What’s your position in your main product market? (market share) 
□ First  □ second/third   □ fourth/fifth  □ sixth and below 
 
What is more important to be competitive: quality (of products and services) or price? 
□ Price □ Quality  □ None (Price and Quality have the same importance) 
 
 How many people do you employ?  
In this establishment or store  January 1
st
  2008:  ___    January 1
st
  2005:  _______ 
 
What is the breakdown of employment by occupation (sales functions only)? 
 Employment 
Management and professional  
Supervisors and department managers  
Sales staff   
Less skilled sales staff  
Trainees  
Other  
Total    
 
How many of your sales staff work on temporary/agency contracts?  
Temps (number or %):  __________      
 
What is your rate of labour turnover?  
year 2007; quits and layoffs only, excluding retirements, if possible 
All employees     ________ % per year 
 Sales staff   ________ % per year 
 Supervisors, dept managers ________ % per year 
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II. Sources of intermediate skills  
How do you typically fill your vacancies for  
(i) sales staff and  
(ii) supervisors and department managers? 
     % of vacancies within each category 
 
 Sources of skills  Sales staff 
vacancies 
 
Supervisor and 
department 
managers 
External Total   
 Skilled recruits (experienced)   
 semi-skilled/less skilled recruits   
Internal Total   
 Own trainees    
 Own employees  
(e.g. from other production places  
of your company )  
               Skilled 
               Unskilled 
  
 
 
 
 
     Total   100% 100% 
 
What are the principal advantages and disadvantages of these sources of skill? 
   Advantages: ______________________________________________________________ 
   Disadvantages: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you recruit Bachelor or Master graduates for supervisor or department management 
positions? 
Have already recruited □   Yes □   No  
Might recruit in future □   Yes □   No  
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III. Attributes of training for sales staff  
What are your principal training programmes for sales staff? How long is the training 
period? How many trainees do you have in them? 
 
                Name/title/occupation   Duration  
    (weeks) 
Number of trainees  
(current; stock) 
1.    
2.    
All    
 
What was your intake into training in 2007? In 2004?  
All basic training for sales staff 
 2007 ______________ 2004  _____________ 
 
Coverage   □  All programmes   □  Specific programme:  ________________ 
 
What is the typical breakdown of a trainee’s activities during training? 
Enter either actual hours or the share of total hours 
 Provider (external) Hours  
 
How many hours until fully 
trained? 
How long is the training period? 
  
Off the job education and training specialist training company 
               or training centre  
 
Workshop training and practice  
(away from the workstation, PC- 
based training) 
  
How many days of shadow- 
Working? (on the job) 
  
Rest of training under supervision?   
Other   
Total   
 
How many applications do you get per free positions in your training program? 
 
How many % of the applicants are potentially acceptable? 
 
How old are your trainees/new employees when they start their training?  
For most recent intake (compulsory education until 16, most common, or 17/18) 
15-17 ___ %  18-20   ____ % 21-24   ____ % 25+____ % 
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What educational qualifications do you require your trainees to have? What do they 
actually have?             Required  Actual (typical)- Share (%) 
UK 
None      □   □  ________ % 
GCSEs     □   □  ________ % 
A Levels     □   □  ________ % 
 
USA 
None      □   □  ________ % 
High school diploma    □   □  ________ % 
College degree    □   □  ________ % 
Bachelor     □   □  ________ % 
 
What share of entrants to your initial training program typically leave before 
completing? 
For a recent entry cohort; include any probationary period if possible 
___________ % of entrants leave before completion  
 
Of your trainees who complete training, what share are offered an employment 
contract? 
_________ % of completers are offered a contract 
_________ % of completers accept a contract 
□  Have already working contract 
 
What share of trainees/employees who complete initial training leave within one year? 
__________ % of completers leave within a year of completion 
 
Are externally validated qualifications acquired as part of the training?  
 
What proportion of your supervisors and department managers have come through 
your own training programs? (went through your initial training?) ____________% 
 
How and when do you identify future supervisors/department managers, to they get 
training before they get the supervisor position or afterwards? 
____________________________ 
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IV. Training: institutions and pay 
What on average is the total pay of initial trainees and experienced sales staff?  
If base pay rates differ from earnings, what are they? 
Total pay (i.e., earnings): all cash payments, including extra months and performance 
bonuses; average per employee in category 
Base pay rate: as specified by a collective agreement, where applicable 
     Base pay rate 
      (if different) 
Trainee 
 
 
Skilled employee immediately after training 
Skilled employee average  
Or Steps: 
 
 
 
 
 
    Period: 200_____    
Pay period:     □  Hourly     □  Weekly     □  Monthly □  Yearly    
 
Do your trainees receive bonus pay? If so, what type of bonuses? 
Performance based pay? Individual or group? Included in table? 
□   Yes   □   No  
 
Do you pay your trainees/employees fringe benefits? 
□   Yes   □   No   
    Details: _____________________________________________________________ 
    Same as other employees? 
 
Do you recognise trade unions?  
i.e., for the collective bargaining of terms and conditions of employment 
 □     No □     Yes; name (s): __________________________________________
    
 
Do you have an employee representation? 
 □     No □     Yes: on the level of   □  company  □  plant    
 
How is the pay of your trainees and your regular employees determined? 
Trainees      regular employees 
□ Collective bargaining company level  □ Collective bargaining company level 
□ Collective bargaining plant level   □ Collective bargaining plant level 
□ Consultation     □ Consultation 
□ Managerial decision    □ Managerial decision 
□ Minimum Wage     □ Minimum Wage  
□ Other ____________    □ Other ____________ 
 
Do trainees usually get the same wage raises (at the same rate) as regular employees? 
□     No □     Yes 
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What is the influence of the following institutions on the pay of your trainees? 
Trade unions     □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None 
Works council/Empl. Repr.  □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None  
 Employers’ association   □  Strong □   Some influence  □   None 
 
In recent years, have there been any significant changes in the trainee pay relative to the 
pay of skilled manual workers?   
Exclude pay increases that apply both trainees and other employees 
□  No changes  □  One or more changes   
    When (largest)? ________ 
    By how much? ________ 
       Cause(s): e.g. change of minimum wage, or excess of  
       supply, etc. ________________________________ 
 
If one or more changes occurred, 
What was the effect of the largest change in trainee relative pay on your training 
and employment practices?   
____________________________________________________ 
 
If no changes occurred,  
What would be the effect on your training and employment practices of a substantial 
forced change in the pay of trainees (e.g., a 20% fall or rise)? 
i.  Number of trainees recruited and retained: __________________________ 
ii. Use of other sources of skill (recruitment, upgrade training, ...) :  ________________ 
 
 
V. Organisational attributes of training 
 
At which level are decisions made in your company about sales staff training? 
Tick one box in each column 
  Volume    Content (in-company training only) 
 □   At headquarters   □   At headquarters 
□   At plant level   □   At plant level 
 
Do you have a formal budget for employee training? How big is it? 
 □   Yes  (amount:  ___% of payroll)  □   No 
If Yes 
Is there a separate budget for the training programs?   
 □   Yes  (amount: ____%  of ________) □   No 
 
How is the cost of trainee programs, off-the-job and on-the-job, handled in your 
accounts?  
     Off-the-job training in a separate training budget     □   Yes □   No 
 On-the-job training in a separate training budget  □   Yes □   No  
Comment: ____________________________________________________________ 
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Has your company ever estimated in detail the cost of your trainee programs? 
□   Yes   □   No  □   Not applicable 
    If Yes,  Who performed the study?  ___________________ 
 Cost per trainee? __________ 
□   Gross: Trainee productivity not taken into account 
□   Net: Trainee productivity taken into account 
Did the results of the study affect your trainee programme? 
□   Yes _____________  □   No   
 
Do you receive any direct financial contribution to the cost of your trainee programs 
from outside bodies, including public funds? 
□   Yes   □   No  □   Not applicable 
 If Yes,  Source of funds: ____________________________ 
  Amount per trainee:  _____________________ 
 
 
VI. Financial attributes of the company 
 
Does your company publish its audited net earnings (e.g., report to the stock market?) 
 □  Yes, at this level (i.e., the plant is a company) 
 □  Yes, at higher level only (e.g., parent company level) 
□   No    
□   Other  (e.g., voluntary reporting, partial reporting)   
 
  If Yes, How frequently does your company publish its net earnings? 
  □  Annually  □ Half yearly  □ Quarterly 
 
 Do you have the impression that a need to report net earnings or support the 
 company’s share price affects your training budgets or practices? 
□   Yes, strongly □   Yes, but not strongly □   No 
 
Stock-market listed companies only: 
Has your company experienced in recent years any substantial change in its position in 
financial markets, high volatility of share price? Any cost cutting programs to raise 
profitability? 
□   No  □   Yes 
 
Have there been any substantial changes in recent years in the identity of your owner 
 (e.g., through a takeover)? 
□   Yes   □   No 
      If Yes,  Year:   ___________  Content: _____________________________ 
 
If Yes to either 
What was the effect of the change (in financial position or ownership) on training 
budgets or practices?  
 □   Significant effect          □   No significant effect 
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If No to both, 
Were your company become highly leveraged (e.g. were it to be bought by a 
private equity group), what effects would you expect on your training budgets or 
practices?  
‘Leverage’: ratio of debt to equity in company’s finance 
□   Significant effect expected □   No significant effect expected 
 
How strong is the competition facing your company in its product market(s)?  
□  Strong  □  Moderate    □  Low  □  None  
 
What effect does that competition have on your training programmes?  
□  Little or no effect  □   Strong effect: positive    □   Strong effect: negative 
 
Who are your principal competitors in your country and in the other countries in our 
study? How similar are their products to yours? 
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